By Delwar Majumder

All that being part of history now, one wonders how it all happened, who did it, and why?

While that is precisely the undertaking of the investigators who will unearth the real intent of the carnage and identify the culprits, the incident demonstrates a serious lapse in military intelligence. The following facts, gathered from over a dozen of reliable sources, further corroborate that fact.

One: Investigators have learnt that a team of 25 trained foreign commandos entered Bangladesh illegally from India through various bordering areas on or within January 11, 2009. They were received and sheltered in Dhaka by individuals working under cover as diplomats.

Two: At the same time, a small group of 10-12 BDR members, including two Deputy Assistant Directors (DADs), were recruited as the internal moles and coordinators to provide precise information to the foreign team via three senior political leaders of the country until the hours of the carnage.

Three: The occasion for the operation was chosen carefully to ensure availability of all senior BDR officers who had gathered in Pilkhana for the annual BDR day celebration. Over 3,000 extra troops also came to Pilkhana for various administrative duties as well as to launch a tattoo show for which the BDR has been historically famous.

Four: The mutiny was slated for February 24, while the PM was in Pilkhana to take salute in the BDR day parade. In consideration of likely collateral harm to the political personalities and other dignitaries who accompanied the PM, the date was changed. However, final coordination and reconnaissance were done that day by some guests who attended the parade, masquerading as VIPs.

Five: Upon conclusion of final reconnaissance, at about 10.30 PM, on February 24, a segment of the foreign killing squad and over 25 BDR soldiers - plus three young - leading politicians of the country - met in a briefing in one of suburban Dhaka residences. The precise timing of the operation and the responsibilities of each small group were decided in that meeting.

Six: As per plan, one of the DADs ensured that members of the BDR cell would be posted on duty on gate number 4 that morning when the DG would sit for the slated Darbar in the Darbar hall.

Seven: On February 25, the D-day, the foreign commando team entered the Pilkhana compound through gate number 4, at 8.10 AM, using a BDR vehicle (Bedford) which the designated DAD had arranged to send for them about an hour ago. Dressed in sports gear (long camouflage trouser, vest, and PT shoe) - in order to be able to quickly change into civil clothes while fleeing after the massacre - the killers entered the Pilkhana compound undetected.

Eight: The BDR vehicle that carried the killers was followed by an ash-colour pick up van which carried initially used arms and ammunition from outside. In order to begin the massacre, one of the Bengali speaking commandos, armed, was ordered to enter the Darbar hall without permission to engage the DG into a provoking altercation.

Nine: Once the DG was shot, other officers, all unarmed, tried to obstruct the lone killer. Within seconds, the action group of the killer team entered the Darbar hall and started killing other officers while the cover up group cordoned the area.

Ten: In the following hours, part B of the mission began by inducting other troops into the team under gun point and the armoury - as well as the intelligence equipments - was looted. The foreign killers and their local henchmen used BDR soldiers on gunpoint to show the locations of other officers, their families, and the offices where vital national security documents remained preserved. Highly classified border security maps, troop deployment plan and initial action plan, etc. were taken away by the foreign commandos.

Eleven: Eyewitnesses say, two of the last foreign commandos - one male and one female - left the BDR compound in the afternoon on February 26, following the surrendering of arms by BDR members who knew nothing about the mutiny even a minute before. These two are presumed to be the leaders of the foreign commando team.

None of the above could have been materialized if the two main national intelligence outfits of the country (DGFI and NSI) have had prior clues about what was being conspired to destroy the armed forces of the country. The foreign commandos took control of BDR's own intelligence outfit, RSU, at the initial stage and used RSU equipments to communicate among themselves during the mutiny. The commanding officer of RSU too was assassinated during the carnage.

That aside, there were other intelligence lapses during the mutiny. In the more than 30 hours while the mutiny prolonged, neither the NSI, nor the DGFI, had any clue about who were being shot at and what exactly went on inside. They also ignored SMS messages from fellow officers, on ground that there was no order from the government to do anything.

In reality, these two agencies were too busy, as they often are, in ensuring security to the VVIPs and VIPs; not the country and its vital institutions that they are oath-bound and mandated to serve and protect.

¶ 3/07/2009 11:33:00 AM 2 Comments Links to this post

It is now widely believed that the barbarous mutiny at BDR HQ (Pilkhana) in Dhaka was perpetrated in revenge for the death of 19 BSF jawans killed (after they intruded on to Bangladesh territory) in the counter-attack by the BDR at Padua of Sylhet and Boraibari of Roumary on April 18, 2001. The BDR was then headed by Maj. Gen. ALM Fazlur Rahman who has since maintained that the three BDR soldiers killed in that encounter should be decorated with National Sword as Birsreshtho and should be commemorated in exactly the same way as the martyrs of 1971. This has regrettably not been done by any of the governments since the incursion by the BSF into Bangladesh in 2001 and it was surprisingly not one of the demands of the rebellious BDR soldiers in the Pilkhana mutiny of 2009. While the mutineers were able to recall many injustices committed against them over the several decades since independence this single most glaring example just managed to escape their over-wrought attention.

Revenge for Padua and Boraibari was the principal justification for the planning and execution of the mutiny but another important objective was to have Bangladesh accept a Peace Mission from India to protect the Kolkata-Dhaka Friendship train service as explained in some news reports. The real purpose for this Peace Mission would be to act as an occupying force and spark further trouble and enmity between the army and the BDR that was likely to ensue after the savage murders at Pilkhana. This would have held out the double benefit and advantage to India of furthering their agenda for securing a transit facility across the country and at the same time cripple the defence and security services of Bangladesh. This would merely be the fulfillment of what had been planned after the 1971 war with Bangladesh having no standing army and the defence needs of the country being organized under Indian army tutelage and control as spelled out in the 7 point agreement signed by the Mujib Nagar government which had only been partly implemented after liberation. The internal law and order situation would according to this agreement be handled by a paramilitary force trained and equipped by India’s external intelligence agency RAW. The first part of this plan was thwarted when the Indian army was forced to leave (which would probably be the same fate of this proposed Peace Mission but with more violent and disturbing consequences for India) after resentment began to grow amongst freedom fighters and the ordinary people of Bangladesh against their prolonged presence which was seen to be tantamount to being an occupying force. The second part of the 1971 plan was suddenly disrupted after the August 15, 1975 coup when the paramilitary force called the Rakkhi Bahini was disbanded soon thereafter. The Rakkhi Bahini earned the reputation of being an undisciplined, brutal and violently vindictive force under the direct control of Sheikh Fazlul Haque Moni and later Tofail Ahmed. It has now been recommended that after the mutiny at Pilkhana the BDR force should similarly be disbanded and like the Rakkhi Bahini have its members assigned to other security forces of the country. In its place a new paramilitary organization would be established and given the name - as one senior army officer has proposed - the Bangladesh Border Force or BBF. This would be the appropriate outcome for the BDR which has by its despicable and heinous acts condemned itself to utter oblivion.

A further comparison may now be made with the situation prevailing immediately after 1971 relating to the suspicious role played by the Awami League leadership. The conduct of the AL government during the recent mutiny is increasingly coming under close and intense scrutiny especially in its failure to act in a timely fashion to counter the revolt by sending in the army directly into Pilkhana compound on the very first day of the uprising. To stall such a move the AL administration sent Sahara Khatun, Jahangir Kabir Nanak and Mirza Azam to negotiate terms with the mutineers. None of these individuals have any experience or expertise in conducting such negotiations and they carry little weight or influence within the country or party but were nevertheless chosen. There were, however, several senior leaders in the party who were far better qualified to undertake this task but were simply not asked by the Prime Minister. It is a surprise and a miracle that after the number of civilians that were killed or injured outside the gates of Pilkhana these ‘negotiators’ (Sahara Khatun, Jahangir Kabir Nanak and Mirza Azam) managed to successfully dodge the bullets and were not automatically set upon by the rebels on their entry into the compound. Another aspect of the AL handling of the crisis that has raised objections relates to their deliberate policy of dividing the country on purely partisan lines on the issue of the rebellion. In a time of national emergency it would be expected that the government would attempt to unite the country by calling for all-party involvement in the decision making process. Instead the AL (on the basis of accusations made in the Indian press and media) started pointing fingers at the opposition parties for complicity in the mutiny. The view has been expressed in some quarters that this self-defeating approach to the revolt was deliberate so that the army would be undermined in revenge for their role in the 1/11 takeover and also in their pursuance of corrupt politicians in the AL and their ultimate trial and prosecution during the tenure of the two year caretaker government. This is entirely consistent with the AL’s inherent distrust of the armed forces –originally encouraged and inspired by India – which also existed during the government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and became greatly intensified after the coup’s of 1975 which saw the AL pushed into the political wilderness for the next two decades. Against this inclination of the AL the people of Bangladesh will expect this government to declare the victims of the mutiny as martyrs to be honoured in the same way as the freedom fighters who lost their lives in the 1971 war but which still has not been done for the BDR soldiers who died in Padua and Boraibari while protecting the territory and borders of the country against Indian intrusion and aggression.

¶ 3/02/2009 07:31:00 AM 0 Comments Links to this post