Rafiqul Islam Azad
The New Nation – August 16, 2008
The Indian intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), is allegedly trying to control the political arena of
To this end, the RAW is resorting to tactics of creating an uncongenial atmosphere among the political parties and provocation for violence in disguise of well-wishers of a certain political party in the name of Indian secular policy.
If their interests are not protected it provides assistance to counter force to assault the certain political quarters. The RAW is playing the game from the very inception of the country.
The RAW is playing active role in creating political divisions and provocation of violence for which democracy could not take shape in the country that started following the mass upsurge in 1990.
Three free, fair and neutral elections were held after the introduction of the caretaker government system to conduct the national polls after the 90's mass upsurge. Two major political parties-BNP and Awami League-formed three successive governments. But various destructive programmes, like hartal, siege and setting ablaze, were conducted during each of the governments. The RAW was the masterminds behind of all the incidents.
These led to increase in doubts, lack of confidence and jealousy among the political parties. Resulting in the closure of all the doors for political understanding.
The RAW had used a certain political party and their like-minded organisations to create anarchy in the country after the taking of office by the BNP in 1991. It funded the creation of Ekkatorer Ghatok Dalal Nirmul Committee to create division in political arena and violence in the name of implementation of spirit of the war of liberation.
After taking power by the Awami League in 1996, the RAW also tried to get transit and using
Later on, the Indian intelligence agency got involved in raising militancy and heinous activities. It also continues to create division among the region-based political parties.
In one hand, it goaded its agents to issue anti-Islamic statements to provoke the Islamic political parties to take to the streets. On the other hand, it carried out publicity about rising fundamentalism in the country.
The RAW also provoked action against some Islamic political parties and madrashas.
After 2001, the RAW resumed their activities in full swing and maintained close relation with a certain political party. It tried to make Parliament ineffective and carried out propaganda that the government has relation with the militants. This time it sued some newspapers, political parties and Indian media.
During the fag end of the four-party alliance government it became successful to subvert the dialogue process on reforms of the caretaker government by using some people of both the major parties.
The main objective of RAW was to prove
The RAW has already carried out a number of activities, including giving shelter to Bangladeshi terrorists and corrupt people. The Indian foreign minister suggested launching movement to free Sheikh Hasina from jail that led to students' movement in
The Indian inelegance agency is now playing an active role to foil the process of bringing political reform taken by the government. It is providing money to provoke both the major parties to take a hard-line against the government initiative to keep the door open for political parties to shun the politics of division and violence.
The RAW is carrying out its activities to plunge the country into an unstable condition. Particularly, it is trying to pit religious-minded people against the government by hurting their religious feelings.
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Research and Analysis Wing [RAW]
The Cabinet Secretariat Research and Analysis Wing [RAW],
Current policy debates in
In 1968
Throughout the Afghan War RAW was responsible for the planning and execution of terrorist activities in
The Government of Pakistan frequently assigns responsibility for terrorist activity to the Indian Government, even when no evidence can be verified. It is evidently in the interest of the Pakistani government to blame terrorist actions on external rather than internal sources, just as it would be in the interest of Indian services to obscure their hand in such actions. Terrorist activities in
- A car bomb explosion in Saddar area of
- An explosion at
- A bus traveling from
- An explosion in a bus near the Sheikhupura hospital killed 9 persons and injured 29 others on 08 May 1996.
- An explosion near Alam chowk,
- A bomb exploded on a bus on
- On 27 June 1996, an explosion opposite Madrassah Faizul Islam, Faizabad,
- A bomb explosion in the
RAW has responded to Pakistani arms and training for Muslim militants in the disputed region of
RAW has a long history of activity in
During the course of its investigation the Jain Commission received testimony on the official Indian support to the various Sri Lankan Tamil armed groups in Tamil Nadu. From 1981, RAW and the Intelligence Bureau established a network of as many as 30 training bases for these groups in
The RAW and the Ministry of External Affairs are provided Rs 25 crore annually as "discretionary grants" for foreign influence operations. These funds have supported organisations fighting Sikh and Kashmiri separatists in the
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/india/raw.htm
Learning the Wrong Lessons from the Bush Era
By Andrew Bacevich
To appreciate the full extent of the military crisis into which the
In some respects, the effort to divine those lessons is well under way, spurred by critics of President Bush's policies on the left and the right as well as by reform-minded members of the officer corps. Broadly speaking, this effort has thus far yielded three distinct conclusions. Whether taken singly or together, they invert the post-Cold War military illusions that provided the foundation for the president's Global War on Terror. In exchange for these received illusions, they propound new ones, which are equally misguided. Thus far, that is, the lessons drawn from
According to the first lesson, the armed services -- and above all the Army -- need to recognize that the challenges posed by Iraq and Afghanistan define not only the military's present but also its future, the "next war," as enthusiasts like to say. Rooting out insurgents, nation-building, training and advising "host nation" forces, population security and control, winning hearts and minds -- these promise to be ongoing priorities, preoccupying U.S. troops for decades to come, all across the Islamic world.
Rather than brief interventions ending in decisive victory, sustained presence will be the norm. Large-scale conventional conflict like 1991's Operation Desert Storm becomes the least likely contingency. The future will be one of small wars, expected to be frequent, protracted, perhaps perpetual.
Although advanced technology will retain an important place in such conflicts, it will not be decisive. Wherever possible, the warrior will rely on "nonkinetic" methods, functioning as diplomat, mediator, and relief worker. No doubt American soldiers will engage in combat, but, drawing on the latest findings of social science, they will also demonstrate cultural sensitivity, not to speak of mastering local languages and customs. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it in October 2007, "Reviving public services, rebuilding infrastructure and promoting good governance" had now become soldiers' business. "All these so-called nontraditional capabilities have moved into the mainstream of military thinking, planning, and strategy -- where they must stay."
This prospect implies a rigorous integration of military action with political purpose. Hard power and soft power will merge. The soldier on the ground will serve as both cop and social worker. This prospect also implies shedding the sort of utopian expectations that produced so much confident talk of "transformation," "shock-and-awe," and "networkcentric warfare" -- all of which had tended to segregate war and politics into separate compartments.
Local conditions will dictate technique, dooming the Pentagon's effort to devise a single preconceived, technologically determined template applicable across the entire spectrum of conflict. When it comes to low-intensity wars, the armed services will embrace a style owing less to the traditions of the Civil War, World War II, or even Gulf War I than to the nearly forgotten American experiences in the
In sum, an officer corps bloodied in
Were the Civilians of the Defense Department Responsible?
Viewed from another perspective, however, the post-9/11 wars teach an altogether different lesson. According to this alternative view, echoing a similar complaint during the
The charges leveled by Major General John Batiste, who served in Rumsfeld's Pentagon but subsequently retired in disgust and became one of the defense secretary's loudest military critics, are representative of this view. "Rumsfeld's dismal strategic decisions resulted in the unnecessary deaths of American servicemen and women," Batiste declared in September 2006. The former general held Rumsfeld personally "responsible for
Nor was the problem limited to Rumsfeld himself. It included his chief lieutenants. According to Batiste, Rumsfeld surrounded himself "with like-minded and compliant subordinates who [did] not grasp the importance of the principles of war, the complexities of
Here lies the second preliminary lesson drawn from Iraq and Afghanistan, one that appeals to disgruntled military officers like Batiste, but also to Democrats eager to blame the Bush administration for any and all sins and to neoconservatives looking to absolve themselves of responsibility for botched wars that they had once cavalierly promoted. The corrective to civilian arrogance and misjudgment is obvious: It requires tilting the civil-military balance back in favor of the generals, untying the hands of senior commanders.
From this perspective, the most important lesson to take away from
Is a Draft the Answer?
There is also a third perspective, which blames the failures of
A reliance on volunteer-professionals places a de facto cap on the army's overall size. The pool of willing recruits is necessarily limited. Given a choice, most young Americans will opt for opportunities other than military service, with protracted war diminishing rather than enhancing any collective propensity to volunteer. It is virtually inconceivable that any presidential call to the colors, however impassioned, any PR campaign, however cleverly designed, or any package of pay and bonuses, however generous, could reverse this disinclination.
Furthermore, to the extent that an army composed of regulars is no longer a people's army, the people have little say in its use. In effect, the professional military has become an extension of the imperial presidency. The troops fight when and where the commander in chief determines.
Finally, a reliance on professional soldiers eviscerates the concept of civic duty, relieving citizens at large of any obligation to contribute to the nation's defense. Ending the draft during the waning days of the Vietnam War did nothing to heal the divisions created by that conflict; instead, it ratified the separation of army from society. Like mowing lawns and bussing tables, fighting and perhaps dying to sustain the American way of life became something that Americans pay others to do.
So the third lesson of the Iraq War focuses on the need to repair the relationship between army and society. One way to do this is to junk the All-Volunteer Force altogether. Rather than rely on professionals, perhaps it makes sense to revive the tradition of the citizen-soldier.
Proposals to restore this hallowed tradition invariably conjure up images of reinstituting some form of conscription. In place of a system based on the principle of individual choice, those unhappy with the AVF advocate a system based on the principle of state compulsion.
The advantages offered by such a system are hardly trivial. To the extent that
For those who worry that the existing army is overextended, conscription provides a mechanism for expansion. Triple the size of the army -- in essence restoring the structure that existed during much of the Cold War -- and the personnel shortages that constrain the prosecution of ground campaigns will disappear. Sustaining the military commitment to
War planners will no longer find themselves obliged to give short shrift to Contingency A (
Creating a mass army might even permit the
For those distressed by the absence of a politically meaningful antiwar movement despite the Iraq War's manifest unpopularity, the appeal of conscription differs somewhat. Some political activists look to an Iraq-era draft to do what the Vietnam-era draft did: animate large-scale protest, alter the political dynamic, and eventually shut down any conflict that lacks widespread popular support. The prospect of involuntary service will pry the kids out of the shopping malls and send them into the streets. It will prod the parents of draft-eligible offspring to see politics as something other than a mechanism for doling out entitlements. As a consequence, members of Congress keen to retain their seats will define their wartime responsibilities as something more than simply rubber-stamping spending bills proposed by the White House. In this way, a draft could reinvigorate American democracy, restore the governmental system of checks and balances, and constrain the warmongers inhabiting the executive branch.
For those moved by moral considerations, a draft promises to ensure a more equitable distribution of sacrifice in war time. No longer will rural Americans, people of color, recent immigrants, and members of the working class fill the ranks of the armed forces in disproportionate numbers. With conscription, the children of the political elite and of the well-to-do will once again bear their fair share of the load. Those reaping the benefits of the American way of life will contribute to its defense, helping to garrison the more distant precincts of empire. Perhaps even the editorial staffs of the Weekly Standard, National Review, and the
Reconfigure the armed services to fight "small wars"; empower the generals; reconnect soldiering to citizenship -- on the surface each of these has a certain appeal. But upon closer examination, each also has large defects. They are the wrong lessons to take from
Drawing the Right Lessons from the Bush Era
If gearing up to fight "small wars," deferring to the brass, and scrapping the All-Volunteer Force are the wrong lessons to be drawn from our recent military experience, then what are the right ones?
The events of the recent past offer several lessons that illuminate these questions. The first concerns the nature of war.
War's essential nature is fixed, permanent, intractable, and irrepressible. War's constant companions are uncertainty and risk. "War is the realm of chance," wrote the military theorist Carl von Clausewitz nearly two centuries ago. "No other human activity gives it greater scope: no other has such incessant and varied dealings with this intruder…" -- a judgment that the invention of the computer, the Internet, and precision-guided munitions has done nothing to overturn.
So the first lesson to be taken away from the Bush administration's two military adventures is simply this: War remains today what it has always been -- elusive, untamed, costly, difficult to control, fraught with surprise, and sure to give rise to unexpected consequences. Only the truly demented will imagine otherwise.
The second lesson of
Although die-hard supporters of the Global War on Terror will insist otherwise, events in
The Bush Doctrine itself provides the basis for a third lesson. For centuries, the Western moral tradition has categorically rejected the concept of preventive war. The events of 9/11 convinced some that this tradition no longer applied: old constraints had to give way. Yet our actual experience with preventive war suggests that, even setting moral considerations aside, to launch a war today to eliminate a danger that might pose a threat at some future date is just plain stupid. It doesn't work.
History has repeatedly demonstrated the irrationality of preventive war. If the world needed a further demonstration, President Bush provided it.
Finally, there is a fourth lesson, relating to the formulation of strategy. The results of
Since the end of the Cold War, the tendency among civilians -- with President Bush a prime example -- has been to confuse strategy with ideology. The president's freedom agenda, which supposedly provided a blueprint for how to prosecute the Global War on Terror, expressed grandiose aspirations without serious effort to assess the means required to achieve them. Meanwhile, ever since the Vietnam War ended, the tendency among military officers has been to confuse strategy with operations.
Here we come face-to-face with the essential dilemma with which the
The four lessons of
As measured by results achieved, the performance of the military since the end of the Cold War and especially since 9/11 has been unimpressive. This indifferent record of success leads some observers to argue that we need a bigger army or a different army.
But the problem lies less with the army that we have -- a very fine one, which every citizen should wish to preserve -- than with the requirements that we have imposed on our soldiers. Rather than expanding or reconfiguring that army, we need to treat it with the respect that it deserves. That means protecting it from further abuse of the sort that it has endured since 2001.
Andrew Bacevich, professor of history and international relations at Boston University, retired from the
16th December 1971, a new country was born –
A great opportunity was created to forge a national unity leaving aside the age-old class differentiations. The people expected that the leaders would rise above the group and party interest and would unite the people to harness their patriotism and productivities to rebuild the war torn country to fulfill the dream of a ‘Golden Bengal’. 100 millions of Bangladeshis would find their rightful place in the world community with dignity and honour.
Historical heritage, distinct self identity, the vision of the able leadership, right direction, patriotism, sacrifices, hard work and above all united efforts of the nation could achieve cherished goal step by step with the passage of time. Creation of a progressive, happy and prosperous
Our political leaders had always done much sweet-talking than actual deeds. Promises had been even greater. People have heard such for ages and got used to such empty promises. Who ever had gone to power had always failed the people. They had oppressed the people paying no heed to their demands. The isolation of the leaders from the people and their selfish interest were the main reasons for such betrayals.
Our leaders mostly are alien in their own societies. That is why people are apathetic toward them. Once in power they do everything to meet their own vested interest and later justify their deeds with power and position. The people remain enslaved in the merry go round of betrayal and deception. The politicians always placed their self-interest above the interest of the nation. Even at times the country and the people became sacrificial goats to meet their greed and lust.
Soon after stepping on the soil of the independent country Awami League came out with the ambiguous slogan of “Mujibbad”. After three and half years when “Mujibbad” was proven to be an empty slogan Sheikh Mujibur Rahman like any other power hungry dictator promulgated 4th amendment and took all powers in his own hand by forming one party autocratic regime of BKSAL. This unprecedented constitutional coup de’ tat was called his ‘Second Revolution’. As he usurped absolute power apparently things for a while looked calm on the surface but beneath that uneasy calm political and social conditions were fast deteriorating.
The main reason for such deterioration was the presumption of the rulers that by dishing out favours and benefits rule can be perpetuated forever. They depended on this belief because of their lake of understanding of the complexities of the newly independent country. It’s problems and solutions were beyond their perception. They lacked any ideology, conviction, experience and vision. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman like other third world dictators considered his own ideas and thoughts to be the ultimate. He never cared to take any advice or suggestion from any one, other than his ‘kitchen cabinet’ comprised of his family members. His all knowing attitudes were to a great extend responsible for his administrative failure.
He also did not have a clear idea about the difference between party and the state. This became clear even in 1956-57 when he deferred with the then Chief Minister Mr. Ataur Rahman Khan. Mr. Khan wanted to keep the administration totally neutral. He knew that if the administration were brought under the party control then it would be difficult to run the administration efficiently. But Sheikh Mujib refuted his contention and said, "The administration has to accept party domination. Not only that administration will just help and assist the party to execute its policies, but the administration will also be helping in increasing its influence among the people". Mr. Ataur Rahman Khan had to surrender to Sheikh Mujib as he was then considered very powerful in the party. Thus during this time Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the Minister of Commerce and Industries indulged in rampant corruption, nepotism and misuse of power. He used his power in giving out permits, licenses, bank loans, and sanction to establish industries to people who were loyal to him and his cronies.
After taking over the reign of
Many of his confidants were also involved in smuggling in collaboration with the Marwaris. Thus under the patronization of Awami rule a new class of ‘novo’ rich grew like mushroom. They accumulated from national resources but did not reinvest into the economic cycle. Most of their wealth was spent in non-productive sectors or transferred abroad. With these people Sheikh Mujibur Rahman wanted to establish ‘GOLDEN BENGAL’ in the country. It was really very hard to understand what he was up to? Was it his ignorance or cunning mechanization? Was it appropriate that he should place his party’s interest over the national interest? Did the nation expect that from him?
It was not only his party people who got involved in rampant corruption. His immediate family members were also involved. Gazi Golam Mustfa who was a close confidant of Sheik’s family became famous as ‘Kamble Chor’ in the country for his open misappropriation of relief goods being the Chairman of the Red Cross. The donors and the international relief agencies also came to know about his malpractices.
International press and media became very vocal against this notorious thief. His only brother Sheikh Naser not only garbed the abandoned properties and businesses in
Regarding the state of corruption during Mujib’s regime, the reputed journalist Lawrence Lift Shulz wrote in the Far Eastern Economic Review on 30th Aug 1974. "Corruption and malpractices are nothing new. But people of
It was virtually impossible for the government to gain any economic or political achievements with such loots and plunders in a newly independent war ravaged country. The looters did not plough back their ill-gotten wealth in the national economy; they spent that fortune for their luxuries and comforts. But the government had to pay heavily as its image got tarnished in the eyes of the people and the world.
The government became isolated from the people. Against the promise to turn
An agricultural country
AWAMI-BAKSAL period is the dark chapter in the history of
The period of AWAMI-BKSAL rule was full of barbaric atrocities. The history of AWAMI-BKSAL rule was basically history of murder, rape, loot, oppression, plunder, famine, capitulation to the foreign exploiters, white terror and above all betrayal to the spirit of the liberation war. People could never be able to forget those horrifying memories. In the name of socialism they plundered the national wealth, they kept the border open for the smuggling, for their mismanagement of the economy the country got recognized internationally as the 'bottomless basket'. There was no famine in
Sheik Mujib and his government presented the people fascism in the name of democracy, social injustice in the name of socialism, national disunity in the name of Bengali nationalism and communal disharmony in the name of secularism. In this way after subjugating the whole nation in a state of gasping suffocation all the opposition was crushed systematically through state terrorism with a view to close all the constitutional and democratic avenues to bring any change of government. The nation was thrown into an era of total darkness with no hope to breathe afresh.
It was Awami League of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman that mortgaged the national independence and state sovereignty signing the 25 years long-term unequal treaty with
On 24th Feb 1975 President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman through a decree announced formation of the only political party of the country Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League or BKSAL. He also declared himself to be the chairman of BKSAL. In the 3rd article of the announcement it was stated, "Till any further order from the President all the members of the Parliament of the defunct Awami League, all its members, Cabinet Ministers, deputy Ministers, state Ministers will be considered as the members of the BKSAL. Bongo Bir Gen. Osmani and Barrister Mainul Hossain decided to defy this order and not to join BKSAL instead they both resigned from their Parliament membership.
Due to the announcement of the so-called ‘national party’ all other political parties got abolished. Finally CPB, NAP Muzaffar and Awami League got merged into BKSAL. Out of the 8 opposition members in the Parliament 4 joined BKSAL.
On 6th June 1975 the organizational structure and the constitution of BKSAL was announced. That day names of 115 members central committee were announced. In that 115 members-- vice President, Prime Minister, speaker, deputy speaker, Ministers, deputy Ministers, state Ministers, 3 Chiefs of the army, navy and airforce, DG BDR, DG JRB and the secretaries of all the ministries were included.
The Executive Committee of BKSAL
(1) Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, (2) Sayed Nazrul Islam, (3) Mansoor Ali, (4) Khandakar Mushtaq Ahmed, (5) Abdul Hasnat Mohammad Kamruzzaman, (6) Abdul Malek Ukil (7) Prof. Yusuf Ali, (8) Manaranjan Dhar, (9) Mohiuddin Ahmed, (10) Gazi Golam Mustafa, (11) Zillur Rahman, (12) Sheikh Fazlul Haq Moni, (13) Abdur Razzak.
List of the Central Committee of BKSAL
(1) Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, (2) Sayed Nazrul Islam, (3) Mansoor Ali, (4) Abdul Malik Ukil, (5) Khandakar Mushtaq Ahmad, (6) A.H.M Kamaruzzaman, (7) Mahmudullah, (8) Abdus Samad Azad, (9) Yusuf Ali, (10) Fani Bhushan Majumder, (11) Dr. Kamal Hussain, (12) Sohrab Hussain, (13) Abdul Mannan, (14) Abdur Rab Shernyabat, (15) Manaranjan Dhar, (16) Abdul Matin, (17) Asaduzzanan, (18) Korban Ali, (19) Dr. Azizul Rahman Mallik, (20) Dr. Mozzaffar Ahmad Choudhury, (21) Tofayel Ahmad, (22) Shah Moazzam Hossain, (23) Abdul Momen Talukder, (24) Dewan Farid Ganj, (25) Professor Nurul Islam Choudhry, (26) Taher uddin Thakur, (27) Moslemuddin Khan, (28) MD Nurul Islam Manju, (29) AKM Obaidur Rahman, (30) Dr. Khitish Chandra Mandal.
(31) Reazuddin Ahmad, (32) M. Baitullah, (33) Rahul Quddus(Secretary), (34) Zillur Rahman, (35) Mohiuddin Ahmad MP, (36) Sheikh Fazlul Haq Moin, (37) Abdur Razzaq, (38) Sheikh Shahidul Islam, (39) Anwar Choudhry, (40) Sajeda Choudhry, (41) Taslema Abed, (42) Abdur Rahim, (43) Abdul Awal, (44) Lutfur Rahman, (45) A.K. Muzibur Rahman, (46) Dr. Mofiz Choudhry, (47) Dr. Allauddin, (48) Dr. Ahsanul Haq, (49) Raushan Ali, (50) Azizur Rahman Akkas, (51) Sheikh Abdul Aziz, (52) Salahuddin Yusuf, (53) Michale Shushil Adhikari, (54) Kazi Abdul Hakim, (55) Mollah Jalaluddin, (56) Shamsuddin Mollah, (57) Gaur Chandra Bala, (58) Gazi Ghulam Mustafa, (59) Shamsul Haq, (60) Shamsuzzoha, (61) Rafiqueuddin Bhuiya, (62) Syed Ahmad, (63) Shamsur Rahman Khan, (64) Nurul Haq, (65) Kazi Zahurul Qayyum, (66) Capt.(Retd) Sujjat Ali, (67) M.R. Siddiqui, (68) MA Wahab, (69) Chittaranjan Sutar, (70) Sayeda Razia Banu, (71) Ataur Rahman Khan, (72) Khandakar Muhammad Illyas, (73) Mong Pru Saire, (74) Professor Muzzafar Ahmad, (75) Ataur Rahman, (76) Pir Habibur Rahman, (77) Sayeed Altaf Hussain, (78) Muhammad Farhad, (79) Motia Choudhury. (80) Hazi Danesh, (81) Taufiq Inam(Secretary), (82) Nurul Islam(Secretary), (83) Fayezuddin (Secretary), (84) Mahbubur Rahman(Secretary), (85) Abdul Khaleque, (86) Muzibul Haq (Secretary), (87) Abdur Rahim(Secretary), (88) Moinul Islam (Secretary), (89) Sayeeduzzaman(Secretary), (90) Anisuzzaman(Secretary), (91) Dr. A Sattar (Secretary), (92) M.A Samad(Secretary), (93) Abu Tahir (Secretary), (94) Al Hossaini (Secretary), (95) Dr Tajul Hossain(Secretary), (96) Motiur Rahman. Chairman. TCB, (97) Maj. Gen K.M. Safiullah, (98) Air Vice Marshal Khandakar, (99) Comodore M.H.Khan, (100) Maj Gen. Khalilur Rahman, (101) A.K. Naziruddin, (102) Dr. Abdul Matin Choudhury, (103) Dr.Mazharul Islam, (104) Dr.Sramul Haq, (105) ATM Syed Hossain, (106) Nurul Islam, (107) Dr. Nilima Ibrahim, (108) Dr. Nurul Islam PG Hospital, (109) Obaidul Haq Eiditor Observer, (110) Anwar Hossain Manju Editor Ittefaq, (111) Mizanur Rahman BPI, (112) Manawarul Islam, (113) Brig. A.M.S. Nuruzzaman DG Jatiyo Rakki Bahini, (114) Kamruzzaman teachers Association, (115) Dr. Mazhar Ali Kadri.
In the same declaration 5 sister organisation of BKSAL were also formed:-
General Secretaries
1. Jatiyo Krishak league Fani Bhushan Majumdar
2. Jatiyo Sramik league Professor. Yousuf Ali
3. Jatiyo Mahila league Sajeda Choudhury
4. Jatiyo Jubo league Tofayel Ahmed
5. Jatiyo Chattra league Sheikh Shahidul Islam.
The general Secretaries nominated were most trusted confidants of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The members of the central committees of these organizations consisted of members taken from CPB, NAP Muzaffar and Jatiyo league of Ataur Rahman Khan.
In accordance with forming of BKSAL on 16th June 1975, News Paper Cancellation Act was promulgated. Under this Act only four nationalized dailies were allowed to be published along with a few weeklies. Rests were all banned.
Thus after complete burial of democracy the whole country was subjugated under unprecedented reign of white terror. Being denied of personal security the people was suffocated and became hostages in their own homeland under the tyranny of the autocratic BKSAL rule. The political leaders and workers alike miserably failed to grasp the famous doctrine, "Of the people, by the people and for the people." Thus people could not achieve their cherished dream in spite of their glorious straggle and sacrifice. All their efforts had got lost once again in the blind alley because of the betrayal of the leadership.
