Shamsul Huq Zahid

Yet again some trigger-happy members of the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) entered a border village in Panchagar in the north of Bangladesh last Sunday night, opened fire indiscriminately on the villagers, killing three people, including a young woman and her baby boy and injuring 15 more. The BSF action on the innocent villagers was unprovoked.

According to an eyewitness account, one of the intruding BSF members, allegedly, shot and killed the young woman and her boy after failing to violate her. The villagers, however, managed to capture the said BSF personnel and handed him over to the BDR after giving a good thrashing.

At a flag meeting between the local sector commanders of BSF and the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) held next day, the Indian side regretted the incident and sought forgiveness.

The violation of the borderline between the two countries and killing of innocent Bangladesh villagers by the BSF members have become rather routine events in recent years. According to an unofficial estimate, nearly 800 Bangladeshis have been shot and killed by the BSF during last eight years.

It appears that the BSF is becomingly increasingly intolerant to Bangladesh and under the slightest of pretext its members target Bangladesh citizens living along the border areas.

The height of their animosity towards Bangladesh and its people was highlighted through the last Sunday's incident. India has erected barbed wire fences along most part of its border with Bangladesh. The BSF men made their way through the fence along borderline in Panchagar and launched attack on the villagers.

It is hard to believe that the central administration in New Delhi has ever ordered the BSF men to commit such criminal acts. But, it, apparently, has neither advised them to exercise restraint even after the recurrence of similar incidents frequently.

Through every incident of BSF intrusion and killing of Bangladesh citizens the strength of Bangladesh government is put to taste. Is the failure to respond to such violation of the country's sovereignty on the part of the government from time to time has emboldened the BSF and made the New Delhi indifferent?

There is no denying that the administration in Dhaka acted rather meekly in the face of BSF unwarranted actions. The Sunday's incident is a glaring example. Surprisingly, the foreign office did say or act nothing throughout Monday on the incident. It should have summoned the Indian high commissioner in Bangladesh and demanded of him an explanation. Is an apology from a petty BSF official for such a heinous crime and attack on the country's sovereignty enough?

The priority task of a government, elected or otherwise, of any country is to protect the country and its citizens from the onslaught of external forces. There is no way of shirking this responsibility.

The Indian government, on a number of occasions in the past, had summoned the Bangladesh envoy in New Delhi and made known its annoyance over some border incidents in which there were some casualties on the Indian side.

The issue relating to the recurrence of untoward incidents along Bangladesh-India border came up for discussion at many top-level meetings between the BDR and the BSF and other high officials of the two countries. There were plenty of assurances that steps would be taken to stop recurrence of the same. But there has been no let up in the incidents marked by high-handedness on the part of the BSF men.

Who does not know India is a regional military and an emerging global economic superpower? But is it necessary for the border security forces to demonstrate the mightiness of their country before the small neighbours including Bangladesh? Does the Indian government approve of the belligerent attitude often displayed by a section of BSF men?

Despite intermittent efforts from both India and Bangladesh to improve the no-so-happy relations between them, neither of the close neighbours until now is satisfied. There exist mistrust and irritants, including sharing of waters of the common rivers and huge trade deficit, waiting to be resolved through sincere efforts from both sides.

There is no denying that, rightly or wrongly, there exists a sort of India-phobia among a section of people in Bangladesh. Honestly speaking, some actions or inactions on the part of India have lent credence and helped further spread of that phobia. The border incidents that have claimed so far hundreds of lives of innocent Bangladesh citizens are among those.

The water-sharing issue does no more attract much attention since the act of causing damage to the Bangladesh environment through the construction of the Farakka Barrage is complete by now. It cannot be reversed anyway. The trade in the globalised world is an issue of competition. Blaming a country for not importing enough from a particular country does not make sense. But the border incidents that claim innocent lives whip up popular sentiment. The giant neighbour can go a long way in improving the bilateral relations just by stopping the recurrence of border incidents.

¶ 11/19/2008 07:54:00 AM 0 Comments Links to this post

Nehru not only is the architect Kashmir problem, but also is the architect of Indian hegemony. It is also because of his friendship (collaboration) with Mountbatten that the whole of Punjab was not included in Pakistan, and the whole of the then Assam and the whole of the then Bengal did not constitute East Pakistan. None of the past Indian governments since 1947 believed in Pakistan or Bangladesh, nor does the present Indian government.

Clinton had his term as President, but he did not solve the problems of Kashmir, Palestine, etc. Apart from gimmicks, Obama-Clinton are not likely to do anything substantial about these problems. They even had to quietly digest the 'rejection' (actually rebuff) of their proposal of discussion on Kashmir, from their ally India! Please see in the following article by Jagmohon the following reference:

'On May 3, 1953, Adlai Stevenson came to Srinagar and had a long meeting with Sheikh Abdullah. The New York Times, on July 5, published a map hinting at independent status for the Valley. On July 10, speaking at Mujahid Manzil, Abdullah said, "A time will, therefore, come when I will bid goodbye to India".'

But the US, in pursuance of their policy of 'divide and rule', have not done anything to solve the crisis, on which three wars have been fought between two countries. These wars were instigated, aided and abetted by the imperialists for their own interest, not only of selling arms, but also of dominating and plundering other countries.

The Kashmiris, the Palestinians and their supporters (like us) must carry on with their struggles and also continue with diplomatic offensives as much as possible, keeping in mind the limitations of diplomacy. [Zoglul Hossain]

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:. Jagmohan's Six Point Formula for Kashmir-I

Jag Mohan (BJP member) is a former governor (twice between 1984-89) of Jammu and Kashmir in India. He is also a former member of Lok Sabha. He is a former minister in central BJP government. He is a recipient of Padma Shri in 1971 and Padma Bhushan in 1977. His six points are at the end of Part-III. Please note his point three (where he says,'it should be made clear to all concerned that India has never accepted the two-nation theory') and point six (where he says, 'the "spirit of Munich".. must end', that is according to him, peace means appeasement).

[Massacres: "Indian armed forces occupied a major part of Jammu and Kashmir on October 27, 1947 that is continuing to date. The Indian troops pursued the policy of suppression in a systematic manner to reduce the overwhelming Muslim majority in occupied Jammu and Kashmir. To achieve this objective Indian troops started the process of mass massacre. There are plenty of events and evidences to support this gory fact."]

How the Valley was won

By Jagmohan

On October 27, 1947, a small contingent of the Indian armed forces landed at Srinagar airport and saved Kashmir for India by a whisker. On the 62nd anniversary of this historic event, it would be instructive to reflect upon the past, present and future of the Kashmir problem.

At the time of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the political stage of Kashmir was crowded with a variety of actors. There was the National Conference, headed by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. It dominated the Valley but had limited influence in Jammu and Ladakh. It had developed close rapport with the leaders of the Indian National Congress, particularly Jawaharlal Nehru, but its equation with the Muslim League was marked by hostility. Mirwaiz Moulvi Yusaf Shah, who had wild and fanatical following in the downtown area of Srinagar city, was antagonistic both to the National Conference and to the Congress. Then, there was the Muslim Conference which had little following in the Valley but had acquired rapid strength amongst the Muslims of the Jammu region during the last two years on account of its ideological affinity with the Muslim League. The Maharaja was yet another force. The Dogra Rajputs of Jammu considered him their own kith and kin. The relations between him on the one hand and Sheikh Abdullah and Pandit Nehru on the other were marked by mutual distrust and dislike.

All these actors were soon to play their part in the first act of the tragic Kashmir drama. The Maharaja was indecisive. Jinnah was impatient. Pandit Nehru was caught between his idealism and stark realities. Sheikh Abdullah, with streaks of megalomania and duplicity embedded deep in the layers of his mind, was nursing secret ambitions to carve out a virtual sheikhdom for himself and his coterie.

Each one of these actors was pushed on the stage with his own illusions and believed that the drama would end the way he desired. Consequently, there was confusion and inconsistency on the stage. Several mistakes were made. And Kashmir soon found itself in the whirlpool of national and international controversy and conflict.
The first grave mistake was made when Maharaja Hari Singh flirted with the idea of independence. In June 1947, Lord Mountbatten paid a four-day visit to Kashmir. He advised the Maharaja to make up his mind. But the Maharaja dodged him.

In accordance with a sinister design to grab Jammu and Kashmir by subterfuge and armed strength, military skirmishes all along the border from Gilgit to Mirpur were manipulated to disperse the State forces. On October 22, Muslim members of the Maharaja's forces, stationed at Poonch, treacherously mutinied in the early hours when their commander, Lt. Col. Narain Singh and his Dogra soldiers were asleep. They killed the commander and most of the Dogra soldiers, and marched to Dommel and Muzaffarabad to join the tribesmen who had launched a full scale invasion of the Valley. These tribesmen and Pakistani regulars, the "volunteers" and the "freedom fighters" were all operating under the overall command of Akbar Khan, a major-general in the Pakistani Army, who was given the code name of "General Tariq". They easily captured the border town of Darhi and Dommel and also Muzaffarabad.

In the developments from October 22 onwards, time was of prime importance. Every minute mattered. The State forces, under the command of Brig. Rajinder Singh, though hampered by large scale desertions of Muslims troops, fought to the "last man and last bullet" at Uri, delaying the advance of the main horde of raiders for two crucial days. The Uri bridge was also destroyed by the retreating forces, thereby gaining another one day.

Brig. Rajinder Singh died like a hero and made an invaluable contribution in saving the State. The Maharaja got the time to seek and obtain India's help. V.P. Menon has compared the heroic act of Brig. Singh and his men with the historic fight put up Leonidas and his 300 gallant men who held the Persian invaders at Thermoplae.

Baramulla fell into the hands of the raiders on October 24-26. Overtaken by their wild habits, they indulged in large-scale killing, looting, burning and rape. They hardly realised that the time spent by them in committing their abominable crimes would turn out to be their punishment, as it enabled the Indian forces to land at Srinagar airport, on October 27.

Maharaja Hari Singh, in his letter of October 26, asked for accession and "attached the instrument of accession for acceptance by the Government of India". In his reply of October 27, Mountbatten accepted the accession but added: "It is my government's wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invaders, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people." This addition was the second major mistake.

On October 27, a few planes of the Indian Air Force hovered over Srinagar airport carrying the first batch of Indian troops under the command of Lt. Col. Ranjit Rai. It was not certain whether the airport was safe. After landing, Lt. Col. Rai led the small contingent of the troops towards Baramulla. He lost his life in this bold venture.

In another bold move, Maj. Som Nath Sharma engaged the raiders at Badgam as they had reached very near the airport (November 3).

He was outnumbered seven to one. But he showed unbounded courage and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. He, too, lost his life.

When the raiders were on the outskirts of Srinagar and Lt. Col. Ranjit Rai and Maj. Som Nath Sharma of the Indian Army had been killed, Sardar Patel, accompanied by defence minister Baldev Singh, flew to the state capital, assessed the situation and on return to New Delhi ordered stoppage of all airline services and diversion of all planes for flying troops to Srinagar. The timely arrival of reinforcements enabled Brig. Sen to lure the raiders in the nest of Indian forces, near Shaltang, and attack them on November 5 from three sides. The raiders were routed.

The Pakistani raiders also made a determined bid to occupy Ladakh. But it was saved by the superior strategy and grit of the Indian military and Air Force. In this regard, two daring actions deserve special mention.

One was the amazing feat of Air Commodore Mehar Singh to fly his plane on May 24, 1948, at 23,000 feet above the sea level without oxygen on a hitherto unchartered course and land on the rough strip of Leh airport located at the height of 11,555 feet. This enabled the Indian forces to be airlifted to Leh and build up defence for Ladakh which was at the mercy of the enemy.

The second unique feat was of Major-General Thimayya who took his tanks to the snow-covered Zojila Pass at the height of 11,578 feet on November 1, 1948. General Thimayya's feat has been compared to Hannibal crossing the Alps with his elephants. Till that time, no one in history had taken tanks to such a height in such hazardous conditions.

Along with triumphs, tragedies, unfortunately, continued. On October 28, the words, "Plebiscite under the UN auspices", were included in Nehru's radio broadcast. Patel made a last-minute effort to secure the deletion of these word, but failed.

Another major mistake was committed when, on January 1, 1948, India took the case to the UN. Patel was so unhappy with Nehru's and Mountbatten's excessive regard for the UN that, in his private conversation, he spoke satirically about the "expertise of two great votaries of the UN in the Government of India".

As one looks at the events that happened over six decades ago, one is saddened to note that the nation has practically forgotten all its heroes on account of whose supreme sacrifices Kashmir could be saved for India.

As I have noted already, in handling the Kashmir issue, a number of mistakes were made at the initial stage. But the most serious of all was the failure to judge the mind and motivation of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. Jawaharlal Nehru placed too great a reliance upon him, but he proved a fair-weather friend. The moment Nehru declared that plebiscite would be held in the state, Sheikh Abdullah calculated that India could not do without his support. He exploited the position to extract one concession after another.

For Sheikh Abdullah, it was his power game that got precedence over everything else. What suited him at a particular moment was all that mattered. When it suited him, he kept proclaiming that accession of Kashmir to India was based on fundamental principles and was irrevocable. At the same time, he was sounding various quarters for support to the idea of having an independent "Sheikhdom". As early as January 28, 1948, he discussed the subject of independence with American officials. This is evident from the note of the same date sent by Warren Austin to the state department after an interview with Sheikh Abdullah. The report (September 1950) of Loy Henderson, the US Ambassador to India, noted: "In discussing future Kashmir, Abdullah was vigorous that it should be independent". On May 3, 1953, Adlai Stevenson came to Srinagar and had a long meeting with Sheikh Abdullah. The New York Times, on July 5, published a map hinting at independent status for the Valley. On July 10, speaking at Mujahid Manzil, Abdullah said, "A time will, therefore, come when I will bid goodbye to India".

All these events and pronouncements, taken together, should leave nobody in doubt that Sheikh Abdullah was dreaming of becoming an independent ruler of Kashmir and the Anglo-US bloc was encouraging him. Clement Attlee even openly said: "Kashmir should belong to neither India nor Pakistan but should be independent".

Even with regard to the Delhi Agreement (1952), for which Nehru was severely criticised in Parliament and other public fora, the stance of Sheikh Abdullah proved insincere. After securing implementation of what suited him, he virtually backed out. Nehru was deeply dismayed by his crafty approach. On June 28, 1953, he wrote to Abdullah: "To me, it has been a major surprise that settlement arrived at between us should be repudiated. That strikes at the root of all confidence. My honour is bound with my words". But Abdullah was unmoved.

It was Sheikh Abdullah's excessive ambition, rank opportunism and virtual conspiracy to carve out an independent state that led to his arrest in August 1953. After Sheikh's arrest, both Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and G.M. Sadiq adopted a constructive attitude and helped in establishing a working constitutional relationship between the state and the Union. However, Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, with elements of separatism in-built in it, remained.

Apart from short period of release in 1958, Sheikh Abdullah was freed in April 1964, and the Kashmir Conspiracy case against him was withdrawn. In the wake of revival of friendship between Sheikh and Nehru, the former visited Pakistan and had a meeting with President Ayub Khan on May 25. President Ayub Khan, in his book, Friends and Not Masters, has recorded: "When Sheikh Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg came to Pakistan in 1964, they had brought the absurd proposal of a confederation between India, Pakistan and Kashmir. I told them plainly we should have nothing to do with it".

On return to Valley, Sheikh Abdullah again changed his stance and started making highly anti-Indian speeches. In February 1965, he went abroad with his wife ostensibly for the purpose of Haj. But during this visit, he indulged in political propaganda which was highly embarrassing to India. On March 28, 1965, he even met Chou En-lai, the Prime Minister of China. This meeting was seen as Abdullah's willingness to become a tool in "Pindi-Peking conspiracy" against India in respect of Kashmir. His passport was, therefore, cancelled. On return, he was arrested at Delhi airport on May 9, 1965.

At that time, Sheikh Abdullah was in close touch with Pakistan. Duane Clarridge, in his book, A Spy For All Seasons: My Life in the CIA, has said: "The Lion of Kashmir basically gave me the whole plan of the Pakistanis for Kashmir. They were going to begin infiltrating small guerrilla units of Azad Kashmir into Kashmir proper. These units would then begin to stir things up. Once the insurrection got under way in Kashmir, regular military would come to Kashmir's aid". And this is exactly what happened in August-September 1965 war. Though Pakistan's plan failed, the stance of Sheikh Abdullah not only betrayed his duplicity and deception but also showed how poor Indian leaders were in judging men and moments in Kashmir.

The central core of Sheikh Abdullah's personality comes out clearly in his observations made on Nehru in his autobiography: "Nehru used to call himself an agnostic. But he was also a great admirer of the past heritage and the Hindu spirit of India… His interpretation of Indian history, though not always based upon accurate knowledge, approximates to the interpretation of revivalists like K.M. Munshi and Dayanand Saraswati… Nehru employed Machiavellian approach towards us in Kashmir. He dealt with Pakistan in the same fashion. At international level also he exhibited the same Machiavellian outlook."

The Indian leadership showed similar lack of understanding with regard to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto at the Simla Conference in 1972. At that time, India held all the cards in her hands. The advisers of Indira Gandhi failed to read the mind of Pakistan's Prime Minister. The way Bhutto's mind was working at that time comes out clearly in his letter of June 23, 1972, to General Tikka Khan: "So neither a few years of arranged peace, nor the present situation can possibly permit us to ignore the reality that there must inevitably, sooner or later, come another war… every invasion from this side has defeated India… And we ourselves have ruled them for eight centuries."

P.N. Dhar, in an article published on April 4, 1995 in a national daily, said that Bhutto had agreed to change the ceasefire-line into a de facto international border. He asserted, "It was thought that with the gradual use of the LoC as a de facto frontier, public opinion on both sides would get reconciled to its permanence…" Even if Dhar's account is taken as true, it only confirms how naive India had been in accepting Bhutto's words.

Pakistan was in a state of disarray and its potential for any mischief had been crippled. But, unfortunately, the habit of relying solely upon personalities persisted. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah was brought back to the helm of affairs through the Kashmir Accord (February 1975). It was not even ensured that he would not revert to his old game of whipping up insular and parochial forces to build up his own nest of power.

By the time Sheikh Abdullah passed away in September 1982, the adverse fallout of unsound decisions taken in the post-1972 period had spread far and wide, both in the Valley and abroad. If any proof of this phenomenon was needed, it was forthcoming in the form of virulent anti-India demonstration at the time of the India-West Indies cricket match, held at Srinagar in October, 1983, the vicious attack on the Central income tax team and the kidnapping and killing of Indian diplomat, Ravinder Mahatre, by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, at Birmingham in February 1984.

Unfortunately, the central leadership, apart from its failure to size up Sheikh Abdullah's personality correctly, has shown little understanding of the forces of fundamentalism and fanaticism that have been operating in Kashmir and shaping the course of social and political events on the ground. For this lapse, the country has paid, and is still paying, a heavy price.

Till the beginning of the second half of the last century, Kashmir's Islamic ethos were shaped by the liberal order of sufis and rishis. Unfortunately, this liberal order was gradually undermined, first by the selfish politics of Sheikh Abdullah and his political party, National Conference, and then by the forces let loose by Jama'at-i-Islami and other fundamentalist organisations. Sheikh Abdullah never hesitated to use Islam if he found it expedient to do so. When, for example, Congress party was established as a separate political entity in Jammu and Kashmir, he issued a fatwa, labelling the new party as a party of Kafirs.

The other parties and groups also found it expedient to make use of Islamic fundamentalism. These groups, in pursuit of their short-term gains, showed no hesitation in orienting Kashmir's polity towards the forces of belligerency and extremism.

It was in these circumstances that Sheikh Abdullah government enacted a new law ? Resettlement Act, 1982. The ostensible objective of this law was to provide for the resettlement of Kashmiris who had migrated to Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir or Pakistan itself. But its real purpose was to present Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference as champions of Kashmiri identity and make a show of independence.

The new law resulted in a fierce controversy, giving an opportunity to the anti-Indian and pro-Pakistani elements to enlarge their sphere of influence. The insular and parochial forces were further fuelled by the manner in which National Conference fought the state Assembly elections in June 1983 and the Lok Sabha elections of December 1984. It was extensively publicised that the "Kashmiri nation" was in chains and the "hands that had put these chains" had to be cut. Dr Farooq Abdullah also joined hands with Mirwaiz Moulvi Farooq, though the latter did not abandon even temporarily his pro-plebiscite and pro-Pakistan stance.

When I took over as governor of the state in April 1984, I found the state in the grip of subversive and fundamentalist forces. Violence and terrorism were creeping in fast and presenting a formidable challenge to the security of the state and integrity of the Union. How this challenge was successfully met during April 1984-June 1989 need not be gone into here. Suffice to say, the history of this period shows that if the administration is committed to materialisation of principled governance, if political parties are subjected to healthy fear and made to believe that they could not advance their personal agenda by playing to the tune of fundamentalists, the forces of subversion could be beaten back.

The moment the aforesaid approach ceased and old permissive attitudes returned in mid-1989, subversion reappeared. Inexcusably, no action was taken even when prominent leaders of the Pandit community were killed, Rubaiya Sayeed, daughter of the Union home minister, kidnapped and highly subversive literature, couched in militant terminology, distributed on a large scale.

Around this period, the war in Afghanistan (1979-89) was near its end. This war had the effect of making ISI one of the most dangerous and powerful intelligence organisation in the world. The United States had placed in its hand huge resources. About 60 per cent of these resources were diverted by the ISI for engineering subversion and terrorism in Kashmir.

The ISI was highly successful in its venture. In this, ironically, it was helped by India's hesitancy and its refusal to call a spade a spade, afflicted as it was by the malady of divisive and vote-bank politics. Pakistan, on the other hand, continued to stoke the fanatics' zeal. Consequently, terrorism-related activities increased manifold in Kashmir and it did not take long for the virus to spread to other parts of India. Today, practically no walk of life is free from the fear of a terrorist attack.

The process of peace-initiative and track II diplomacy, initiated by the government of National Democratic Alliance and carried forward by government of United Progressive Alliance, has not made any significant impact at the ground level. In fact, during this process, some of the most lethal and savage terrorist attacks have been carried out in Kashmir and the rest of India. And fanatical minds still hold the sway, as was evident in the course of recent agitations connected with the allotment of land to Amarnath Shrine Board.

From the above analysis of events of the past and forces that are operating in Kashmir at present, it should be clear that if the state has to be pulled out of current turmoil and turbulence and put on the road to peace and progress, a fundamental transformation in the attitude of the decision-makers in Delhi has to come about, and a radically different plan of action has to be formulated and implemented. In this respect I have six suggestions to make.

First, let us not remain under any illusion that India can solve its chronic problems, much less a problem as acute and critical as Kashmir's, without its polity and system of governance being subjected to reforms and renovation. It is only a strong, confident and resurgent India, underpinned by its ancient nobility of temper and with its vision of unified country fully restored, that can ward off the onslaught of divisive and destructive forces.

Secondly, Kashmir's true place in the Indian vision should be strongly projected. At present, hardly any one realises that Kashmir's relationship with the rest of India is rooted in potent and enduring forces whom neither the turbulence and tornadoes of the past nor the negativism and nihilism of the present-day politics can really destroy. It is a relationship of mind and soul that has existed from time immemorial.

Thirdly, it should be made clear to all concerned that India has never accepted the two-nation theory. The Partition came about when India was not a master of its own destiny. Now that it is a sovereign, secular and democratic republic, providing constitutional protection to the rights of minorities and their religion and culture, it cannot allow any part of its territory to secede merely on the ground that it has a majority of Muslims.

Even otherwise, could India accept a position that seven or eight million Muslims of Kashmir cannot live in the Indian Union, while about 150 million Muslims can do so in its other parts? Secession is also not constitutionally permissible. Article 1 of the Constitution of India, which defines the territory of the Union, cannot be amended.

Fourthly, the phoney nature of the ideas floated by the former President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, in respect of "self-governance", "joint management" and "demilitarisation" should be rejected outright. They are not only impractical but also have a huge potential for mischief in future.

Fifthly, India must ensure that the terrorists are not able to dictate terms to the local population. At present, practically no one in the Valley is afraid of any authority but every one is afraid of the terrorists. This is because the terrorists are ruthless in dealing with people who do not obey their command, while government blinks over even the most blatant violations of laws. If government continues to appease and the terrorists continue to terrorise, no negotiations with any functionary of the recalcitrant groups can fructify.

Sixthly, the "spirit of Munich" which has so far determined the attitude of Indian decision makers must end. Buying peace for a moment at the cost of basic values only means planting the seeds of trouble for the future. It should also be ensured that a congenial atmosphere is created for Kashmiri Pandits to return to the Valley.

¶ 11/17/2008 08:35:00 AM 0 Comments Links to this post