The Conspiracy In Pakistan
The Conspiracy In Pakistan
Since the lawyers began their protests, every Pakistani citizen has lost around Rs. 10,000 for every Rs. 100,000 he had in his bank account. Pakistanis forget that one year ago, their nukes, sovereignty and stability were under attack.
By Ahmed Quraishi
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan—Since the judicial crisis in March 2007, a Pakistani citizen has lost around Rs. 10,000 for every Rs. 100,000 he had in his bank account.
Usually, nations go to war to make this happen to other nations. But in our case, everyone sat by laughing as our impressive economic rise was thrown away because someone decided that sparking political instability in Pakistan trumped everything else.
Even now, as the “tsunami of inflation, recession, food shortage, power crisis and fuel prices is moving toward the shore,” writes a report sent this week by a private security threat assessment company to its multinational clients in Pakistan, “those in charge of disaster management are busy haggling over the judges’ constitutional packages.”
It is easy to forget that Pakistan a year ago was the target of a creative campaign of destabilization, part indigenous and part manufactured. Some mistakes by those in power provided Pakistan’s antagonists an opening to speed up their own plans to derail Pakistan off track economically and politically. And they had almost succeeded. The crisis was so intense that President Musharraf had to resign from his military office in an attempt to deflate political tension. It is also safe to say that some of his foreign detractors wanted to seen him replaced. The tide turned thanks to the Feb. 18 election when larger instability was averted and those who were advocating U.S. boots on Pakistani soil were silenced, hopefully for good.
Now a London-based Bangladeshi author, Mr. M.B.I. Munshi, is preparing to release in August a revised version of a book, The Indian Doctrine, which is expected to shed new light on what happened in Pakistan in 2007. Simply said, it was an impressive destabilization campaign, combining suicide bombings with threats of taking out Pakistani nukes and open insinuations in op-ed editorials in major U.S. dailies about the break up of the Pakistani homeland.
A small incident in the Pakistani business hub city of Karachi in September 2007 gave Pakistani policy strategists a rare glimpse into the larger game plan in the region at the time. The incident fitted a pattern and provided clues to the unfortunate role played by some actors in India, apart from the sitting government there, in compounding Pakistan’s problems on our western borders.
The incident was barely noticed by the otherwise boisterous Pakistani media, which was busy in covering a wave of Palestinian-style suicide bombings never known to Pakistanis before. A car raced by a police check post in the city’s busy downtown, stopped close enough for the policemen to see it but far enough to ensure escape. Two men were inside. One of them pulled down the window, threw out some jackets on the street and then screeched away.
The unknown car had just dropped a few ‘suicide vests’ ready for use, with markings that indicated U.S. origin. “It was a lousy act linked to the Indian intelligence services trying to create an impression that CIA was sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan,” Mr. Munshi’s book quotes a Pakistani source as explaining. “Neither the CIA nor the actual suicide bombers are in the business of dropping U.S. marked suicide vests on roadsides from moving cars in front of the police. It was a trap designed to mislead investigations.”
Later that month, Washington sent a rare message to New Delhi that basically said, ‘Please don’t make things difficult for us. Try to get out of this Pakistan obsession. You are too important to limit yourself in this way.’
The message, in as many words, came in a rare and closed-door interaction between the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Defense, James Clad, and a visiting group of retired Indian generals and diplomats. In a transcript released then by the Pentagon, Clad told the Indian group that “the United States has de-hyphenated its relations with India from its relations with Pakistan. New Delhi should do the same.”
The U.S. official was essentially telling the Indians they should not feel threatened by the Pak-American cooperation in Afghanistan for the simple reason that it was not going to affect Indian interests. The Indians, Clad implied, should desist from trying to undermine Pak-U.S. ties based on that false notion.
But Clad’s advice fell on deaf ears because, by 2007, India was in the advanced stages of executing an ambitious intelligence operation suspected of having substantially contributed to the multiple and unprecedented security challenges that Pakistan faced in its western regions in the period between 2004 and early 2008. The India-inspired troubles were beyond the natural fallout from the war on terror.
In a special chapter titled, The Peace Charade: How 9/11 Helped India Penetrate Pakistan, Mr. Munshi’s book shows how a document prepared by two Indian security analysts in the year 2000, recommending to the Indian government a creative approach to expand Indian intelligence operations in Pakistan, inspired an ambitious Pakistan-specific plan after 9/11, exploiting the unprecedented uncertainty on the ground in the Pak-Afghan region.
The ultimate goal of this massive operation was “to help [India] in the foreign policy objective of breaking the monopoly of the ISI and army over Pakistan,” according to the Indian document, aptly titled, ‘India’s Experience and Need for Action Against Pakistan,’ authored by Dr. Bhashyam Kasturi and Pankaj Mehra. “The aim is,” the authors wrote, “to break the stranglehold of the intelligence agencies, the bureaucracy and the military in Pakistan.” Some Indians believe all three are responsible for keeping the Kashmir issue alive.
The Indian document seemed to have been inspired by the infamous Neocon policy papers produced by neo-conservative think tanks in the United States in late 1990s, advocating a global militaristic policy that was adopted later in the Bush presidency. There is, of course, a wider context to the great game in and around Pakistan and it includes other players.
Those Pakistanis who still believe that we should turn an insignificant domestic haggle over the judges, an issue that has more to do with anti-Musharrafism and score settling than anything else, should definitely read Mr. Munshi’s book. We need to learn how domestic politics should be managed in an important country like Pakistan, unless we want to lose everything.
Summary of the Book "The India Doctrine"
Summary of the Book "The India Doctrine" written by Barrister MBI Munshi
By S A Hannan
In India Doctrine, the writer Mr. Munshi has tried to lay emphasis on the point that India from the very beginning has been pursuing a policy of establishing hegemony in the region.
Mr. Munshi through evidences, arguments and her practices has tried to prove that the intentions of India are nothing short of this. To materialize India's objective the EU and the USA have also joined hands with her. The USA has concluded a treaty for cooperation in the nuclear field with India although it (USA) propagates non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
This nuclear agreement she did to contain the Chinese influence in the South Asian region. This is a direct threat to peace in the region. Besides the propaganda onslaught against Bangladesh and other countries here through some persons and media is on. The visit of Shaikh Hasina to India in 2003 and again in 2005, were of considerable significance. The 2007 election was also important for them since it was the desire of India that Awami League should come into power. The insurgency in Chittagong Hill Tracts was creation of India. In brief India has been instrumental in destabilizing situation in Bangladesh as well as in other countries of the South Asian region like Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka etc.
The book says India was partitioned in 1947 but India followed the undeclared policy of re-unification or Akhand Bharat since then. The skirmishes along the borders, the unabated killing of innocent civilians of Bangladesh, insurgencies in Nepal, Pakistan (Baluchistan) Sri Lanka are pointer towards this.
India does not believe in two nation theory since they consider that there are other common cultural, ethnic grounds for forming a nation. India viewed emergence of Bangladesh as an independent state which negates the division on the basis of religion.
Nehru's ideology centred round non-partition of India or the Akhand Bharat as detailed in his book, "The discovery of India" (1947). And this policy has been followed subsequently even after partition in 1947. Nehru/ruled from 1947 to 1964 and his successors were no different from him. The situation of Sikkim in 1973-75 was similar to that of Nepal's in 2006. In both cases the rulers were over thrown. The former became a constituent part of India while the latter (Nepal) began to be ruled by the persons of choice of India.
As regard Pakistan, Indira Gandhi at a public meeting on Nov, 30, 1970 observed, "India has never reconciled with the existence of Pakistan, Indian leaders always believed that Pakistan should not have been created and that Pakistan nation has no right exist".
The book says that, keeping the above in view it could be said that India's role in 1971 war to help Bangladesh was according to her own policy consideration of Akhand Bharat. The later events like looting and taking away of military equipments after Pakistanis were defeated, unequal distribution of Farraka water, killing of Bangladeshis at the borders, inciting insurgencies within Bangladesh territories, indirect interference in shaping Bangladesh foreign policy, creating problem for garment industries etc. loudly speak of the Indian intentions.
The book says that, Henry Kissinger, the then National Security Advisor and Secretary of State thought that India's help for the then East Pakistanis in their struggle for liberation was purely motivated by self-interest guided by the dream of claiming of all territories ruled by the former British colonial power. J. N. Dixit, the vet-ran diplomat in his book, "Liberation and beyond", gives the impression that it was Pakistan which wanted to break India and created condition in the former East Pakistan to make a cause to attack India. This is an absurd proposition for it was India which impeded the return of refugees when a political settlement was in the offing in the later part of 1971. Further, after 9/11, there were sufficient reasons to believe that India instigated insurgences through JMB out-fit as the confessional statement of its deceased leader proved. This was done to tarnish the image of Bangladesh as a terrorist state.
After liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, India started propaganda offensive both within and out side India against Bangladesh. Noted left leaning writers are on their pay rolls in Bangladesh. This is done to materialize their goal of Akhand Bharat. Hence it is felt necessary that against their propaganda offensive, RAW's clandestine activities, counter offensive both through media measures and active intelligence surveillance are must.
The book says that the six points became a great plea for going into a tougher movement. Had that been accepted, it was presumed that Pakistan would not have broken and nor independent Bangladesh emerged in 1971. After 1971, India became more active to make the newly emerged state its part. For this she appointed Chittarangan Sutar as Shaikh Saheb's representative in India. Sutar had direct access to Indian Prime Minister and other high officials there. His plans however failed following assassination of Shaikh Saheb in August 1975.
India entered into a 7 point agreement with the then Bangladesh government in exile (located in Calcutta) which contained provisions like no standing army for Bangladesh, Joint forces for Bangladesh with the command lying with the Indian Army Chief, identical foreign policy etc. The defeat of Pakistani army and its surrender to the Indian General, (Sans Bangladesh Army Chief) and the terms having never been shown to Bangladesh, apparently spoke that virtually Bangladesh belonged to India since India won the war with Pakistan and took its soldiers captive. The Mujib Bahini, the Rakhi Bahini etc. were created to seek their assistance in consolidating the Indian Government's authority in Bangladesh and also to use them when the appropriate time had come as thought by India. Their authority was further strengthened by the 25 years treaty of friendship which also fortified the 7 point agreement made by the government in exile. As said before the plan of subordinating Bangladesh failed following assassination of Shaikh Saheb. India could have walked over but restrained itself for fear of international condemnation etc. It however continued its effort to destabilize it and others by harboring insurgencies through RAW and other agencies in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka Nepal and Pakistan. The insurgencies in Chittagong Hill Tracts are worth mentioning.
The book has been further enriched by the valuable contributions from the eminent writers of both home and abroad. Professor Khodeja Begum in her article laid emphasis on the India's concept of Akhand Bharat or united India quoting authentic references like the 7 point agreement made between Indian government and Bangladesh government in exile. She also quoted the Ananda Bazar Patrika's observation following 1991 election. The Patrika said that the people in Bangladesh should raise their voice for merger with India. Brig Gen (Retd) Shakhawat laid emphasis on geopolitical condition of Bangladesh and suggested for careful move for making relationship with USA, China and more importantly India.
Other Nepalese and Sri Lanka writers have also blamed India for inciting insurgencies and instability in the neighboring countries. Maoists in Nepal and LTTE in Sri Lanka are the beneficiaries of the Indian government.
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By S A Hannan
E Mail : sahannan@sonarbangladesh.com
