SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT IN SHEIKH MUJIBUR RAHMAN MURDER CASE
Opinion of the Court –
a) Sections 378 and 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure contemplate that it is for the third judge to decide on what points he shall hear arguments, if any, and, that postulates that he is completely free in resolving the difference as he thinks fit, and therefore, the third learned judge was competent to decide the case of six convicts of whom the learned judges were equally divided in their opinion and thus the third learned judge was in agreement with the decision of the learned judges of the Division Bench in respect of 9 (nine) convicts of whom there was no difference in opinion.
b) The learned Sessions Judge as well as the learned Judges of the High Court Division have believed the explanation given by the prosecution regarding the delay in lodging the First Information Report on assessment of the evidence on record; this finding being a concurrent finding of fact, in our view, does not call for any interference.
c) An offence of murder has been included in section 59 (2) of the Army Act, 1952 triable under the Army Act subject to the condition that if the offender commits the said offence while in ‘active service’, but as the appellants were not in ‘active service’ within the meaning of section 8(1) of the Army Act, their trial by an ordinary criminal court is not barred by the provisions of the Army Act, and secondly, even if it is assumed that it is a ‘civil offence’ within the meaning of Section 8(2) of the Army Act, there is no legal bar for trial of such offence in view of section 94 of the said Act.
d) There is no legal evidence on record to come to the conclusion that the murder of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and other members of his family including the three security personnel was committed as a consequence of mutiny, we are of the view that it is not a case of criminal conspiracy to commit mutiny, rather it is a criminal conspiracy to commit the murder of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and other members of his family.
e) The learned Judges of the High Court Division having believed that the prosecution has been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the charge of murder against the appellants and other convicts by adducing reliable evidence, and the appellants having failed to make out a case that the High Court Division has caused a grave substantial injustice or a miscarriage of justice in accepting the death reference so far as it relates to the appellants without proper evaluation and sifting of evidence, we find no cogent ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court Division.
f) The appellants having failed to make out a case of extenuating circumstances to commute their sentence of death, we are not inclined to interfere with the sentence of death awarded to the appellants by the learned Sessions Judge and maintained by the High Court Division.
See further –
Defence arguments placed on behalf of Lt. Col. Syed Faruk Rahman and Lt. Col. Mohiuddin Ahmed
Case of Mutiny leading to Murder or a Case of Murder Simpliciter?
1. By the terms of the Leave, it is to be determined from the evidence and materials on record whether the instant case is a case of mutiny leading to murder of President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his family members or the instant case is a case of murder simpliciter. Upon the determination of the above question would depend whether it was proper on the part of the prosecution to have the appellant convicted by a normal criminal court vitiating the trial.
Upon examination of the evidence and materials on record it is clear that the series of events, activities, briefings, exercises and happening in Dhaka Cantonment in the night preceding the fateful event occurring in House No. 677, Road No. 32 Dhanmondi clearly constituted mutiny and does not indicate any case of murder simpliciter particularly when the place of occurrence includes the Cantonment and the Cantonment activities include the fact of the case. Thus it is not a case of murder simpliciter but a clear case of mutiny.
In the result, no case of agreement or implicative presence, or criminal conspiracy or pre-concert, preplan, premeditated plan or pre-arranged plan, common intention or object of common intention or any imaginable illegal act within the scope whether of Section 34 or Section 120A of the Penal Code can be lawfully inferred otherwise than by way of conjecture or surmise.
It is evident from the facts of the case as adduced, the event occurring in House No. 677 was in course of a mutiny originating in the Cantonment in the preceding night of occurrence. The killings occurring in the occurrence house resulted from mutiny and the murders are absorbed in the commission of offence of mutiny. An analogy may be found in the case of Section 396 of the Penal Code which absorbs in itself the offence of murder as an offence of dacoity with murder and not as murder simpliciter.
It may be noticed that where any ex-military participant or any other participant not subject to Army Act joined the kind of activities in the Cantonment occurring in the night following 14 August 1975 would be liable for committing mutiny within the scope of Section 31 of the Army Act. In such cases, the persons concern in the mutiny irrespective of whether there is a combination of persons subject to the Army Act, ex-military man or any civilian shall be tried by Court Martial. In the instant case such combination of persons if any, would not hinder trial by Court Martial for committing the offence of mutiny. It may be noticed that the provision of section 31 of the Army Act includes besides any person subject to Army Act, any other person in the commission of mutiny as specified therein. Thus it is clear from the facts and circumstances of the case that the trial of the case by the ordinary criminal court such as the Sessions Judge, Dhaka was not maintainable in law for want of jurisdiction thereby vitiating the trial. Thus the conviction and sentence awarded on the appellants are liable to be set aside.
Worthwhile to mention that one of the points for consideration as laid down in the judgment of the trial court is (7) Whether trial of this case by this court is without jurisdiction under the military law?
Killing of Any Person in Course of Mutiny Triable by Court Martial.
1. Three persons subject to Army Act, namely, Colonel Jamil, Sheikh Jamal and Sepoy Samsu were killed by persons subject to Army Act.
Sheikh Jamal was testified to as military officer by- PW 4, Page 247, 5th Para from bottom 1st line; PW 7, Page 276, middle of the page; PW 8, Page 284, 4th Para from top and PW 9, Page 290, 6th Para from top.
2. Killing of the three persons in this case subject to Army Act does not cover the scope of civil offence under section 59 of the Army Act. These killings including other killings are not murders simplicitor because they occurred in course of mutiny.
3. Mutiny is not a Penal Code offence; it is and offence under the Army Act and exclusively triable by Court Martial as per provision of section 31 of Army Act. Their Lordship’s of the Supreme Court in the case of Jamil Huq v. Bangladesh reported in 34 DLR (AD) 125, noted in that judgment (paragraph 28):
“These twelve petitioners have been tried and convicted by a court martial convened by the Chief of the Army Staff under the Army Act, 1952. They were charged with the offence of mutiny under the Army Act. The mutiny took place in the night of 29th/30th May, 1981, which resulted in the death of Ziaur Rahman, President of Bangladesh. These petitioners were sentenced to death.”
4. It may be noticed that section 31 of the Army Act does not contain any definition of mutiny. It is defined in section 35 of the Navy Ordinance, 1961 making it applicable to persons subject to service law.
Service law is defined in section 4 clause XXXIV of the Navy Ordinance, 1961 which makes the said definition of mutiny under the Navy Ordinance adopted by the Army Act.
5. The trial having included killing of 3 military men as per the charge is mistrial.
6. For clear understanding of case of mutiny another example is contained in the case of R Vs. Grant, Davis, Riley and Topley; All England Law Reports 1957, Volume-2 Pages 694-697. This case shows a simple nature of mutiny. Present case shows a grave nature of mutiny.
Case of Mutiny leading to Murder or a Case of Murder Simpliciter?
1. The respondent pleaded that whatever be the case, whether of mutiny or of murder, the appellants would not be prejudiced by the extent of punishment.
The present case in fact is a case of mutiny attracting section 31 of the Army Act read with section 35 of the Navy Ordinance. Section 31 of Army Act reads—
31. Mutiny and insubordination.- Any person subject to this Act who commits any of the following offences, that is to say,-- (a) ... (b) ... (c) ... (d) ... shall, on conviction by court-martial, be punished with death or with such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned.
From the above reproduction of section 31 of the Army Act it is clear that the offence of mutiny is triable exclusively by court martial and no other court; any sentence alternative to death sentence is any such less punishment. The alternative to death penalty ranges to any variety as enjoined in section 60 of the Army Act. Thus, the offence of mutiny in terms of sentence cannot be equated with that for murder under section 302 of the Penal Code. In the case of punishment for murder there is only one alternative of death penalty to imprisonment for life. So, extent of penalty in case of mutiny or in case of murder is not same and the difference is to the advantage of appellants in a trial by court martial and therefore the plea by the respondent is not correct.
2. The respondent pleaded that the event of the case involves murder attracting concurrent jurisdiction of Court Martial and Criminal Court under section 94 of the Army Act. Murder is a civil offence under section 59 of the Army Act and in this case, a civil offence of murder has been put on trial in the criminal court such as court of Sessions, Dhaka after compliance with necessary legal formalities provided in law.
The respondent pleaded concurrent jurisdiction for the trial of the case by the criminal court or court martial basing the plea on the provision of section 91 and section 92 of the Army Act. If the provisions of section 91 and section 92 of the Army Act are read together it will be clear that sub-section (2) of section 92 is relevant on the point in this case. Sub-section (2) of section 92 has made an exception to general application of the provision in case of section 31 of the Army Act as relevant in the case. The expression in that sub-section that “Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to the trial of any such person for an offence of desertion, fraudulent enrolment, or for any of the offences mentioned in section 31 or shall affect the jurisdiction of a criminal court to try any offence triable by such court as well as by a court-martial.”
Trial by court martial is embedded in section 31 of the Army Act itself as symbolized by the expression on conviction by the court-martial (quoted from section 31 of the Army Act). So, the question of concurrent jurisdiction of trial of case is misconceived. It should not be lost sight of in this connection that the alleged killing of 3 military men is so intermingled with killing of persons not subject to Army Act that the two sets of killing cannot be separated from the occurrence and such proposition is supported by Sub-section (3) of section 59 of the Army Act. So, for the trial of the present case, court martial is the appropriate court to the exclusion of the criminal court. It should be borne in mind in this connection that, persons not subject to the service law (that includes the Army Act) may be put on trial in a court martial in combination with persons subject to service law under the provision of section 31 of the Army Act read with section 35 of the Navy Ordinance.
The respondent cited section 69 of the Indian Army Act to correspond to section 59 (1) of our Army Act and section 70 of Indian Army Act to correspond to section 59 (2) of our Army Act and claimed that under section 70 of the Indian Army Act civil offence are not triable by court martial but in doing so they missed to notice that section 59 of our Army Act has 4 (four) sub-sections out of which sub-sections (3) and (4) are not covered by section 69 and 70 of the Indian Army Act and section 70 of the Indian Army Act unlike our Army Act contains the clear provision prohibiting trial of civil offences by court martial. Sub-section (3) of section 59 of our Army Act has empowered court martial to charge and punish any person without mentioning whether or not such person is subject to Army Act and exercise of such power shall not be affected by reason of the fact that the civil offence with which such person is charged is also an offence against this Act. Thus, it is clear that those laws of the Indian Army Act do not contain identical provisions in our Army Act.
Further fact is that in this case the fact of murder is inseparably incidental to the offence of mutiny as murder may be incidental to dacoity. The above proposition is supported by the case law reported in 34 DLR (AD) 125 in the case of Jamil Haq Vs. Bangladesh. (relevant extract ibid)
It may be noticed that in connection with mutiny or murder, the point for consideration as framed in the case at the trial court relevant in the context is as follows:
(7)Whether trial of this case by this court is without jurisdiction under the military law?
From the very stage of trial of the case, the appellants raised the point of ouster of jurisdiction of the trial court by the provisions of Army Act but the plea was not paid heed to. For this reason the appellants have been deprived of trial by the competent court in consequence of which the trial has been vitiated disentitling the respondent to any remedy. The appellants are entitled to be discharged from the case.
The respondent raised the plea that they have right to chose between murder and mutiny assuming that the offences are distinct and separate. In reply to it, the provision of section 5 of the Penal Code is relevant. Section 5 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
“5. Nothing in this Act is intended to repeal, vary, suspend, or affect any of the provisions of any Act for punishing mutiny and desertion of officers soldiers, sailors or airmen in the service of the Republic, or of any special or local law.”
From the above provision of law in the Penal Code it is clear that the operation of Army Act for awarding punishment for commission of any offence of mutiny shall take precedence over any provision of the Penal Code. So the respondent representing prosecution has no right to elect between the offence of murder and that of mutiny. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that concurrent jurisdiction is no abdication of jurisdiction of court martial.
A Case of Criminal Conspiracy for Murder or a Case of Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Mutiny to Change the Government?
The instant case stands on a footing on criminal conspiracy for committing murder. The case was viewed in that premise and the appellants were found guilty sustaining the conviction and sentence but the evidence and materials on record show that the criminal conspiracy involved mutiny to change the then Mujib government. In this connection it may be noticed that any allegation of mutiny carries with it the existence of conspiracy within the definition of the offence of mutiny.
It is worth noticing that the opinions of the learned Judges of the High Court Division provided supposedly respective materials from the Cantonment activities for making out the instant case as a case of criminal conspiracy for committing murder but it can be authoritatively said that there is absolutely no evidence to support any expression of resolve, designing, pronouncing, declaring, sounding, expressing or indicating in any manner whatsoever as a prelude to or preparation for killing President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, his family members and near relations. But in contrast thereto, there is overwhelming evidence on record of the case to support a case of overthrowing the then Mujib government. The evidence in that regard is reproduced below:
P.W. 7 *(Page-267)
I, Major Dalim, speaking. Sheikh Mujib has been killed; his government overthrown; martial law proclaimed in the country and so on and so forth.
----- A fact that already happened and no evidence of any fact to be caused to happen. ---- Comment
*(Page-277)
That day in a special situation, chain of command and control broke down. I think some strayed officers had influenced my solders.
P.W. 9 *(Page-290)
The chain of command of Artillery and First Bengal Lancer Unit broke down at the incident of 15 August.
*(Page-292)
These killings, looting and plunder attract offences under the Army Act. I think, this an offence under the Army Act because the chain of command of two units of the Army was broken in this incident. Every one including the Chief of Army Staff had knowledge of the 15 August incident.
*(Page-293)
It is a fact that, at dawn, immediately before the occurrence, Bangabandhu phoned General Shafiullah and said ‘Your forces attacked my house. You send force immediately.’
P.W. 12 *(Page-313)
Major Farook Rahman gave a briefing saying that ‘Tomorrow 15 August there will be a meeting in the University. In that meeting Kingship will be proclaimed by Sheikh Mujib. We do not support Kingship. Now you all will hear and obey what I and my officers say.
*(Page-318)
Major Sayed Farook Rahman addressed briefing at us: Tomorrow 15 August at the meeting in the University Sheikh Mujib will declare Kingship, which we do not accept.
P.W. 24*(Page-388)
Afterwards our C. O. Khandakar Abdur Rashid and Major Dalim addressed us saying ‘We liberated the country staking our life and comfort. Present government failed to protect the dignity of our women. People are dying in a starvation so on and so forth. So the present government has to be overthrown.
P.W. 25*(Page-398)
Major Farook Rahman, Major Rashid and Major Dalim said, ‘We librated this country at the cost of many lives, property and hard labour. This government has failed to protect the dignity of our women. Men are dying in starvation. The government is to be overthrown and you are to remain with us.
*(Page-403)
In half circle formation we closed in on the house. Solders were also posted outside the house. During operation, formation is made.
P.W. 37*(Page-465)
Thereafter Taher Uddin Thakur drafted the proclamation himself to the effect that, ‘Armed forces seized power under the leadership of Khandakar Mustaq overthrowing Sheikh Mujib and his autocratic government and clamped curfew.
----- A fact that already happened and no evidence of any fact to be caused to happen. ---- Comment
P.W. 40*(Page-484)
I said to Mr. Farook, ‘Sir, where will you go? He said, ‘I shall go to overthrow the autocratic government.’
*(Page-485)
I heard the speech of Major Dalim on Radio within 10/15 minutes of performing the morning prayer. In his speech he said, ‘Autocratic government has been overthrown. Sheikh Mujib has been killed.
----- A fact that already happened and no evidence of any fact to be caused to happen. ---- Comment
P.W. 44*(Page-518)
Major Rashid said as soon as he saw me, (the following speech is in English) “we have captured state power under Khandaker Mustaque, Sheikh is killed; do not try to take any action against us.”
----- A fact that already happened and no evidence of any fact to be caused to happen. ---- Comment
*(Page-520)
The presence of Major Farook and Major Rashid in that meeting was against Military protocol and that was why I told them, they are to be brought back to the chain of command. I said to them, (in English version) You people are Mutinous deserters and killers you will be brought back to the chain of command and tried for your crime.
P.W. 45*(Page-533)
When I contacted Safayet (P.W. 44) it appeared to me that I awoke him. I thereupon directed him to resist them with three infantry battalions (Artillery and Armor).
*(Page-543)
I had power to initiate proceeding of court martial in connection with the occurrence. I had no opportunity to initiate any court of inquiry or court martial. Given any opportunity I would have set up a court martial.
P.W. 47*(Page-552)
The message was that, we the joiners have done our job, it is now turn of you, seniors to tackle the situation and save the country. Other senior officers are already at the Radio Station, you, please, quickly come and join them. Consult with them and act accordingly.’
----- A fact that already happened and no evidence of any fact to be caused to happen. ---- Comment
P.W. 48*(Page-561)
And those who are involved in the killings and the conspiracy (in English version) they must be brought to book.
Besides them none of the whole Army was involved in the killings and conspiracy.
----- A fact that already happened and no evidence of any fact to be caused to happen. ---- Comment
P.W. 49*(Page-568)
Enquiring about the whereabouts of General Shafiullah, I at last located him in the 46th Brigade where I found a chaotic situation. I found General Shafiullah surrounded in a room by armed men with aggressive mood. I found then the situation out of control.
----- A fact that already happened and no evidence of any fact to be caused to happen. ---- Comment
· As per High Court Additional Paper Book Page No.
Even the learned 3rd Judge commented on the event saying that:
“The murder of Bangabandhu along with his family members though revolting one but the nature of the offence must not be influenced by emotion .....” (Page 1408, last Para)
“In the instant case of conspiracy and murder, most of the witnesses are also accomplices and have been deposing against accused, themselves being the parties to the offence and in the revolting nature of the facts and circumstances of the case .....” (Page 1409, last Para)
The above findings of the learned 3rd Judge is a finding of the situation as a mutiny obtaining in course of the occurrence.
Impact of exclusion of section 10 of the Evidence Act barring the admissibility of confession affecting co-accused
The Evidence Act provides special rule of evidence for proving criminal conspiracy by means of section 10. So long allegation of criminal conspiracy remains attached to the facts of the case, the requirement of section 10 is to be followed for proving the fact of conspiracy and conspirators.
All the learned 3 judges discarded the applicability or admissibility of section 10 of the Evidence Act in considering the confession against the co-accused. In the context relevant observations of learned 3 judges are reproduced below:
“In the instant case, both the learned judges have ruled out the applicability of section 10 of the Evidence Act, as the confessional statement of a co-accused cannot be used as a substantive evidence of conspiracy under section 10 of the Evidence Act against other co-accused, although the confessional statement may be admissible as evidence against the maker.” (3rd Judge, Page-1243, 2nd Para PB)
“.. .. it is seen that confession made to a third party after the common intention or conspiracy was no longer operating and had ceased to exist is not admissible as evidence under section 10 of Evidence Act. This being the state of law the confessional statement cannot be considered as evidence as against the confessing accused or the other co-accused in proving the allegation of conspiracy against the confessing accused or co-accused.” (1st Judge, Page-23, 2nd Para from bottom, Add. PB)
“.. .. it is clear that the confessional statement of a co-accused cannot be used as a substantive evidence of conspiracy under section 10 of the Evidence Act, against other co-accused conspirators. In such a legal position the confessional statements of Lt. Col. Sayed Faruque Rahman (A-1), Lt. Col. Sultan Shahriar Rashid Khan (A-2), Lt. Col. Mohiuddin Ahmed (Artillery) (A-3) cannot be used as substantive evidence of conspiracy under Section 10 of the Evidence Act against any of other rest 12 co-accused, although the said confessional statements may be admissible as evidence against the makers thereof.” (2nd Judge, Page-209, Para-2nd, Add. PB)
It is clear from the above findings that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of criminal conspiracy through the application of section 10 of the Evidence Act.
It may be noticed that there is absolutely no evidence indicating what was the offence that was intended to be committed by means of criminal conspiracy. There is no substantive evidence to support the prosecution case of the occurrence also as through the charge.
In the result of discarding the application of section 10 of the Evidence Act, all the alleged activities of the convicts lost reference to common intention---a requirement inherent in that section and therefore the prosecution case of criminal conspiracy failed. But the leaned 2nd Judge fruitlessly put his efforts in upholding the plea of criminal conspiracy by means of relying on confessions. In doing so, he failed to realize that confession is a statement made to the Magistrate and not to any co-conspirator. Further in doing so, pieces of inculpatory parts of confessions against the respective makers cannot be put up in combination to prove common intention because each such part remains confined and isolated to the maker only and no material is relevant to lend support to it.
The first part of section 10 of the Evidence Act reads “where there is reasonable ground to believe two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence . . .,” it is only when this condition precedent is satisfied, the subsequent part of the section comes into operation. Kehar Singh Vs. State, AIR 1988 SC 1883, Indira Gandhi’s Case Para-44. In this case, there is no reasonable ground to believe that the appellants conspired to commit any offence. In the result, the activities in the Cantonment deserved no consideration as part of any conspiracy. It is to be noticed that any allegation of criminal conspiracy is referable to a substantive offence but in the instant case the evidence shows overthrow of the government is substantive offence and the charge shows that allegation of murder is the tried offence.
A Case of Criminal Conspiracy for Murder or a Case of Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Mutiny to Change the Government?
1. On the plea of the respondent as to point no. 4 of the Leave granting order that the criminal conspiracy is admitted by the respondent is of no substance because criminal conspiracy may remain attached to common intention to committing murder or to commit mutiny to change the then Mujib government. There is no direct evidence in the whole of legal evidence of the case to the effect that murder was intended to be committed. If it were so, when Bangabandhu was in the grip of Major Mohiuddin and his forces, he was led from his bedroom in the upstairs down the staircase up to the slap without being harmed. This shows that those holding the grip of Bangabandhu had no intention to commit murder of him. So, there was a set of mutineers not intending to commit murder but to commit mutiny for change of the Mujib government. As such, the mutineers intending to commit murder and those to change the government are to be separated to make the offences respective to each of the accused.
2. In reply to the plea of respondent relating to PW 12, it is stated that PW 12 is not a charge sheeted witness (PW 61, Page 613, 4th Para from top).
(a) The respondent referred to PW 12 as saying that under order of appellant Farook Rahman went to the Kote for collecting ammunitions and this shows the intention of committing murder as occurred in this case. This alleged fact does not constitute to demonstrate any guilty mind of Syed Farook Rahman pointed to the alleged occurrence because PW 12 is a soldier engaged in allegedly entrusted duty and the collection of ammunition may be defensive as well as offensive and there is no indication from Syed Farook Rahman as to the use of collected ammunition for causing the occurrence.
(b) The respondent cited different PWs and submitted that their deposition shows a deployment plan in the house of occurrence, in the house of Abdur Rab Sherniabad, in the house of Sheikh Fazlul Haq Moni, at the Radio Station and sarcastically commented that the defence pleads that there is no conspiracy to commit murder. The appellants react by stating that the respondent did not see that any fact of any alleged murder cannot be construed and understood by implication from evidence in the light and perspective of common intention and/or criminal conspiracy and it must be always by clear indication as to the common intention of killing the victims. The respondent also did not see that the places of deployment and the occurrence houses of Abdur Rab Sherniabad and Sheikh Fazlul Haq Moni are not included in the charge and fact of the case. Furthermore, they did not see that conspiracy is to be suspected and discovered from the co-conspirator at the first hand. In the instant case there is no account of conspiracy from any co-conspirator of the conspiracy. In any view of the matter, all those places are places unrelated to the case from the point of view of the charge and facts of the case. Those places came to be added to the case events in course of same transaction extending the facts of the case beyond the facts of the case and thereby, illegally merging unrelated evidence with the evidence of this case and embellishing the case with unrelated evidence.
3. Respondent further pleaded that the fact of changing government and that of murder of the President remain intermingled in this case.
By such submission the respondent partly accepts our plea of change of the government. The respondent represents the prosecution of the case and burden of proof heavily lies on it. The shift of the prosecution from the position of murder simplicitor is a pointer to the fact that the prosecution case suffers from infirmity hitting the prosecution case at its root.
4. In reply to the written submission of the Attorney General on the point of criminal conspiracy for murder or for committing mutiny, the respondent relied on the decisions Mallimpggala Venkataramiah, reported in AIR 1938 (Madras) 130, in the case of East Pakistan Vs. Zakir Hossain, reportd in 8 DLR 48 and in the case of Md. Shamsul Haque Vs. State, reported in 20 DLR 540 and quoting those reported cases, stated that
“it was decided that when a conspiracy has gone beyond the stage of conspiracy and offence is committed in pursuance thereof, then conspiracy becomes irrelevant i.e. no conviction can be awarded for conspiracy if substantive offence is committed in pursuance thereof.”
Out of the above extract comes out the basic question if the substantive offence is committed in this case and the reply is in the affirmative; so it is irrelevant to embark on a research whether or not there was any existence of conspiracy.
1. It was pleaded that question number 5 of column number 5 of the form of confession having not been put to confessing convict Sayed Farook Rahman, it cannot be said that the confession is true. The form of question is a guideline to the effect that he should say nothing which is untrue. (Page 747, HC PB). In column number 6 the Magistrate did not frame any question to that effect.
The query was, whether such non-compliance was curable under section 533 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The reply is no, because such confession shall not be admitted if the error has injured the accused as to his defence on the merits. Such limitation is provided in that very section of law.
2. Another query is whether any error, omission or irregularity in the charge is curable under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
In the charge of the instant case no place of occurrence was mentioned in respect of deceased Col. Jamil. There is evidence that Col. Jamil was killed near Sobahanbag Mosque (PW 1, Page 207, 5th line from bottom; Page 213, 3rd line form top; PW 4, Page 236, 20th line form bottom; PW 8, Page 280, 3rd Para from top; PW 11, Page 300, 12th line from bottom; PW 20, Page 366, last Para).
The mention of place of occurrence is a requirement of section 222 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and any breach of such legal requirement is a breach of law, which cannot be categorise as any error, omission or irregularity of the charge such as may be cured by section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. So such defect of charge as obtaining in the case is not curable. (4 BLT 83)
3. In the light of section 367 (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure the further query is what reasons may be advanced for awarding punishment in the alternative.
In respect of convict Syed Farook Rahman:
a. His confession remains unresolved by the fact that the 1st Judge discarded it, the 2nd Judge upheld it and the 3rd Judge did not hear his case.
b. No direct evidence of his participation in the alleged killing.
c. He is a Freedom Fighter.
d. He suffered prolonged custody in death row for over 13 years.
In respect of convict Mohiuddin Ahmed (Artillery)
a. Till before the charge sheet in the case covering a long span of more then 21 years his name did not surface in connection with the alleged occurrence.
b. There is no evidence relating to him for or in connection with killing of the victims.
c. His identity is confusing as he was misidentified on dock as A. K. M. Mohiuddin. The learned 1st Judge relied on such misidentification and acquitted him. (Page 136-137, Last and 1st Para, Add. PB HC)
The learned 2nd Judge in his opinion (judgment) fell into an error as to the identity as Major A. K. M. Mohiuddin Ahmed (Artillery) thinking that he and others “being fully armed went straight to the residence of the then President situated at Road No. 32, Dhanmondi, with armed troops.” (Page 299, 27th line for bottom, Add. PB HC)
Fact remains that the present convict by the prosecution case never led any armed men to the occurrence house with armed troops.
4. On the subject captioned hereinabove Real Planner of the Event the further submission is that the citation referred to therein was material for consideration for the purpose therein contained. It appears that there is evidence through examination in-chief supporting the material and such evidence is contained in the deposition of PW 47. No piece of deposition in chief relied upon by the defence can be left out of consideration for any reason whatsoever to the prejudice of the defence. The extract of the piece of evidence is reproduced below:
At one stage, Major Rashid introduced me with his wife after the oath taking ceremony of council of Ministers. It seemed to me that Major Rashid proudly said, ‘She is my wife. She is the chief planer of all that we have done.’ (Page 552, 5th Para from bottom)
The above reproduction is evidence adduced by the prosecution in terms of section 3 of the Evidence Act. There is no plurality of planner from the extract of the evidence. So, the plurality required in the matter of section 120A or section 34 of the Penal Code is absent and the application of the said section in the case is of no legal significance.
5. The submission arising out of the findings of the learned three Judges in respect of section 10 of the Evidence Act as appearing below is now to be tested from the relevant portion of the opinion (judgment) of the 2nd Judge:-
“Pieces of inculpatory parts of confessions against the respective makers cannot be put up in combination to prove common intention because each such part remains confined to maker only.”
The opinion in respect of Farook Rahman on his confession:
“Let me now examine the confessional statements of Major Sayed Faruque Rahman (A-1) retracted subsequently. In his confessional statement, he divulged the facts of his conversations with Major Rashid (A-4), Major General Ziaur Rahman, indicating his participation in the conspiracy [plurality by participation in conspiracy remains truncated]. This was also high lighted by the evidence of P.W. 43 [P.W. 43 did not disclose any conspiracy, even by any remote implication and what was high lighted is unspecified]. In his confessional statement he said that he supported the confessional statement he said that he supported the logic of Major Rashid (A-4), Major Dalim (A-6) and Khondker Moshtaq that if necessary Sheikh Mujib had to be murdered [This context of confession does not lend assurance to other substantive evidence on record]. He also stated about holding a coordination meeting at the parade held on the night following 14th August, 1975. This was amply proved by the evidence of number of witnesses discussed above. In his address at the said night parade, he also emphasized about the change of Government and if Sheikh Mujib did not agree, if there was resistance he would be executed [This context of confession does not lend assurance to other substantive evidence on record]. His earlier belief and convictions together with that he meant what he stated has been amply proved by his orders in arming the troops by arms and ammunitions cannons with live shells and deployment of tanks not only in and around the house of the then President at Road No. 32, Dhanmondi, but in all relevant strategic positions of the city [belief and conviction is subjective in nature and what he meant is singular in nature]. His statements that he went to the house at Road No. 32, Dhanmondi, inquiring about Sheikh Mujib, rescue of Brigadier Mashrurul Haque, his role in Cantonment, in Banga Bhaban and elsewhere, as stated in his confessional statement and found on evidence, amply show that he was in the helm of affairs all around [A surmise].” (Page 305, Add. PB HC)
Comment: The above finding did not bring out any common intention.
The opinion in the relevant context in respect of Lt. Col. Mohiuddin Ahmed (Artillery): Contained in Page 306, 2nd Para from top, Add. PB HC.
In this paragraph exculpatory statements are referred to as having proved facts on evidence. Learned 2nd Judge illegally found his confession to corroborate the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses.
Comment: There is no inculpatory statement of the convict to prove any common intention.
1. In this case there is no judgment in the eye of law delivered by the Division Bench of the High Court Division. Each of the learned Judges separately signed their respective opinions on the appeal in violation of provision of section 377 of the Cr. P. C. The order dated 14.12.2000 of the High Court Division speaks for itself that both the learned Judges gave their (judgments) opinions in separate sheets.
2. The order of the learned Chief Justice dated 15.01.2001 shows that Mr. Justice Mohammad Fazlul Karim was appointed as Third Judge to dispose of the Death Reference. It is manifestly clear from the order that the Death Reference was intended to be disposed of by the learned 3rd Judge. By that order the Death Reference was not piecemealed for disposal. The purport of the order required the 3rd Judge to dispose of the Death Reference as a whole.
3. The learned 3rd Judge took up the appeal finding that:
a. The learned Judges of the High Court Division concurrently affirmed 9 condemned accused.
b. And his bench has taken up the hearing in the respect of the remaining 6 only.
c. On the conclusion of the hearing by his bench, the learned 3rd Judge acquitted 3 convicts out of 6 and confirmed the Death Reference in respect of the remaining 3 and in doing so he amalgamated the cases of 9 convicts with the 6 --- about whom he did not hear --- by confirming their conviction and sentence. Thus he misconceived that concurrent conclusion is no concurrent conviction and sentence on concurrent finding.
d. The leaned Senior Judge of the Division Bench discarded all the three confessions in this case. One of such confession is coming from Lt. Col. Mohiuddin Ahmed (Artillery) and his confession remained finally decided by the learned 3rd Judge and remaining two undecided for his exclusion from the hearing. So finality of opinion to follow the Judgment as per the provision of section 429 read with section 377 of the Cr. P. C. for the purpose of section 378 of the Cr. P. C. has not been achieved in this case.
In the case of Hethubha Vs. The State of Gujarat reported in 1970 (1) SCC (Cr) 280, held that: “It is, therefore, manifest that the third learned Judge can or will deal with the whole case.” (Page 283, Para 10)
In the case of Union of India Vs. Ananti Padmanabiah reported in 1971 SCC (Cri) 535, held that:
“This court held that the third learned Judge could deal with the whole case.” (Page 537, Para 6)
In the case of Sajjan Singh Vs. State of M. P. reported in 1999 SCC (Cri) 44, it was held:
“... The third Judge is, therefore, required to examine whole of the case independently and it cannot be said that he is bound by that part of the two opinions of the two Judges comprising the Division Bench where there is no difference. As a matter of fact the third Judge is not bound by any such opinion of the Division Bench. He is not hearing the matter as if he is sitting in a three-Judge Bench where the opinion of majority would prevail. ...” (Page 53, Para 10 & 11)
In the case of Mahim Mondal Vs. State reported in 15 DLR 615 (Para 10, 11).
Entire appeal including the point on which there was no disagreement was to be laid before the 3rd Judge and in that case, the cases reported in ILR 38 Cal. 202; AIR 1931 Lah 513 and AIR 1943 All 272 were discussed and not considered. In the concise statement of the respondent, the respondent relied upon the abovementioned reported cases that support our contention.
1. For the above purpose, section 378 and section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure need be reproduced side by side:
378. When any such case is heard before a bench of Judges and such Judges are equally divided in opinion, the case, with their opinions thereon, shall be laid before another Judge, and such Judge, after such hearing as he thinks fit shall deliver his opinion, and the judgment or order shall follow such opinion.
429. When the Judges composing the Court of Appeal are equally divided in opinion, the case, with their opinions thereon, shall be laid before another Judge of the same Court, and such Judge, after such hearing (if any) as he thinks fit, shall deliver his opinion, and the judgment or order shall follow such opinion.
The above reproductions provide the scope of comparative study of said two provisions of law.
a. Section 378 arises out of Chapter XXVII of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to submission of sentences for confirmation including sentence of death.
b. Section 429 arises out of Chapter XXXI of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to Appeals. In a pending appeal, the appellant may default in making the hearing before the third Judge and this is why the ‘hearing’ as provided in section 429 has been qualified by ‘hearing (if any)’. It should be borne in mind that where there is no criminal appeal, there is no situation to arise attracting the provision of section 429.
c. The present case involves Death Reference as well as appeals. The Judges hearing the case became equally divided in opinion so that both the provisions came into operation for the disposal of the ‘case’. It was the learned 3rd Judge who delivered his opinion to follow the judgment and order. It has been pleaded by the respondent that learned 3rd Judge has unfettered power to conduct the hearing of the case ‘as he thinks fit’.
d. Both the sections of law involve three learned Judges delivering their opinions out of which the last opinion from the learned 3rd Judge shall be conclusive opinion so that the Judgment and order shall follow such opinion.
e The respondent relied on 16 DLR (WP) 73 in the case of Abdur Raziq vs. State and cited the finding from the case law as follows:
“The plain reading of these sections [section 378 and 429 of Cr.P.C.] shows that the third Judge to whom the case is referred need not agree with the finding of either of the two Judges. He is to give an independent opinion and then give his finding.”
The above proposition finds support from the case reported in 1999 SCC (Cri) 44 in the case of Sajjan Singh Vs. State of M. P. and the relevant extract is as follows:
“The third Judge is, therefore, required to examine whole of the case independently and it cannot be said that he is bound by that part of the two opinions of the two Judges comprising the Division Bench where there is no difference. As a matter of fact the third Judge is not bound by any such opinion of the Division Bench. He is not hearing the matter as if he sitting in a three-Judge Bench where the opinion of majority would prevail.”
In this regard both the parties being the appellants and respondent cited Hethubha vs. State of Gujarat AIR 1970 SC 1266. In that case the 1st Judge convicted accused no. 1 under section 302 and accused nos. 2 and 3 under section 324/34. The 2nd Judge held that all the accused must be acquitted. The 3rd Judge convicted accused no. 1 under section 302 and accused nos. 2 and 3 under section 302/34. The 3rd Judge upheld conviction under section 323 of accused nos. 1 and 2 and section 323/34 of accused no. 3.
From the scope of authority of the learned 3rd Judge under the above mentioned two sections of law is so wide that he can deliver his opinion ‘as he thinks fit’. But ‘as he thinks fit’ in both the sections has been misinterpreted on behalf of the respondent reading that those words qualify the hearing.
It is stated that hearing is a matter circumscribed by the case itself and there is no correlation between the ‘hearing’ and ‘as he thinks fit’
f. In paragraph 2 of the submission on behalf of the respondent, they solicited clear guideline on the point of scope and jurisdiction of 3rd Judge. But there are consensus of opinions in the case laws of our country as well as of India and erstwhile Pakistan on the subject.
g. The citation relied upon by the respondent of the case of Sarat Chandra Mitra Vs. Emperor reported in ILR 38 Cal 202, an extract from the Judgment was reproduced at page 9 of their submission. In the concluding portion of that extract it reads that, “It is this last opinion which prevails, subject to the provisions of section 377 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the case of confirmation of sentences of death.” So it follows in the matter of present case that for breach of provision of section 377 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there is no judgment in this case in the eye of law.
h. Two confessions of Syed Farook Rahman and Shahriar Rashid Khan remain hanging without being resolved by the learned 3rd Judge. It is pleaded by the respondent without dispute that the 3rd Judge will hear the difference of opinion but the learned 3rd Judge did not hear the difference and resolve it.
i. It was pleaded that the learned 3rd Judge concurred with the opinion of the other Judges regarding 9 convicts and was therefore, right in dismissing the appeals and accepting the death reference but in doing so missed to notice that the convicts were denied hearing as a requirement of law. So the plea of the respondent that the confirmation of death sentence by the learned 3rd Judge as a condition precedent as enjoined in section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is now overcome has no substance because the confirmation proceeding is not complete by reason of the 3rd Judge defaulting to give his finding on the evidence and hanging two confessions.
Delay in Lodging the FIR
1 Paragraph 5 of the above heading of our written submission in support of argument has not been controverted on behalf of the respondent.
Whether charge under section 302/34 of the Penal Code has been proved on the basis of proper evaluation and sifting of evidence on Record?
1. e. PW 50 is not an eyewitness. As per testimonies of PW 1 and PW 50 they claimed they were together in the ground floor of the occurrence house during the occurrence. PW 1 claimed he sustained injury but does not refer to PW 50 also to have sustained injury. Conversely, PW 50 does not say PW 1 had sustained any injury. Their respective testimonies are materially discrepant.
Mistake and error inadvertently occurred in the above submission under the above caption in respect of PW 1 and PW 50. Correct submission would be that PW 1 deposed as to his injury as well as to that of PW 50 but PW 50 did not depose that he saw the PW 1 to have sustained injury but stated that he came to know about the injury of PW 1 from him.
PW 1 stated, “One bullet struck me in the heel. Another bullet hit D.S.P. Nurul Islam in his leg.” (Page 207, 16th line from top)
On the other hand PW 50 D.S.P. Nurul Islam Khan deposed, “At that time I saw scars of blood on the shirt of Mohitul Islam who gave out that he has also been hit.” (Page 572, 3rd line from bottom of 3rd Para)
The prosecution case is that both the witnesses were together in the occurrence house and in that case, PW 50 does not require to know from PW 1 that he sustained injury. It shows that PW 50 did not see PW 1 to have sustained injury. It became doubtful if they were together at the relevant time and at the relevant place. So, their togetherness is not free from doubt and worthy of any credence.
2. The respondent pleaded that the movement and deployment of troops, amalgamation of different kinds of troops in the cantonment preceding the alleged occurrence are indicators to a pre-plan in furtherance of common intention to commit the murders.
Arguing but not conceding that if the above plea is accepted, in that case, as soon as the alleged murders were committed between 5 to 5.30 am of the morning of 15 August, 1975, the continuation of deployment of troops after the commission of the alleged murders loses all significance. It does not matter if the deployment continues to hold the ground or withdraws from their position or moves around or goes back to the barracks. In that view of the matter no furtherance of common intention can be invented in reference to such deployment and positioning of troops after the alleged murders was carried into effect.
3. In the highest court of the country for the first time at the hearing of the case the respondent by referring some pieces of evidence claimed that such pieces of evidence amount to extra judicial confession and in doing so they did not raise the issue at the trial court to enable those to subject them to a test through section 24 of the Evidence Act.
4. The respondent raised a plea on non-consideration of the Video Cassette as legal piece of evidence in the case. To back up their plea they referred to the case of Islamic Republic of Pakistan Vs. Abdul Wali Khan, reported in 1976 PLD SC 57. In that case the officer recording the speech was produced and examine along with the necessary tape played in the court. The officer identified the voice of the person speaking in the tape record. By contrast in the instant case the videographer was not produced and examined and the videograph as produced was admittedly a copy of the original from Granada Independent Television in the United Kingdom (Page-1034, HC PB).
2. Indemnity (Repeal) Act, 1996 was published in the Gazette on 14.11.1996 (49 DLR Statute 24)
3. Awami League Government came to power on 26.06.1996
4. The FIR dated 02.10.1996 shows that it was lodged with the Dhanmondi Police Station by PW 1 and the same was recorded by PW. 56, the then officer in Charge of that Police Station. So it appears that the operation of the Indemnity Ordinance, 1975 which was repealed on 14.11.1996 did not hinder earlier in point of time the lodging of the FIR on 02.10.1996.
5. PW. 1 explained that consequent upon accession of Awami League to power he was free from fear and insecurity of life and that is why there was delay in lodging the FIR. But the facts remain that Awami League Came to power on 26.06.1996 but the FIR was lodged on 02.10.1996, that is to say, after above 3 months. There is no explanation whatsoever for this delay of above 3 months. It may be noticed that PW. 1 was so much impatient in lodging the FIR that he did not wait for the repeal of the Indemnity Ordinance. Such impatience is not compatible with causing the delay of above 3 months in filing the FIR from the date of Awami League coming to power.
6. a. PW 1 not any eyewitness.
The Investigating Officer PW 61 stated in his cross examination that
I examined the informant on matters outside the First Information Report and recorded the same. I examined the informant on 3.10.96, 4.10.96, 24.10.96, 10.1.97. During such examination names of Rama PW 2 and Salim PW 3 residents of occurrence house transpired on 3.10.96. On 4.10.96 I collected information on Rabbani, A.D.C. to the President (PW 15) and on Aziz ... ...
and further stated in cross examination that, “... on 3.10.96 and 4.10.96 the informant named some persons and from them he came to know about the incident.” (page-612 of HC PB)
b. 450 persons had to be tested by I. O. Page 614, 4th Para from top; Page 622, 4th line from bottom.
c. The delay in FIR was aimed at tutoring witnesses.
d. Object of delay was to present a concocted but seemingly plausible prosecution case.
PW 1 stated that
I prepared the present First Information Report after adding some thing with the First Information Report which I had presented to the Lalbag Police Station in 1976. The previous First Information Report has been torn out. (Page 211, 11th line from bottom)
1. Supreme Court (Appellate Division) Rules, 1988 is a kind of rules not covered by the definition of Rule in the General Clauses Act because Rule as defined in the General Clauses Act is a product out of exercise of power conferred by any enactment.
Enactment which includes Regulations is defined in Section 3 (17) of General Clauses Act. Regulation is defined in Section 3 (46) of the General Clauses Act but the Supreme Court (Appellate Division) Rules, 1988 can not be classed as Regulation, because Article 107 of the Constitution describes the product of Article 107 as Rules and further because General Clauses Act has been made applicable to the Constitution by Article 152 (2) of the Constitution.
2. Thus, a concise statement is a class by itself which can not be described in any class of Suits, Appeals and Applications as envisaged in Part II of the Limitation Act. It is in the class of a statement required to be furnished following granting of leave by the Appellate Division and such statements can not be classified to belong to the Suits, Appeals and Applications and can not also give rise to a situation for requiring to condone the delay. The kind of delay required to be condoned, rests in matters of procedure. But in the case of concise statement a timely response as per Rule 2 of Order XIX was imperative and no case of condonable delay is relevant in the instant case. In the case of concise statement, requirement of law has to be addressed and in the case of limitation by way of delay the cause of delay has to be addressed. Any failure to respond within time as set down in Order XIX of Supreme Court (Appellate Division) Rules is attended with consequences as laid down in Rule 3 of the said Order, and the consequences is therefore final. If for argument’s sake, it is pleaded that it is a long drawn practice that time barred concise statements have been accommodated by the Honorable Court, the plea is of no substance because acknowledgment of such practice as customary must be characterized by absence of law in that regard.
3. It is noticed that Order XIX of the Supreme Court (Appellate Division) Rules apparently relate to Civil Appeals dealing with Appellate Jurisdiction in Part II of the Supreme Court (Appellate Division) Rules but the application of the said Order in Criminal Appeals has been provided for by Rule 13 of Order XXIII adopting the before mentioned Rules to Criminal Appeals “with necessary modification and adoption so far as may be applicable”. In the instant case no modification and adaptation of the Rules contained in Order XIX of the Supreme Court (Appellate Division) Rules is necessary.
Whether Charge under section 302/34 of the Penal Code has been proved on the basis of proper evaluation and sifting of evidence on Record?
1. Proper evaluation and sifting of evidence on record clearly shows that there was no case of committing the murder pursuant to any common intention and the declared case without reservation is a case of overthrowing the government. In the view of the matter, the charge under section 302/34 of the Penal Code is irrelevant and thereby disproved. The broad fact is that there is no evidence to support any common intention or pre-concert etc. for causing the murders. It is only by means of conjecture and surmise the leaned judges invented a case of common intention or pre-concert etc. for causing the alleged murders as shown earlier.
2. If viewed from another angle, charge shows that 3 persons subject to Army Act were killed by persons subject to Army Act and as such, the charge do not attract Penal Code offence and therefore, charge has not been legally proved.
3. The charges do not specify the places of occurrence in respect of alleged killing of Colonel Jamil and Army Sepoy Samsul Haque so that the charge is incomplete and therefore, not proved.
4. The evidence adduced in the case through PW 2, (Page 219, 1st line from top and Page 221, 17th line from bottom), PW 4 (Page 236, 16th line from bottom), and PW 8 (Page 280, 3rd Para from top) speaks of the offence of looting committed by accused Honorary Captain A. Wahab Joarder in particular and generally against other participants to the alleged occurrence and this aspect of the case remains outside the purview of the charge framed.
5. The fact of looting having been over looked in framing the charge, the defence of appellant suffered misdirection in the manner of commission of alleged murder and as such, the charge has not been proved.
6. Misidentification of Mohiuddin Ahmed (Artillery) Renders the Charge not Proved
Page 136-137 Last and 1st Para (Additional PB) Judgment I J
Convict Major Mohiuddin Ahmed of Artillery misidentified on dock as Major A.K.M Mohiuddin who is not from Artillery but from Lancer then absconding.
Mohiuddin Ahmed of Artillery was not named in FIR even after long 21 years, within which time it was natural that his name could have surfaced unless his name was wrongfully inducted. His name in the case is a mistake and product of concoction for which the charge against him not proved.
Page 299, Para 4 form top (Additional PB) Judgment II J
The learned 2nd Judge misidentified Major Mohiuddin Ahmed as Major A. K. M. Mohiuddin Ahmed (Artillery) finding that he and others being fully armed went straight to the residence of the then President situated at Road No. 32, Dhanmondi with Armed Troops. This shows that even the learned 2nd Judge was mislead in proper identification of Major Mohiuddin Ahmed of Artillery.
7. Nothing of Section 34 of the Penal Code in this case of murder simplicitor
a. Nowhere in this case, there is any agreement or implicative presence, or criminal conspiracy or pre-concert, preplan, premeditated plan or pre-arranged plan, common intention or object of common intention or any imaginable illegal act that can be found to relate to committing any murder simplicitor read with section 34 of the Penal Code.
b. If the offence committed is found to be mutiny (which is a military offence) section 34 or 38 of the Penal Code has no manner of application in this case.
c. The presence, if any, of the appellant(s) in relation to the alleged occurrence may be viewed in terms of mutiny and not as murder simplicitor.
i. Presence in the Cantonment where the appellants used to reside and/or to keep engaged in the ordinary business of their military activities is prima face innocent unless contrary is proved in terms of evidence and not in terms of charge;
ii. Their presence in the routine parade is equally innocent.
iii. The presentation of the prosecution case, arguing but not conceding, may attract the provision of section 38 and not 34 of the Penal Code.
8. Impact of exclusion of section 10 of the Evidence Act barring the admissibility of confession affecting co-accused
The Evidence Act provides special rule of evidence for proving criminal conspiracy by means of section 10 and by no other means. So long allegation of criminal conspiracy remains attached to the facts of the case, the requirement of section 10 is to be followed for proving the fact of conspiracy and conspirators.
All the learned 3 judges discarded the applicability or admissibility of section 10 of the Evidence Act in considering the confession against the co-accused. In the context relevant observations of learned 3 judges are reproduced below:
“In the instant case, both the learned judges have ruled out the applicability of section 10 of the Evidence Act, as the confessional statement of a co-accused cannot be used as a substantive evidence of conspiracy under section 10 of the Evidence Act against other co-accused, although the confessional statement may be admissible as evidence against the maker.” (3rd Judge, Page-1243, 2nd Para PB)
“.. .. it is seen that confession made to a third party after the common intention or conspiracy was no longer operating and had ceased to exist is not admissible as evidence under section 10 of Evidence Act. This being the state of law the confessional statement cannot be considered as evidence as against the confessing accused or the other co-accused in proving the allegation of conspiracy against the confessing accused or co-accused.” (1st Judge, Page-23, 2nd Para from bottom, Add. PB)
“.. .. it is clear that the confessional statement of a co-accused cannot be used as a substantive evidence of conspiracy under section 10 of the Evidence Act, against other co-accused conspirators. In such a legal position the confessional statements of Lt. Col. Sayed Faruque Rahman (A-1), Lt. Col. Sultan Shahriar Rashid Khan (A-2), Lt. Col. Mohiuddin Ahmed (Artillery) (A-3) cannot be used as substantive evidence of conspiracy under Section 10 of the Evidence Act against any of other rest 12 co-accused, although the said confessional statements may be admissible as evidence against the makers thereof.” (2nd Judge, Page-209, Para-2nd, Add. PB)
It is clear from the above findings that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of criminal conspiracy through the application of section 10 of the Evidence Act.
Pieces of inculpatory parts of confessions against the respective makers cannot be put up in combination to prove common intention because each such part remains confined to maker only.
It may be noticed that there is absolutely no evidence indicating what was the offence that was intended to be committed by means of criminal conspiracy. There is no substantive evidence to support the prosecution case of the occurrence also as through the charge.
Section 10 of the Evidence Act reads:
“Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by anyone .. ..”
Thus, in the result of discarding the application of section 10 of the Evidence Act, all the alleged activities of the convicts lost reference to common intention---a requirement inherent in that section and therefore the prosecution case of criminal conspiracy backed by common intention (section 34 of the Penal Code) failed.
The first part of section 10 of the Evidence Act reads “where there is reasonable ground to believe two or more persons have conspired to commit an offence it is only when this condition precedent is satisfied, the subsequent part of the section comes into operation.”
(Kehar Singh Vs. State, AIR 1988 SC 1883, Indira Gandhi’s Case Para-44). In this case, there is no reasonable ground to believe that the appellants conspired to commit any offence. In the result, the activities in the Cantonment deserved no consideration as part of any conspiracy.
9. In the light of evidence the prosecution failed to prove the charge of murder (section 302 of the Penal Code) because---
a. PW 1 is not a eyewitness (How? Already submitted in no. 6 of the heading Delay in Lodging FIR)
b. From the chronology of events in the deposition of PW 2, Banga Bandhu was killed at 5 am. He woke up at about 5 am when he was informed by Begum Mujib about the attack of the house of Serniabat (Page 218, 1st Para). He further stated that he did not hear the sound of Bugle (Page 220, 23rd line from top), whereas PW 4 (Page 235, 15th line from bottom) and PW 5 (Page 250, 4th line from bottom) stated that they hoisted the flag and played Bugle at 5 am. Had he been an eyewitness he would have sound of Bugle.
c. PW 3 is not a eyewitness. His case as per his statement is that he was shot at his stomach and hand (Page 224, last line) confining him to 1 month 3 days in hospital (Page 226, 1st Para). Injury sustained by Military weapon of the kind as claimed cannot permit him to continue to see what happened afterwards.
d. Hoisting Flag and Playing Bugle is concoction.
The PWs 1, 2 and 3 are inmates of the house and guard PW 6 and security officer PW 50 giving the accounts of the occurrence deferent from the account given by guard PW 4 and 5 in respect of hoisting flag and playing Bugle.
In the inmates’ account including that of house guard PW 6 there is no event for hoisting the flag and playing the Bugle in the morning of occurrence. The house was under attack. It is striking to notice that in the accounts of the inmates there was development of events successively occurring without any respite for fitting in the event of hoisting the flag and playing the Bugle. Moreover, the account from PW 1, 2, 3, shows assailants already in the house keeping no occasion for hoisting the flag and playing the Bugle. It may be reasonably presumed that Banga Bandhu was killed before 6 am. (PW 4, 15-17 line from bottom Page -239, PW 5 Page 250, 251)
PW 4 (Habildar) stated that, “So I attended to duty at 5am in place of 6am.” But PW 7 (C.O.) stated that, “Then I didn’t know the program.” he further stated that, “Time schedule cannot be changed at the level of havilder.” (Page 276, 4th line from bottom)
e. PW 50 is not an eyewitness. As per testimonies of PW 1 and PW 50 they claimed they were together in the ground floor of the occurrence house during the occurrence. PW 1 claimed he was sustained injure but does not refer to PW 50 also to have sustained injury. Conversely, PW 50 does not say PW 1 had sustained any injury. Their respective testimonies are materially discrepant.
PW 50 is Charge Sheet witness no. 4 (Page 199 HC PB). He was withdrawn from serial no. 4 of the Charge sheet in violation of order no.26 dated 30.06.1997, passed by the Sessions Judge, Dhaka (relevant Page 32, 3rd line from bottom) and produced as PW 50 without any permission from the court.
10. Omission to protect the victims renders the guard PWs unreliable.
Criminal omission to protect the victims prompted the guards to depose falsely for protecting them from implication in the occurrence.
The story of taking away of the 1000 rounds of ammunition from the guards is a myth. So the accused Joarder is acquitted and no appeal was preferred.
In the case of Kehar Singh Vs. State (Indira Gandhi’s Case) AIR 1988 SC 1883 Para-280, it was held that, “to place reliance on his [guards/ security officer] testimony would be to put a premium on his irresponsibility”
11. Presence of Farook Rahman
a. There is no incriminating presence of Farook Rahman in the case relatable to the killings being the subject matter of the case.
The tank crew carrying accused Farook Rahman is not a witness of this case.
The Tank crew was intentionally withheld because if they would have produced the following suggestion would have been supported.
It is not a fact that if the tank crew of Farook Rahman would have been produced as witness, he would have disclosed that at the direction of Army Head Quarter subsequent to the occurrence, accused Farook Rahman made the outing for the sake of checkmating the civil war. (Page 623 Para 3 and 4 from bottom)
c. Tank Movement
PW 14 refers to order for moving out tank at 4 am and one tank moved to Radio Station via Cantonment old Railway Station-Mohakhali-3rd Gate and another tank taking possession on the old Racecourse. (PW 14, Page 328)
Major Dalim came to Radio Station at 5.30 am. (PW 14, Page 328)
After sometime Farook and others came to Radio Station. (PW 14, Page 329)
At about 3/3.30 am Farook Rahman came and ordered for moving out the tank from the Garage for placement at the Signal Gate road side. (PW 23, Page 382, Last Para)
At 4/4.30 am Major Farook Rahman boarded one of the tanks, which moved southwards. (PW 23, Page 383, 1st Para)
None of the witnesses deposing on Farook Rahman and tank movement stated that the tanks had their targets on the occurrence house in anticipation of or in course of the occurrence. The movements of tank had taken their position in the Radio Station and Old Racecourse. Farook Rahman’s arrival in the occurrence house was quite a long time after the occurrence had taken place. Thus, the tank movement cannot be linked with the occurrence that took place in Road No. 32, where the tank did not visit in support of the occurrence.
12. Confession not voluntary and true.
a. Farook Rahman
Confession of Farook Rahman was recorded after 32 days remand. PW 61 stated that confession of Farook Rahman was recorded after 25 days remand. Senior Judge of Division Bench held that the confession of Farook Rahman is not voluntary and question of truth does not arise.
Materials
a. Confession is dated 19.12.1996 (PW 51, Page 577 Add. PB)
b. Date of Arrest 13.08.1996 (Page 624 Add. PB)
c. 25 days remand custody in violation of section 344 of Cr. P. C. (Page 624 Add. PB)
d. Till before 19/12/96 accused Farook Rahman was never produced in the court. (PW 61, Page 615, Para 8)
e. The 1st Judge relied on 32 days of remand preceding the confession. (Page 62, last Para, Add. PB)
f. Question no. 5 of column no. 5 of the form of recording confession was not put to him for which it cannot be said whether the confession was true.
g. 32 days is a compact period involving one person subjected to severe strain and stress which cannot be piecemealed by piecing the compact period to few pieces.
b. Mohiuddin Ahmed (Artillery)
The 2nd Judge found “As such the allegation that the accused made his confessional statements after a long period of remand indicating mental and physical torture on him has got no substance. He was on remand for a period of 7 days with effect from 19.11.1996 and he made his confessional statement on 27.11.1996.” (Page 182, above 2 Paragraphs from bottom, Add. PB)
27.11.1996 is a date of wrongful confinement out of remand for 7 days and as such the confession of Mohiuddin Ahmed is to be rejected.
13. Material Non-Identification of Farook Rahman
PW 50 stated he was on duty in the house of Bang Bandhu since 31 October 1974 (Page 573, 2nd Para, Add. PB) it is therefore verily likely that he knew Farook Rahman by reason of deployment of his force for that house. He deposed “I recognized the army officer who was on the occurrence day at the occurrence place.” (Page 573, 4th Para from top, Add. PB).
[Farook Rahman was on dock on the date of deposition 10.02.1998, see order sheet, but he did not identify Farook Rahman.]
14. Real Planner of the Event
The real planner of the event is Jobaida Rashid, wife of convict Khandakar Abdur Rashid as per prosecution case. [Real planner is a single person and the question of pre-concert etc. in plurality attracting section 34 of the Penal Code does not arise.]
Jobaida Rashid Vs. The State 2 BLC 356 Para 23
15. Military PWs contradicted each other in their deposition since they did not see the occurrence.
PW 45 the then Army Chief [highest authority amongst the soldier witnesses in the case] stated that “I think the military men did not see the occurrence but made contradictory statements/ versions and provided information at different times and that is why there are discrepancies in them.”
Conclusion For Sayed Farook Rahman
1. Prolonged custody in death cell deserves reduction of death sentence to imprisonment for life. 7 BLC (AD) 52
2. In his 342 examination he disclosed that he was a Freedom Fighter and his sentence may be reduce to imprisonment for life. (38 DLR 188, Para 38)
Conclusion For Mohiuddin Ahmed (Artillery)
1. With in a span of more then 21 years, his name did not surface and his name did not appear in FIR which claims that the informant filed the FIR after gathering details of the occurrence but in such details the name of Mohiuddin Ahmed (Artillery) did not transpire. So it may be said that his name was deliberately inducted into the case in order to be sure of any doubt that the person bearing the name of Mohiuddin is netted in the case.
2. A question in respect of Major Mohiuddin Ahmed of Artillery remains unanswered and the question is whether the alleged deployment of artillery battery near Kalabagan allegedly along with this convict was in connection with killing of the occurrence victims or in connection with overthrow the government? There is no evidence relating to him for or in connection with killing of the victims.
3. Gist is that Supreme Court may go through evidence if there is dissenting opinion as to death sentence and in that case death sentence may be reduced to another form. AIR 1955 (SC) 216 (Para 9 & 37)
4. It is safer, therefore to err in acquitting than in convicting him. (Convict Balabir Singh acquitted) AIR 1988 (SC) 1883 (Indira Gandhi’s Case)
Whether Charge under section 302/34 of the Penal Code has been proved on the basis of proper evaluation and sifting of evidence on Record?
1. Proper evaluation and sifting of evidence on record clearly shows that there was no case of committing the murder pursuant to any common intention and the declared case without reservation is a case of overthrowing the government. In the view of the matter, the charge under section 302/34 of the Penal Code is irrelevant and thereby disproved. The broad fact is that there is no evidence to support any common intention or pre-concert etc. for causing the murders. It is only by means of conjecture and surmise the leaned judges invented a case of common intention or pre-concert etc. for causing the alleged murders as shown earlier.
2. If viewed from another angle, charge shows that 3 persons subject to Army Act were killed by persons subject to Army Act and as such, the charge do not attract Penal Code offence and therefore, charge has not been legally proved.
3. The charges do not specify the places of occurrence in respect of alleged killing of Colonel Jamil and Army Sepoy Samsul Haque so that the charge is incomplete and therefore, not proved.
4. The evidence adduced in the case through PW 2, (Page 219, 1st line from top and Page 221, 17th line from bottom), PW 4 (Page 236, 16th line from bottom), and PW 8 (Page 280, 3rd Para from top) speaks of the offence of looting committed by accused Honorary Captain A. Wahab Joarder in particular and generally against other participants to the alleged occurrence and this aspect of the case remains outside the purview of the charge framed.
5. The fact of looting having been over looked in framing the charge, the defence of appellant suffered misdirection in the manner of commission of alleged murder and as such, the charge has not been proved.
6. Misidentification of Mohiuddin Ahmed (Artillery) Renders the Charge not Proved
Page 136-137 Last and 1st Para (Additional PB) Judgment I J
Convict Major Mohiuddin Ahmed of Artillery misidentified on dock as Major A.K.M Mohiuddin who is not from Artillery but from Lancer then absconding.
Mohiuddin Ahmed of Artillery was not named in FIR even after long 21 years, within which time it was natural that his name could have surfaced unless his name was wrongfully inducted. His name in the case is a mistake and product of concoction for which the charge against him not proved.
Page 299, Para 4 form top (Additional PB) Judgment II J
The learned 2nd Judge misidentified Major Mohiuddin Ahmed as Major A. K. M. Mohiuddin Ahmed (Artillery) finding that he and others being fully armed went straight to the residence of the then President situated at Road No. 32, Dhanmondi with Armed Troops. This shows that even the learned 2nd Judge was mislead in proper identification of Major Mohiuddin Ahmed of Artillery.
7. Nothing of Section 34 of the Penal Code in this case of murder simplicitor
a. Nowhere in this case, there is any agreement or implicative presence, or criminal conspiracy or pre-concert, preplan, premeditated plan or pre-arranged plan, common intention or object of common intention or any imaginable illegal act that can be found to relate to committing any murder simplicitor read with section 34 of the Penal Code.
b. If the offence committed is found to be mutiny (which is a military offence) section 34 or 38 of the Penal Code has no manner of application in this case.
c. The presence, if any, of the appellant(s) in relation to the alleged occurrence may be viewed in terms of mutiny and not as murder simplicitor.
i. Presence in the Cantonment where the appellants used to reside and/or to keep engaged in the ordinary business of their military activities is prima face innocent unless contrary is proved in terms of evidence and not in terms of charge;
ii. Their presence in the routine parade is equally innocent.
iii. The presentation of the prosecution case, arguing but not conceding, may attract the provision of section 38 and not 34 of the Penal Code.
8. Impact of exclusion of section 10 of the Evidence Act barring the admissibility of confession affecting co-accused
The Evidence Act provides special rule of evidence for proving criminal conspiracy by means of section 10 and by no other means. So long allegation of criminal conspiracy remains attached to the facts of the case, the requirement of section 10 is to be followed for proving the fact of conspiracy and conspirators.
All the learned 3 judges discarded the applicability or admissibility of section 10 of the Evidence Act in considering the confession against the co-accused. In the context relevant observations of learned 3 judges are reproduced below:
“In the instant case, both the learned judges have ruled out the applicability of section 10 of the Evidence Act, as the confessional statement of a co-accused cannot be used as a substantive evidence of conspiracy under section 10 of the Evidence Act against other co-accused, although the confessional statement may be admissible as evidence against the maker.” (3rd Judge, Page-1243, 2nd Para PB)
“.. .. it is seen that confession made to a third party after the common intention or conspiracy was no longer operating and had ceased to exist is not admissible as evidence under section 10 of Evidence Act. This being the state of law the confessional statement cannot be considered as evidence as against the confessing accused or the other co-accused in proving the allegation of conspiracy against the confessing accused or co-accused.” (1st Judge, Page-23, 2nd Para from bottom, Add. PB)
“.. .. it is clear that the confessional statement of a co-accused cannot be used as a substantive evidence of conspiracy under section 10 of the Evidence Act, against other co-accused conspirators. In such a legal position the confessional statements of Lt. Col. Sayed Faruque Rahman (A-1), Lt. Col. Sultan Shahriar Rashid Khan (A-2), Lt. Col. Mohiuddin Ahmed (Artillery) (A-3) cannot be used as substantive evidence of conspiracy under Section 10 of the Evidence Act against any of other rest 12 co-accused, although the said confessional statements may be admissible as evidence against the makers thereof.” (2nd Judge, Page-209, Para-2nd, Add. PB)
It is clear from the above findings that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of criminal conspiracy through the application of section 10 of the Evidence Act.
Pieces of inculpatory parts of confessions against the respective makers cannot be put up in combination to prove common intention because each such part remains confined to maker only.
It may be noticed that there is absolutely no evidence indicating what was the offence that was intended to be committed by means of criminal conspiracy. There is no substantive evidence to support the prosecution case of the occurrence also as through the charge.
Section 10 of the Evidence Act reads:
“Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by anyone .. ..”
Thus, in the result of discarding the application of section 10 of the Evidence Act, all the alleged activities of the convicts lost reference to common intention---a requirement inherent in that section and therefore the prosecution case of criminal conspiracy backed by common intention (section 34 of the Penal Code) failed.
The first part of section 10 of the Evidence Act reads “where there is reasonable ground to believe two or more persons have conspired to commit an offence it is only when this condition precedent is satisfied, the subsequent part of the section comes into operation.”
(Kehar Singh Vs. State, AIR 1988 SC 1883, Indira Gandhi’s Case Para-44). In this case, there is no reasonable ground to believe that the appellants conspired to commit any offence. In the result, the activities in the Cantonment deserved no consideration as part of any conspiracy.
9. In the light of evidence the prosecution failed to prove the charge of murder (section 302 of the Penal Code) because---
a. PW 1 is not a eyewitness (How? Already submitted in no. 6 of the heading Delay in Lodging FIR)
b. From the chronology of events in the deposition of PW 2, Banga Bandhu was killed at 5 am. He woke up at about 5 am when he was informed by Begum Mujib about the attack of the house of Serniabat (Page 218, 1st Para). He further stated that he did not hear the sound of Bugle (Page 220, 23rd line from top), whereas PW 4 (Page 235, 15th line from bottom) and PW 5 (Page 250, 4th line from bottom) stated that they hoisted the flag and played Bugle at 5 am. Had he been an eyewitness he would have sound of Bugle.
c. PW 3 is not a eyewitness. His case as per his statement is that he was shot at his stomach and hand (Page 224, last line) confining him to 1 month 3 days in hospital (Page 226, 1st Para). Injury sustained by Military weapon of the kind as claimed cannot permit him to continue to see what happened afterwards.
d. Hoisting Flag and Playing Bugle is concoction.
The PWs 1, 2 and 3 are inmates of the house and guard PW 6 and security officer PW 50 giving the accounts of the occurrence deferent from the account given by guard PW 4 and 5 in respect of hoisting flag and playing Bugle.
In the inmates’ account including that of house guard PW 6 there is no event for hoisting the flag and playing the Bugle in the morning of occurrence. The house was under attack. It is striking to notice that in the accounts of the inmates there was development of events successively occurring without any respite for fitting in the event of hoisting the flag and playing the Bugle. Moreover, the account from PW 1, 2, 3, shows assailants already in the house keeping no occasion for hoisting the flag and playing the Bugle. It may be reasonably presumed that Banga Bandhu was killed before 6 am. (PW 4, 15-17 line from bottom Page -239, PW 5 Page 250, 251)
PW 4 (Habildar) stated that, “So, attended to my duty at 5 am in place of 6 am.” (Page 239, Para 7). But PW 7 (C.O.) stated that, “Time of program was not known to me.” (Page 275, 2nd Para) he further stated that, “The time schedule for duty cannot be changed at the level of Habildar.” (Page 276, 4th line from bottom)
e. PW 50 is not an eyewitness. As per testimonies of PW 1 and PW 50 they claimed they were together in the ground floor of the occurrence house during the occurrence. PW 1 claimed he sustained injury but does not refer to PW 50 also to have sustained injury. Conversely, PW 50 does not say PW 1 had sustained any injury. Their respective testimonies are materially discrepant.
PW 50 is Charge Sheet witness no. 4 (Page 199 HC PB). He was withdrawn from serial no. 4 of the Charge sheet in violation of order no.26 dated 30.06.1997, passed by the Sessions Judge, Dhaka (relevant Page 32, 3rd line from bottom) and produced as PW 50 without any permission from the court.
10. Omission to protect the victims renders the guard PWs unreliable.
Criminal omission to protect the victims prompted the guards to depose falsely for protecting them from implication in the occurrence.
The story of taking away of the 1000 rounds of ammunition from the guards is a myth. So the accused Joarder is acquitted and no appeal was preferred.
In the case of Kehar Singh Vs. State (Indira Gandhi’s Case) AIR 1988 SC 1883 Para-280, it was held that,
“to place reliance on his [guards/ security officer] testimony would be to put a premium on his irresponsibility”
11. Presence of Farook Rahman
a. There is no incriminating presence of Farook Rahman in the case relatable to the killings being the subject matter of the case.
b. PW 61 I.O. of the case stated that, “The tank crew carrying accused Farook Rahman is not a witness of this case."
It was pleaded:
The Tank crew was intentionally withheld because if they would have been produced, the following suggestion would have been supported.
It is not a fact that if the tank crew of Farook Rahman would have been produced as witness, he would have disclosed that at the direction of Army Head Quarter subsequent to the occurrence, accused Farook Rahman made the outing for the sake of checkmating the civil war. (Page 623 Para 3 and 4 from bottom)
c. Tank Movement
PW 14 refers to order for moving out tank at 4 am and one tank moved to Radio Station via Cantonment old Railway Station-Mohakhali-3rd Gate and another tank taking possession on the old Racecourse. (PW 14, Page 328)
Major Dalim came to Radio Station at 5.30 am. (PW 14, Page 328)
After sometime Farook and others came to Radio Station. (PW 14, Page 329)
At about 3/3.30 am Farook Rahman came and ordered for moving out the tank from the Garage for placement at the Signal Gate road side. (PW 23, Page 382, Last Para)
At 4/4.30 am Major Farook Rahman boarded one of the tanks, which moved southwards. (PW 23, Page 383, 1st Para)
None of the witnesses deposing on Farook Rahman and tank movement stated that the tanks had their targets on the occurrence house in anticipation of or in course of the occurrence. The movements of tank had taken their position in the Radio Station and Old Racecourse. Farook Rahman’s arrival in the occurrence house was quite a long time after the occurrence had taken place. Thus, the tank movement cannot be linked with the occurrence that took place in Road No. 32, where the tank did not visit in support of the occurrence.
12. Confession not voluntary and true.
a. Farook Rahman
Confession of Farook Rahman was recorded after 32 days remand. PW 61 stated that confession of Farook Rahman was recorded after 25 days remand. Senior Judge of Division Bench held that the confession of Farook Rahman is not voluntary and question of truth does not arise.
Materials
a. Confession is dated 19.12.1996 (PW 51, Page 577 Add. PB)
b. Date of Arrest 13.08.1996 (Page 624 Add. PB)
c. 25 days remand custody in violation of section 344 of Cr. P. C. (Page 624 Add. PB)
d. Till before 19.12.96 accused Sayed Farook Rahman produced in any court. (PW 61, Page 615, Para 8)
e. The 1st Judge relied on 32 days of remand preceding the confession. (Page 62, last Para, Add. PB)
f. Question no. 5 of column no. 5 of the form of recording confession was not put to him for which it cannot be said whether the confession was true.
g. 32 days is a compact period involving one person subjected to severe strain and stress which cannot be piecemealed by piecing the compact period to few pieces.
b. Mohiuddin Ahmed (Artillery)
The 2nd Judge found “As such the allegation that the accused made his confessional statements after a long period of remand indicating mental and physical torture on him has got no substance. He was on remand for a period of 7 days with effect from 19.11.1996 and he made his confessional statement on 27.11.1996.” (Page 182, above 2 Paragraphs from bottom, Add. PB)
27.11.1996 is a date of wrongful confinement out of remand for 7 days and as such the confession of Mohiuddin Ahmed is to be rejected.
13. Material Non-Identification of Farook Rahman
PW 50 stated he was on duty in the house of Banga Bandhu since 31 October 1974 (Page 573, 2nd Para, Add. PB) it is therefore verily likely that he knew Farook Rahman by reason of deployment of his force for that house. He deposed “On the date of occurrence at the place of occurrence ... I could recognize who was the Army officer.” (Page 573, 4th Para from top, Add. PB).
[Farook Rahman was on dock on the date of deposition 10.02.1998, see order sheet, but he did not identify Farook Rahman.]
14. Real Planner of the Event
The real planner of the event is Jobaida Rashid, wife of convict Khandakar Abdur Rashid as per prosecution case. [Real planner is a single person and the question of pre-concert etc. in plurality attracting section 34 of the Penal Code does not arise.]
Jobaida Rashid Vs. The State 2 BLC 356 Para 23
15. Military PWs contradicted each other in their deposition since they did not see the occurrence.
PW 45 the then Army Chief [highest authority amongst the soldier witnesses in the case] stated that “I think the military men did not see the occurrence but made contradictory statements/ versions and provided information at different times and that is why there are discrepancies in them.“
Conclusion For Sayed Farook Rahman
1. Prolonged custody in death cell deserves reduction of death sentence to imprisonment for life. 7 BLC (AD) 52
2. In his 342 examination he disclosed that he was a Freedom Fighter and his sentence may be reduce to imprisonment for life. (38 DLR 188, Para 38)
Conclusion For Mohiuddin Ahmed (Artillery)
1. With in a span of more then 21 years, his name did not surface and his name did not appear in FIR which claims that the informant filed the FIR after gathering details of the occurrence but in such details the name of Mohiuddin Ahmed (Artillery) did not transpire. So it may be said that his name was deliberately inducted into the case in order to be sure of any doubt that the person bearing the name of Mohiuddin is netted in the case.
2. A question in respect of Major Mohiuddin Ahmed of Artillery remains unanswered and the question is whether the alleged deployment of artillery battery near Kalabagan allegedly along with this convict was in connection with killing of the occurrence victims or in connection with overthrow the government? There is no evidence relating to him for or in connection with killing of the victims.
3. Gist is that Supreme Court may go through evidence if there is dissenting opinion as to death sentence and in that case death sentence may be reduced to another form. AIR 1955 (SC) 216 (Para 9 & 37)
4. It is safer, therefore to err in acquitting than in convicting him. (Convict Balabir Singh acquitted) AIR 1988 (SC) 1883 (Indira Gandhi’s Case)
Why are such glaring truths about the effects of our policies continuously ignored?
By Glenn Greenwald
The British journalist Johann Hari has written an absolutely vital article for The Independent, examining a growing movement of former hardened Islamic militants who are now devoted to teaching a more moderate and less fundamentalist Islam. Hari focuses on understanding what motivates some Muslims to turn to radicalism and terrorism in the first place, and how that process can be reversed. Though these ex-militants have very diverse backgrounds, they all stress two critical facts: (1) the more the foreign policy of the West is seen as aggressive, violent and oppressive to the Muslim world, the easier it is to convert Muslims to violent radicalism, and (2) the most potent weapon for undermining Islamic extremism is the efforts of Westerners to work against their own governments' belligerent policies: ·Continue Reading To my surprise, the ex-jihadis said their rage about Western foreign policy -- which was real, and burning -- emerged only after their identity crises, and as a result of it. They identified with the story of oppressed Muslims abroad because it seemed to mirror the oppressive disorientation they felt in their own minds. . . . But once they had made that leap to identify with the Umma – the global Muslim community -- they got angrier the more abusive our foreign policy came. Every one of them said the Bush administration's response to 9/11 -- from Guantanamo to Iraq -- made jihadism seem more like an accurate description of the world. Hadiya Masieh, a tiny female former HT organiser, tells me: "You'd see Bush on the television building torture camps and bombing Muslims and you think -- anything is justified to stop this. What are we meant to do, just stand still and let him cut our throats?" But the converse was -- they stressed -- also true. When they saw ordinary Westerners trying to uphold human rights, their jihadism began to stutter. Almost all of them said that they doubted their Islamism when they saw a million non-Muslims march in London to oppose the Iraq War: "How could we demonise people who obviously opposed aggression against Muslims?" asks Hadiya. One of the leaders of Britain's movement of ex-Islamists, Maajid Nawaz, recounts how his hardened militarism began when, as a youth, he read "leaflets saying Muslims were being massacred all over the world, from India to Bosnia to Southend." In 2000, he moved to Egypt and began recruiting students into radicalism. Listen to what he says about what helped and hindered his efforts: He started to recruit other students, as he had done so many times before. But it was harder. "Everyone hated the [unelected] government [of Hosni Mubarak], and the US for backing it," he says. But there was an inhibiting sympathy for the victims of 9/11 -- until the Bush administration began to respond with Guantanamo Bay and bombs. "That made it much easier. After that, I could persuade people a lot faster." Nawaz was ultimately imprisoned in Egypt and was surrounded by Egyptian prisoners who were being brutally tortured by a government propped up by the U.S. (he was spared only because he was a British citizen). Consider what began to change Nawaz's views on the rightness of his Islamic extremism: Maajid's Islamist convictions were about to be challenged from two unexpected directions -- the men who murdered Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and Amnesty International. HT [the Islamic group which he had headed] abandoned Maajid as a "fallen soldier" and barely spoke of him or his case. But when his family were finally allowed to see him, they told him he had a new defender. Although they abhorred his political views, Amnesty International said he had a right to free speech and to peacefully express his views, and publicised his case. "I was just amazed," Maajid says. "We'd always seen Amnesty as the soft power tools of colonialism. So, when Amnesty, despite knowing that we hated them, adopted us, I felt -- maybe these democratic values aren't always hypocritical. Maybe some people take them seriously ... it was the beginning of my serious doubts." In other words, the very policies the U.S. has been pursuing in the name of combating Terrorism -- invading, occupying, and bombing Muslim countries; locking them up without trials; torturing them; violating the values we've been preaching to the world -- have been the most potent instruments for fueling Islamic radicalism and terrorism. By contrast, those who have been continuously accused of being "soft on Terrorism" and even being allied with the Terrorists -- those who opposes our various wars, who demanded and provided basic human rights protections and equal liberties to Muslims, who objected to their own governments' oppressive and belligerent policies -- have done more to diffuse and impede Muslim radicalism than virtually anyone else in the world. These truths are so self-evident that they shouldn't require journalists like Hari to document. If we invade, bomb and attack Muslim countries -- and uniquely deny to them the rights we claim are universal (such as the right to be free of torture and imprisonment without trials) -- then far more Muslims are going to wallow in rage and hatred for the West and be willing and eager to return the treatment. Conversely, seeing Westerners speak out against their countries' attacks on, and oppressive policies towards, Muslims renders far harder to sustain the divisiveness and demonization on which all radicalism feeds. This is all basic cause and effect, as even the Pentagon's own Task Force concluded all the way back in 2004 in explaining how and why our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are severely exacerbating the threat of Terrorism. Despite how obvious and well-documented these truths are, so many American elites continue to ignore them. Writing in Newsweek this week, Slate's Editor-in-Chief Jacob Weisberg looks at the Fort Hood shootings and various disrupted terrorist plots and concludes that Obama has perhaps been too conciliatory towards Muslims; that "Obama's [so-called] olive-branch strategy" has not made us safer, at least in the short-term; and that "Obama's heritage feeds a broader suspicion that he is too casual about the threat from America's Islamist enemies." In what fantasy world is Jacob Weisberg living? Obama is presiding over active wars in three separate Muslim countries -- Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. All year long, there has been an abundance of video footage of Muslim villages -- including scores of women and children -- being wiped out by American air raids. Obama has already escalated the war in Afghanistan. His administration is actively demanding the right to abduct people and imprison them at Bagram with no charges and is actively protecting those who spent the last decade torturing Muslims and disppearing them to secret camps. Our steadfast alliance with Israel -- which The New York Times' Mark Mazzetti documented this weekend was a prime motivating factor in the militarism and hatred of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed -- has been symbolically altered by Obama but otherwise remains fully in place. It's true that Obama has sand-papered some of the roughest rhetorical and policy edges of the Bush/Cheney approach -- explicitly barring torture and CIA black sites, trying to close Guantanamo, sounding a far different tone in how he speaks about and to the Muslim world -- but, at least so far, many of the fundamentals remain largely in place, and it's thus unsurprising that Obama's intense international popularity has not yet translated to much of the Muslim world. Despite all that, people like Jacob Weisberg fret that Obama "has not taken the radical Islamist threat to American security -- at home or in Afghanistan -- seriously enough," and demand that Obama announce to the world that "America does not face a threat from the perversion of faith in general. We face a threat from the perversion of one faith in particular." Even in the face of mountains of evidence that this sort of heightened aggression and oppression exacerbates the threat of Islamic terrorism, people like Weisberg continue to demand more of it. And even in the face of the most compelling evidence imaginable that accommodation to the Muslim world and treating Muslims equally and respectfully is the greatest threat to the Islamic extremist, people like Weisberg perpetually worry that we're doing too much of that. At some point, a rational person has to wonder whether people like Jacob Weisberg -- who endlessly advocate policies that fuel Islamic extremism and intensify tension between the West and the Muslim world -- aren't desirous of exactly that outcome. After decades of pursuing this blatantly counter-productive approach, what else could explain such moral and intellectual blindness?
By courtesy of Senior Advocate Khan Saifur Rahman (Defence counsel of Col. Sayyed Farook Rahman) who has kindly permitted DeshCalling to republish the following article whose logic may be applied to the BDR mutiny cases if serving army officers could be found complicit in the tragic event and which by extension may allow the application of the Army Act to BDR personnel. This possibility would only arise if the Supreme Court finds that the Bangabandhu Murder Case should have been tried through court martial rather than the civilian court procedure. This is, of course, only my humble opinion and a point that was not considered by the Supreme Court when it heard the presidential reference on the appropriate trial process for the BDR mutiny cases -
SHEIKH MUJIBUR RAHMAN MURDER CASE— A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
Khan Saifur Rahman
Senior Advocate
Supreme Court of Bangladesh
2001
For anybody concerned in the case of what is commonly known as the Bangabandhu Murder Case, there is a pressing need for assessing what kind of occurrence had taken place in the morning of 15th August 1975. It calls for a realistic legal formulations to judge which way the balance of justice tilts --- in favour of conviction to capital sentence or in favour of acquittal?
It is an admitted fact that uniformed members of the Army from the Dhaka Cantonment had made an outing during the night of 14th/15th August to cause the incident. Besides the military men, some ex-military men and some civilians seemed to have been involved in activities that caused the incident.
In the nature of the above incident, another incident took place in the night of 29th/30th May, 1981 at the Chittagong Circuit House. Some of the members of the Army from the Chittagong Cantonment made their way into the said circuit house where the-then President Ziaur Rahman was staying. He was killed by those military men in uniform.
In the latter incident, a general field court-martial was instituted on charge of mutiny, basing on the incident that occurred in the night of 29th/30th May. 12 military men went to the gallows in the result of the verdict given by the said court-martial. It may be noticed that the military offenders were put on trial by their domestic tribunal which was the said court-martial.
The only distinguishing feature between the two incidents --- one occurring August 14th/15th, 1975 and the other occurring 29th/30th May, 1981 is that in the former, besides military men, were also involved ex-military men and civilians; In the latter only exclusively military men were involved. That is the extent of the difference between the two. Now the question is --- will that matter anyway on that account?
To get to the answer, it calls for scrutinizing what constitutes mutiny, who are to be offenders and what is the extent of punishment for the same under the military law, more particularly under the Army Act. The provision relating to mutiny is enjoined in section 31 of the Army Act, 1952, which is reproduced below: "Mutiny and insubordination - Any person subject to this Act who commits any of the following offences, that is to say, -
1. begins, incites, causes, or conspires with any other person to cause, or joins in, any mutiny in the military, naval or air forces of Bangladesh or any forces co-operating therewith or
2. being present at any such mutiny, does not use his utmost endeavours to suppress the same; or
3. knowing or having reason to believe in the existence of any such mutiny or any intention to commit such mutiny, or of any such conspiracy, does not without reasonable delay give information thereof to his commanding or other superior officer; or
4. attempts to seduce any person in the military, naval or air forces of B.D. from his duty or his allegiance to the Government of Bangladesh' shall, on conviction by court-martial, be punished with death or with such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned."
The above reproduction of the relevant provision of law clearly shows that a mutiny was staged in the Dhaka Cantonment in the night of August 14th /15th 1975 and the uniformed members of the Army (in the language of the said provision "persons subject to the Army Act") incited and conspired together with other persons, that is to say, with other ex-military men and civilians (in the language of the said provision "with any other person") and thereby caused and joined in the mutiny resulting in the killing of the-then President and others. Thus, if military men commit the offence of mutiny in combination with ex-military men and civilians as outlined in the said provision, they may be drawn within the ambit of the said provision of law.
In the latter incident a common law case was started as Chittagong Kotwali PS Case No . dated . under section 302 . Penal Code. The case was investigated by the police and Final Report as True (FRT) was submitted. It is a necessary corollary that where the military offenders were brought to justice by court-martial, no further occasion would arise for their trial by the common law court. Mutiny is not a common law offence. It is anybody's guess that mutiny in its wake brings forth a result --- be that a killing, a rioting or anything; the result may be viewed as Penal Code offences but such offences are by no means separable from the offence of mutiny. In that view of the matter, the common law case of murder for the killing of the-then President Ziaur Rahman could not be viewed separately from the military offence of mutiny. To be more clear, where a mutiny is caused, a result is begotten, so the cause and effect are so inextricably intermingled that one cannot be separated from the other. Thus, mutiny culminates in a result and the whole matter is therefore to be amenable exclusively to the jurisdiction of court-martial.
It may be noticed that Captain Jamil Huq a member of the army approached the Supreme Court in his frantic effort to save himself from capital punishment awarded by the court-martial for committing mutiny resulting in the death of the then President Ziaur Rahman by invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Their Lordship's of the Supreme Court in the case of Jamil Huq v. Bangladesh reported in 34 DLR(AD) 125, noted in that judgment (paragraph 28): “These twelve petitioners have been tried and convicted by a court martial convened by the Chief of the Army Staff under the Army Act, 1952. They were charged with the offence of mutiny under the Army Act. The mutiny took place in the night of 29th/30th May, 1981, which resulted in the death of Ziaur Rahman, President of Bangladesh. These petitioners were sentenced to death.”
The above reproduction from the judgment from the highest court of the country identified the killing the-then President Ziaur Rahman as a result of mutiny which was the subject-matter of court-martial. For a better understanding of the matter a further reproduction from the said judgment (from paragraph 42) is quoted as follows:
“Offence was a mutiny. The learned Counsel have criticized that the offence 'mutiny' has not been defined. Mr. Sirajul Huq argued the point and he referred to section 59 and submitted that it being 'murder' was a civil offence and therefore, the trial was bad. The argument overlooks section 31 which catalogues the offence of mutiny. Clauses (b), (c) and (d) highlight the point that even if any one is present at such mutiny and does not use his utmost endeavours to suppress the same or does not give information to his superior officers or even attempts to seduce any one from duty or allegiance to the Government shall be guilty of the offences. It is interesting to note that in England the Lewis Court Martial Committee in their report (1949) recommended that an attempt should be made to define the offence of mutiny in the light of present different conditions capable of too wider interpretation. Whatever it is, in the facts of the case there is hardly any scope for doubting that the offence does not come within the ambit of section 31 of the Army Act.”
Thus, it is evident that in spite of the difference between the two incidents, the first one being caused by the members of the Army in combination with others and the other being caused exclusively by the members of the Army, there is no difference in the application of the provisions of the Army Act in general and mutiny in particular (resulting in death) in the incident of 14th/15th August 1975 in the same way the provision of the Army Act was applied for the incident, resulting in the killing of the-then President Ziaur Rahman. The occurrence of 14th/15th August 1975, resulted in deaths of the members of the household of the then President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman including himself and the occurrence was clearly a mutiny, which cannot be separated from the killings. So, it is clear that this occurrence stood on the same footing with the subsequent occurrence thereby being exclusively liable to be tried by court-martial and not otherwise. It is therefore a misapplication of common law under which the military offenders of 14th/15th August 1975 were awarded capital punishment.
Another aspect of this case should not be lost sight of. The prosecution witness (PWs) consisted amongst others, of members of the military establishment of the time of the occurrence, they deposed in the case, to prove the occurrence, knowing or having reason to believe in the existence of any such mutiny or intention to commit such mutiny or of any such conspiracy, and without giving information thereof to their respective commanding or other superior officer. It is therefore clear that those PWs are clearly mutineers liable to be tried by court- martial and not to be qualified to depose for their commission of offence in the criminal court implicating the military offenders put on trial in that court.
Now a question may be raised if the military offenders were tried under the common law as they have so been done, how they were prejudiced? It is in the evidence of the case that some military offenders were dismissed from service for the incident of 14th/15th August 1975. It is also in evidence that on that account the Lancer Unit were disbanded in 1976. There might still be other punishments awarded to different military offenders causing the incident. This matter calls for a strict scrutiny and verification of the records of the Army in that respect. Worthwhile to mention in this connection that the tenets of military law in respect of whatever punishment whether major or minor is awarded on a military offender whether for committing offence major or minor, such military offender is immune from any punishment by the common law court. In order to examine the matter, the provision of the Army Act after amendmentNo. 8.11.67 is reproduced below: “96. Trial by Court martial, bar to subsequent trial by Criminal Court. Where a person subject to this Act is acquitted or Convicted of an offence by a Court martial, a criminal Court shall be debarred from trying him subsequently for the same offence or on the same facts.”
Military law is a system of law or jurisprudence, which exists separate, and apart from the law which governs the judiciary of the country in its ordinary and general jurisdiction. In the civil sector of life there may be a fact which may constitute different offences triable in a single court or in different courts under different laws but in the military sector of life, there is the court-martial or the appropriate military authority to deal with the fact on the dimension of fact or on the dimension of offences involved in the fact or on the dimension of both. This approach of military law is significantly different from the approach of laws in the civil sector in that respect. The military law provides for civil offences that is to say Penal Code offences, pure and simple. But mutiny is an offence reserved to military law and justice but abetment of mutiny by any civilian would be tried by the criminal court of competent jurisdiction but the abetment of mutiny by a member of the Army would be covered by the fact of mutiny and not by the offence of mutiny.
Chapter VII of the Penal Code in the context of the offence of mutiny provides for offences of abetment for mutiny triable by criminal court subject to the provision 139 of the Penal Code, which reads as follows:
“139. No person subject to the Army Act, 1952, the Navy Ordinance, 1961, the Air Force Act, 1953, is subject to punishment under this Code for any of the offences defined in this Chapter.”
The said provision of section 139 of the Penal Code shows that even no Penal Code offences under the said chapter VII relating to the Army shall be tried by the criminal court if the offender is a military offender.
For awarding punishment, no limitation is cast on the court-martial, which can inflict punishment, ranging from death, transportation for life to dismissal from service, imposition of fine and forfeiture of salary. The range of punishment of the court-martial is contained in Chapter VI of the Army Act and particularly in section 60 therein; minor punishments are envisaged in section 23 of the Army Act and such punishment may be awarded by competent military authority.
In view of the above it is very much clear that any Penal Code offence occurs in the result of mutiny, such Penal Code offence loses its separate entity as a Penal Code offence and merges in the fact of mutiny liable to be tried only by the court-martial or by the competent military authority.
The incident of 14th/15th August 1975 is the culmination of mutiny and no Penal Code offences can be deduced out of the result of mutiny. The provision of mutiny as appearing in section 31 of the Army Act absorbs into it any offence of conspiracy and thereby overrides the Penal Code offence of conspiracy as envisaged in section 120A and 120B of the Penal Code. The allegation of murder involved in the incident is also merged in mutiny and as such it can be said without hesitation that the conviction of the military offenders by the criminal court to capital punishment for Penal Code offences is palpably illegal and without jurisdiction. Once a mutiny is committed by the members of the Army, they are liable to be tried by military law --- no matter whether they were in service or not at the time of trial. In that respect, section 91 of the Army Act is relevant authorising a trial of mutiny without any period of limitation. Thus, the military offenders of 14th/15th August 1975 are liable to be tried only by court-martial or by any military authority only after conducting an investigation as per military law on the incident justifying the necessity of constituting a court-martial for trial of the military offender, if any, in due course of military law and legal expediency. It is also to be examined if any member/s of the Army having knowledge of the incident but not liable himself as a mutineer is/are available to be truly worthy of deposing as PW in the case.
Some of the military offenders had been dismissed from service on the facts of the same incident. Say, Lt. Col. Farook Rahman (Dismissed) is one of them and he cannot be tried on the same facts again. A probe is to be undertaken to verify if other military offenders convicted on account of the incident of 14th/15th August this way or other had been punished under the military law for arriving at a conclusion if they were to be subjected to a trial over again on the same facts. In the facts of the case, the military officers convicted in the case by the criminal courts should be delivered to the military authorities for being dealt with in accordance with military law.
CONCLUSION
Had the mutiny any goal which it had achieved is a different question. Are the mutineers liable in law in view of the success of the mutiny is also a different question. The mutiny is now on trial in the highest court of the country other than a military court; How the learned judges of the said court would view the case is a different question either.
The low, flat-topped hills of south Orissa have been home to the Dongria Kondh long before there was a country called India or a state called Orissa. The hills watched over the Kondh. The Kondh watched over the hills and worshipped them as living deities. Now these hills have been sold for the bauxite they contain. For the Kondh it's as though god had been sold. They ask how much god would go for if the god were Ram or Allah or Jesus Christ.
Perhaps the Kondh are supposed to be grateful that their Niyamgiri hill, home to their Niyam Raja, God of Universal Law, has been sold to a company with a name like Vedanta (the branch of Hindu philosophy that teaches the Ultimate Nature of Knowledge). It's one of the biggest mining corporations in the world and is owned by Anil Agarwal, the Indian billionaire who lives in London in a mansion that once belonged to the Shah of Iran. Vedanta is only one of the many multinational corporations closing in on Orissa.
If the flat-topped hills are destroyed, the forests that clothe them will be destroyed, too. So will the rivers and streams that flow out of them and irrigate the plains below. So will the Dongria Kondh. So will the hundreds of thousands of tribal people who live in the forested heart of India, and whose homeland is similarly under attack.
In our smoky, crowded cities, some people say, "So what? Someone has to pay the price of progress." Some even say, "Let's face it, these are people whose time has come. Look at any developed country – Europe, the US, Australia – they all have a 'past'." Indeed they do. So why shouldn't "we"?
In keeping with this line of thought, the government has announced Operation Green Hunt, a war purportedly against the "Maoist" rebels headquartered in the jungles of central India. Of course, the Maoists are by no means the only ones rebelling. There is a whole spectrum of struggles all over the country that people are engaged in–the landless, the Dalits, the homeless, workers, peasants, weavers. They're pitted against a juggernaut of injustices, including policies that allow a wholesale corporate takeover of people's land and resources. However, it is the Maoists that the government has singled out as being the biggest threat.
Two years ago, when things were nowhere near as bad as they are now, the prime minister described the Maoists as the "single largest internal security threat" to the country. This will probably go down as the most popular and often repeated thing he ever said. For some reason, the comment he made on 6 January, 2009, at a meeting of state chief ministers, when he described the Maoists as having only "modest capabilities", doesn't seem to have had the same raw appeal. He revealed his government's real concern on 18 June, 2009, when he told parliament: "If left-wing extremism continues to flourish in parts which have natural resources of minerals, the climate for investment would certainly be affected."
Who are the Maoists? They are members of the banned Communist party of India (Maoist) – CPI (Maoist) – one of the several descendants of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), which led the 1969 Naxalite uprising and was subsequently liquidated by the Indian government. The Maoists believe that the innate, structural inequality of Indian society can only be redressed by the violent overthrow of the Indian state. In its earlier avatars as the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in Jharkhand and Bihar, and the People's War Group (PWG) in Andhra Pradesh, the Maoists had tremendous popular support. (When the ban on them was briefly lifted in 2004, 1.5 million people attended their rally in Warangal.)
But eventually their intercession in Andhra Pradesh ended badly. They left a violent legacy that turned some of their staunchest supporters into harsh critics. After a paroxysm of killing and counter-killing by the Andhra police as well as the Maoists, the PWG was decimated. Those who managed to survive fled Andhra Pradesh into neighbouring Chhattisgarh. There, deep in the heart of the forest, they joined colleagues who had already been working there for decades.
Not many "outsiders" have any first-hand experience of the real nature of the Maoist movement in the forest. A recent interview with one of its top leaders, Comrade Ganapathy, in Open magazine, didn't do much to change the minds of those who view the Maoists as a party with an unforgiving, totalitarian vision, which countenances no dissent whatsoever. Comrade Ganapathy said nothing that would persuade people that, were the Maoists ever to come to power, they would be equipped to properly address the almost insane diversity of India's caste-ridden society. His casual approval of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka was enough to send a shiver down even the most sympathetic of spines, not just because of the brutal ways in which the LTTE chose to wage its war, but also because of the cataclysmic tragedy that has befallen the Tamil people of Sri Lanka, who it claimed to represent, and for whom it surely must take some responsibility.
Right now in central India, the Maoists' guerrilla army is made up almost entirely of desperately poor tribal people living in conditions of such chronic hunger that it verges on famine of the kind we only associate with sub-Saharan Africa. They are people who, even after 60 years of India's so-called independence, have not had access to education, healthcare or legal redress. They are people who have been mercilessly exploited for decades, consistently cheated by small businessmen and moneylenders, the women raped as a matter of right by police and forest department personnel. Their journey back to a semblance of dignity is due in large part to the Maoist cadre who have lived and worked and fought by their side for decades.
If the tribals have taken up arms, they have done so because a government which has given them nothing but violence and neglect now wants to snatch away the last thing they have – their land. Clearly, they do not believe the government when it says it only wants to "develop" their region. Clearly, they do not believe that the roads as wide and flat as aircraft runways that are being built through their forests in Dantewada by the National Mineral Development Corporation are being built for them to walk their children to school on. They believe that if they do not fight for their land, they will be annihilated. That is why they have taken up arms.
Even if the ideologues of the Maoist movement are fighting to eventually overthrow the Indian state, right now even they know that their ragged, malnutritioned army, the bulk of whose soldiers have never seen a train or a bus or even a small town, are fighting only for survival.
In 2008, an expert group appointed by the Planning Commission submitted a report called "Development Challenges in Extremist-Affected Areas". It said, "the Naxalite (Maoist) movement has to be recognised as a political movement with a strong base among the landless and poor peasantry and adivasis. Its emergence and growth need to be contextualised in the social conditions and experience of people who form a part of it. The huge gap between state policy and performance is a feature of these conditions. Though its professed long-term ideology is capturing state power by force, in its day-to-day manifestation, it is to be looked upon as basically a fight for social justice, equality, protection, security and local development." A very far cry from the "single-largest internal security threat".
Since the Maoist rebellion is the flavour of the week, everybody, from the sleekest fat cat to the most cynical editor of the most sold-out newspaper in this country, seems to be suddenly ready to concede that it is decades of accumulated injustice that lies at the root of the problem. But instead of addressing that problem, which would mean putting the brakes on this 21st-century gold rush, they are trying to head the debate off in a completely different direction, with a noisy outburst of pious outrage about Maoist "terrorism". But they're only speaking to themselves.
The people who have taken to arms are not spending all their time watching (or performing for) TV, or reading the papers, or conducting SMS polls for the Moral Science question of the day: Is Violence Good or Bad? SMS your reply to ... They're out there. They're fighting. They believe they have the right to defend their homes and their land. They believe that they deserve justice.
In order to keep its better-off citizens absolutely safe from these dangerous people, the government has declared war on them. A war, which it tells us, may take between three and five years to win. Odd, isn't it, that even after the Mumbai attacks of 26/11, the government was prepared to talk with Pakistan? It's prepared to talk to China. But when it comes to waging war against the poor, it's playing hard.
It's not enough that special police with totemic names like Greyhounds, Cobras and Scorpions are scouring the forests with a licence to kill. It's not enough that the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the Border Security Force (BSF) and the notorious Naga Battalion have already wreaked havoc and committed unconscionable atrocities in remote forest villages. It's not enough that the government supports and arms the Salwa Judum, the "people's militia" that has killed and raped and burned its way through the forests of Dantewada leaving 300,000 people homeless or on the run. Now the government is going to deploy the Indo-Tibetan border police and tens of thousands of paramilitary troops. It plans to set up a brigade headquarters in Bilaspur (which will displace nine villages) and an air base in Rajnandgaon (which will displace seven). Obviously, these decisions were taken a while ago. Surveys have been done, sites chosen. Interesting. War has been in the offing for a while. And now the helicopters of the Indian air force have been given the right to fire in "self-defence", the very right that the government denies its poorest citizens.
Fire at whom? How will the security forces be able to distinguish a Maoist from an ordinary person who is running terrified through the jungle? Will adivasis carrying the bows and arrows they have carried for centuries now count as Maoists too? Are non-combatant Maoist sympathisers valid targets? When I was in Dantewada, the superintendent of police showed me pictures of 19 "Maoists" that "his boys" had killed. I asked him how I was supposed to tell they were Maoists. He said, "See Ma'am, they have malaria medicines, Dettol bottles, all these things from outside."
What kind of war is Operation Green Hunt going to be? Will we ever know? Not much news comes out of the forests. Lalgarh in West Bengal has been cordoned off. Those who try to go in are being beaten and arrested. And called Maoists, of course. In Dantewada, the Vanvasi Chetana Ashram, a Gandhian ashram run by Himanshu Kumar, was bulldozed in a few hours. It was the last neutral outpost before the war zone begins, a place where journalists, activists, researchers and fact-finding teams could stay while they worked in the area.
Meanwhile, the Indian establishment has unleashed its most potent weapon. Almost overnight, our embedded media has substituted its steady supply of planted, unsubstantiated, hysterical stories about "Islamist terrorism" with planted, unsubstantiated, hysterical stories about "Red terrorism". In the midst of this racket, at ground zero, the cordon of silence is being inexorably tightened. The "Sri Lanka solution" could very well be on the cards. It's not for nothing that the Indian government blocked a European move in the UN asking for an international probe into war crimes committed by the government of Sri Lanka in its recent offensive against the Tamil Tigers.
The first move in that direction is the concerted campaign that has been orchestrated to shoehorn the myriad forms of resistance taking place in this country into a simple George Bush binary: If you are not with us, you are with the Maoists. The deliberate exaggeration of the Maoist "threat" helps the state justify militarisation. (And surely does no harm to the Maoists. Which political party would be unhappy to be singled out for such attention?) While all the oxygen is being used up by this new doppelganger of the "war on terror", the state will use the opportunity to mop up the hundreds of other resistance movements in the sweep of its military operation, calling them all Maoist sympathisers.
I use the future tense, but this process is well under way. The West Bengal government tried to do this in Nandigram and Singur but failed. Right now in Lalgarh, the Pulishi Santrash Birodhi Janasadharaner Committee or the People's Committee Against Police Atrocities – which is a people's movement that is separate from, though sympathetic to, the Maoists – is routinely referred to as an overground wing of the CPI (Maoist). Its leader, Chhatradhar Mahato, now arrested and being held without bail, is always called a "Maoist leader". We all know the story of Dr Binayak Sen, a medical doctor and a civil liberties activist, who spent two years in jail on the absolutely facile charge of being a courier for the Maoists. While the light shines brightly on Operation Green Hunt, in other parts of India, away from the theatre of war, the assault on the rights of the poor, of workers, of the landless, of those whose lands the government wishes to acquire for "public purpose", will pick up pace. Their suffering will deepen and it will be that much harder for them to get a hearing.
Once the war begins, like all wars, it will develop a momentum, a logic and an economics of its own. It will become a way of life, almost impossible to reverse. The police will be expected to behave like an army, a ruthless killing machine. The paramilitary will be expected to become like the police, a corrupt, bloated administrative force. We've seen it happen in Nagaland, Manipur and Kashmir. The only difference in the "heartland" will be that it'll become obvious very quickly to the security forces that they're only a little less wretched than the people they're fighting. In time, the divide between the people and the law enforcers will become porous. Guns and ammunition will be bought and sold. In fact, it's already happening. Whether it's the security forces or the Maoists or noncombatant civilians, the poorest people will die in this rich people's war. However, if anybody believes that this war will leave them unaffected, they should think again. The resources it'll consume will cripple the economy of this country.
Last week, civil liberties groups from all over the country organised a series of meetings in Delhi to discuss what could be done to turn the tide and stop the war. The absence of Dr Balagopal, one of the best-known civil rights activists of Andhra Pradesh, who died two weeks ago, closed around us like a physical pain. He was one of the bravest, wisest political thinkers of our time and left us just when we needed him most. Still, I'm sure he would have been reassured to hear speaker after speaker displaying the vision, the depth, the experience, the wisdom, the political acuity and, above all, the real humanity of the community of activists, academics, lawyers, judges and a range of other people who make up the civil liberties community in India. Their presence in the capital signalled that outside the arclights of our TV studios and beyond the drumbeat of media hysteria, even among India's middle classes, a humane heart still beats. Small wonder then that these are the people who the Union home minister recently accused of creating an "intellectual climate" that was conducive to "terrorism". If that charge was meant to frighten people, it had the opposite effect.
The speakers represented a range of opinion from the liberal to the radical left. Though none of those who spoke would describe themselves as Maoist, few were opposed in principle to the idea that people have a right to defend themselves against state violence. Many were uncomfortable about Maoist violence, about the "people's courts" that delivered summary justice, about the authoritarianism that was bound to permeate an armed struggle and marginalise those who did not have arms. But even as they expressed their discomfort, they knew that people's courts only existed because India's courts are out of the reach of ordinary people and that the armed struggle that has broken out in the heartland is not the first, but the very last option of a desperate people pushed to the very brink of existence. The speakers were aware of the dangers of trying to extract a simple morality out of individual incidents of heinous violence, in a situation that had already begun to look very much like war. Everybody had graduated long ago from equating the structural violence of the state with the violence of the armed resistance. In fact, retired Justice PB Sawant went so far as to thank the Maoists for forcing the establishment of this country to pay attention to the egregious injustice of the system. Hargopal from Andhra Pradesh spoke of his experience as a civil rights activist through the years of the Maoist interlude in his state. He mentioned in passing the fact that in a few days in Gujarat in 2002, Hindu mobs led by the Bajrang Dal and the VHP had killed more people than the Maoists ever had even in their bloodiest days in Andhra Pradesh.
People who had come from the war zones, from Lalgarh, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Orissa, described the police repression, the arrests, the torture, the killing, the corruption, and the fact that they sometimes seemed to take orders directly from the officials who worked for the mining companies. People described the often dubious, malign role being played by certain NGOs funded by aid agencies wholly devoted to furthering corporate prospects. Again and again they spoke of how in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh activists as well as ordinary people – anyone who was seen to be a dissenter – were being branded Maoists and imprisoned. They said that this, more than anything else, was pushing people to take up arms and join the Maoists. They asked how a government that professed its inability to resettle even a fraction of the 50 million people who had been displaced by "development" projects was suddenly able to identify 1,40,000 hectares of prime land to give to industrialists for more than 300 Special Economic Zones, India's onshore tax havens for the rich. They asked what brand of justice the supreme court was practising when it refused to review the meaning of "public purpose" in the land acquisition act even when it knew that the government was forcibly acquiring land in the name of "public purpose" to give to private corporations. They asked why when the government says that "the writ of the state must run", it seems to only mean that police stations must be put in place. Not schools or clinics or housing, or clean water, or a fair price for forest produce, or even being left alone and free from the fear of the police – anything that would make people's lives a little easier. They asked why the "writ of the state" could never be taken to mean justice.
There was a time, perhaps 10 years ago, when in meetings like these, people were still debating the model of "development" that was being thrust on them by the New Economic Policy. Now the rejection of that model is complete. It is absolute. Everyone from the Gandhians to the Maoists agree on that. The only question now is, what is the most effective way to dismantle it?
An old college friend of a friend, a big noise in the corporate world, had come along for one of the meetings out of morbid curiosity about a world he knew very little about. Even though he had disguised himself in a Fabindia kurta, he couldn't help looking (and smelling) expensive. At one point, he leaned across to me and said, "Someone should tell them not to bother. They won't win this one. They have no idea what they're up against. With the kind of money that's involved here, these companies can buy ministers and media barons and policy wonks, they can run their own NGOs, their own militias, they can buy whole governments. They'll even buy the Maoists. These good people here should save their breath and find something better to do."
When people are being brutalised, what "better" thing is there for them to do than to fight back? It's not as though anyone's offering them a choice, unless it's to commit suicide, like some of the farmers caught in a spiral of debt have done. (Am I the only one who gets the feeling that the Indian establishment and its representatives in the media are far more comfortable with the idea of poor people killing themselves in despair than with the idea of them fighting back?)
For several years, people in Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand and West Bengal – some of them Maoists, many not – have managed to hold off the big corporations. The question now is, how will Operation Green Hunt change the nature of their struggle? What exactly are the fighting people up against?
It's true that, historically, mining companies have often won their battles against local people. Of all corporations, leaving aside the ones that make weapons, they probably have the most merciless past. They are cynical, battle-hardened campaigners and when people say, "Jaan denge par jameen nahin denge" (We'll give away our lives, but never our land), it probably bounces off them like a light drizzle on a bomb shelter. They've heard it before, in a thousand different languages, in a hundred different countries.
Right now in India, many of them are still in the first class arrivals lounge, ordering cocktails, blinking slowly like lazy predators, waiting for the Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) they have signed – some as far back as 2005 – to materialise into real money. But four years in a first class lounge is enough to test the patience of even the truly tolerant: the elaborate, if increasingly empty, rituals of democratic practice: the (sometimes rigged) public hearings, the (sometimes fake) environmental impact assessments, the (often purchased) clearances from various ministries, the long drawn-out court cases. Even phony democracy is time-consuming. And time is money.
So what kind of money are we talking about? In their seminal, soon-to-be-published work, Out of This Earth: East India Adivasis and the Aluminum Cartel, Samarendra Das and Felix Padel say that the financial value of the bauxite deposits of Orissa alone is $2.27 trillion (more than twice India's GDP). That was at 2004 prices. At today's prices it would be about $4 trillion.
Of this, officially the government gets a royalty of less than 7%. Quite often, if the mining company is a known and recognised one, the chances are that, even though the ore is still in the mountain, it will have already been traded on the futures market. So, while for the adivasis the mountain is still a living deity, the fountainhead of life and faith, the keystone of the ecological health of the region, for the corporation, it's just a cheap storage facility. Goods in storage have to be accessible. From the corporation's point of view, the bauxite will have to come out of the mountain. Such are the pressures and the exigencies of the free market.
That's just the story of the bauxite in Orissa. Expand the $4 trillion to include the value of the millions of tonnes of high-quality iron ore in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand and the 28 other precious mineral resources, including uranium, limestone, dolomite, coal, tin, granite, marble, copper, diamond, gold, quartzite, corundum, beryl, alexandrite, silica, fluorite and garnet. Add to that the power plants, the dams, the highways, the steel and cement factories, the aluminium smelters, and all the other infrastructure projects that are part of the hundreds of MoUs (more than 90 in Jharkhand alone) that have been signed. That gives us a rough outline of the scale of the operation and the desperation of the stakeholders.
The forest once known as the Dandakaranya, which stretches from West Bengal through Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, parts of Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, is home to millions of India's tribal people. The media has taken to calling it the Red corridor or the Maoist corridor. It could just as accurately be called the MoUist corridor. It doesn't seem to matter at all that the fifth schedule of the constitution provides protection to adivasi people and disallows the alienation of their land. It looks as though the clause is there only to make the constitution look good – a bit of window-dressing, a slash of make-up. Scores of corporations, from relatively unknown ones to the biggest mining companies and steel manufacturers in the world, are in the fray to appropriate adivasi homelands – the Mittals, Jindals, Tata, Essar, Posco, Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton and, of course, Vedanta.
There's an MoU on every mountain, river and forest glade. We're talking about social and environmental engineering on an unimaginable scale. And most of this is secret. It's not in the public domain. Somehow I don't think that the plans afoot that would destroy one of the world's most pristine forests and ecosystems, as well as the people who live in it, will be discussed at the climate change conference in Copenhagen. Our 24-hour news channels that are so busy hunting for macabre stories of Maoist violence – and making them up when they run out of the real thing – seem to have no interest at all in this side of the story. I wonder why?
Perhaps it's because the development lobby to which they are so much in thrall says the mining industry will ratchet up the rate of GDP growth dramatically and provide employment to the people it displaces. This does not take into account the catastrophic costs of environmental damage. But even on its own narrow terms, it is simply untrue. Most of the money goes into the bank accounts of the mining corporations. Less than 10% comes to the public exchequer. A very tiny percentage of the displaced people get jobs, and those who do, earn slave-wages to do humiliating, backbreaking work. By caving in to this paroxysm of greed, we are bolstering other countries' economies with our ecology.
When the scale of money involved is what it is, the stakeholders are not always easy to identify. Between the CEOs in their private jets and the wretched tribal special police officers in the "people's" militias – who for a couple of thousand rupees a month fight their own people, rape, kill and burn down whole villages in an effort to clear the ground for mining to begin – there is an entire universe of primary, secondary and tertiary stakeholders.
These people don't have to declare their interests, but they're allowed to use their positions and good offices to further them. How will we ever know which political party, which ministers, which MPs, which politicians, which judges, which NGOs, which expert consultants, which police officers, have a direct or indirect stake in the booty? How will we know which newspapers reporting the latest Maoist "atrocity", which TV channels "reporting directly from ground zero" – or, more accurately, making it a point not to report from ground zero, or even more accurately, lying blatantly from ground zero – are stakeholders?
What is the provenance of the billions of dollars (several times more than India's GDP) secretly stashed away by Indian citizens in Swiss bank accounts? Where did the $2bn spent on the last general elections come from? Where do the hundreds of millions of rupees that politicians and parties pay the media for the "high-end", "low-end" and "live" pre-election "coverage packages" that P Sainath recently wrote about come from? (The next time you see a TV anchor haranguing a numb studio guest, shouting, "Why don't the Maoists stand for elections? Why don't they come in to the mainstream?", do SMS the channel saying, "Because they can't afford your rates.")
Too many questions about conflicts of interest and cronyism remain unanswered. What are we to make of the fact that the Union home minister, P Chidambaram, the chief of Operation Green Hunt, has, in his career as a corporate lawyer, represented several mining corporations? What are we to make of the fact that he was a non-executive director of Vedanta – a position from which he resigned the day he became finance minister in 2004? What are we to make of the fact that, when he became finance minister, one of the first clearances he gave for FDI was to Twinstar Holdings, a Mauritius-based company, to buy shares in Sterlite, a part of the Vedanta group?
What are we to make of the fact that, when activists from Orissa filed a case against Vedanta in the supreme court, citing its violations of government guidelines and pointing out that the Norwegian Pension Fund had withdrawn its investment from the company alleging gross environmental damage and human rights violations committed by the company, Justice Kapadia suggested that Vedanta be substituted with Sterlite, a sister company of the same group? He then blithely announced in an open court that he, too, had shares in Sterlite. He gave forest clearance to Sterlite to go ahead with the mining, despite the fact that the supreme court's own expert committee had explicitly said that permission should be denied and that mining would ruin the forests, water sources, environment and the lives and livelihoods of the thousands of tribals living there. Justice Kapadia gave this clearance without rebutting the report of the supreme court's own committee.
What are we to make of the fact that the Salwa Judum, the brutal ground-clearing operation disguised as a "spontaneous" people's militia in Dantewada, was formally inaugurated in 2005, just days after the MoU with the Tatas was signed? And that the Jungle Warfare Training School in Bastar was set up just around then?
What are we to make of the fact that two weeks ago, on 12 October, the mandatory public hearing for Tata Steel's steel project in Lohandiguda, Dantewada, was held in a small hall inside the collectorate, cordoned off with massive security, with an audience of 50 tribal people brought in from two Bastar villages in a convoy of government jeeps? (The public hearing was declared a success and the district collector congratulated the people of Bastar for their co-operation.)
What are we to make of the fact that just around the time the prime minister began to call the Maoists the "single largest internal security threat" (which was a signal that the government was getting ready to go after them), the share prices of many of the mining companies in the region skyrocketed?
The mining companies desperately need this "war". They will be the beneficiaries if the impact of the violence drives out the people who have so far managed to resist the attempts that have been made to evict them. Whether this will indeed be the outcome, or whether it'll simply swell the ranks of the Maoists remains to be seen.
Reversing this argument, Dr Ashok Mitra, former finance minister of West Bengal, in an article called "The Phantom Enemy", argues that the "grisly serial murders" that the Maoists are committing are a classic tactic, learned from guerrilla warfare textbooks. He suggests that they have built and trained a guerrilla army that is now ready to take on the Indian state, and that the Maoist "rampage" is a deliberate attempt on their part to invite the wrath of a blundering, angry Indian state which the Maoists hope will commit acts of cruelty that will enrage the adivasis. That rage, Dr Mitra says, is what the Maoists hope can be harvested and transformed into an insurrection.
This, of course, is the charge of "adventurism" that several currents of the left have always levelled at the Maoists. It suggests that Maoist ideologues are not above inviting destruction on the very people they claim to represent in order to bring about a revolution that will bring them to power. Ashok Mitra is an old Communist who had a ringside seat during the Naxalite uprising of the 60s and 70s in West Bengal. His views cannot be summarily dismissed. But it's worth keeping in mind that the adivasi people have a long and courageous history of resistance that predates the birth of Maoism. To look upon them as brainless puppets being manipulated by a few middle-class Maoist ideologues is to do them a disservice.
Presumably Dr Mitra is talking about the situation in Lalgarh where, up to now, there has been no talk of mineral wealth. (Lest we forget – the current uprising in Lalgarh was sparked off over the chief minister's visit to inaugurate a Jindal Steel factory. And where there's a steel factory, can the iron ore be very far away?) The people's anger has to do with their desperate poverty, and the decades of suffering at the hands of the police and the Harmads, the armed militia of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) that has ruled West Bengal for more than 30 years.
Even if, for argument's sake, we don't ask what tens of thousands of police and paramilitary troops are doing in Lalgarh, and we accept the theory of Maoist "adventurism", it would still be only a very small part of the picture.
The real problem is that the flagship of India's miraculous "growth" story has run aground. It came at a huge social and environmental cost. And now, as the rivers dry up and forests disappear, as the water table recedes and as people realise what is being done to them, the chickens are coming home to roost. All over the country, there's unrest, there are protests by people refusing to give up their land and their access to resources, refusing to believe false promises any more. Suddenly, it's beginning to look as though the 10% growth rate and democracy are mutually incompatible.
To get the bauxite out of the flat-topped hills, to get iron ore out from under the forest floor, to get 85% of India's people off their land and into the cities (which is what Chidambaram says he'd like to see), India has to become a police state. The government has to militarise. To justify that militarisation, it needs an enemy. The Maoists are that enemy. They are to corporate fundamentalists what the Muslims are to Hindu fundamentalists. (Is there a fraternity of fundamentalists? Is that why the RSS has expressed open admiration for Chidambaram?)
It would be a grave mistake to imagine that the paramilitary troops, the Rajnandgaon air base, the Bilaspur brigade headquarters, the unlawful activities act, the Chhattisgarh special public security act and Operation Green Hunt are all being put in place just to flush out a few thousand Maoists from the forests. In all the talk of Operation Green Hunt, whether or not Chidambaram goes ahead and "presses the button", I detect the kernel of a coming state of emergency. (Here's a maths question: If it takes 600,000 soldiers to hold down the tiny valley of Kashmir, how many will it take to contain the mounting rage of hundreds of millions of people?)
Instead of narco-analysing Kobad Ghandy, the recently arrested Maoist leader, it might be a better idea to talk to him.
In the meanwhile, will someone who's going to the climate change conference in Copenhagen later this year please ask the only question worth asking: Can we leave the bauxite in the mountain?
The Government's move to grant India transit and corridor facility will bring the country's 'economy and security' under serious threat for no tangible benefits to the nation, except repaying the debt to Delhi by the Awami League-led grand coalition government for bringing it to power.
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is planning to visit Delhi shortly, but notably after about one year since takeover of power -- and analysts here say that one of the reasons of delaying the visit is that the Indian government wants to see a substantive progress in the transit issue before welcoming her to the Indian capital.
So Hasina went on a visit to Saudi Arabia after taking over of power, most conspicuously avoiding such a visit to her next-door strategic ally. Bangladesh foreign minister Dr Dipu Moni similarly paid more than a dozen visits to European capitals and the USA before preparing a schedule for a visit to Delhi only in September last.
Sheikh Hasina also went on a visit to Sweden and Qatar last week, in addition to a visit to the USA in September, to attend the UN General Assembly session. But her day for the long anticipated visit to Delhi is yet to come.
Except a few statements by key ministers and policy makers on the 'great benefit' of becoming a transit nation, the Government is tight-lipped on what type of agreement it is working out on the transit issue, in the name of its consent to the Asian Highway routes.
Insiders say, both sides are now working on several agreements, which may come up for signing during the Bangladesh Prime Minister's visit to Delhi. And Sheikh Hasina appears adamant to ignore any domestic opposition that may come on the way to offering transit through Bangladesh to India's northeast. The nation is now clearly divided on the issue to ultimately bring the battle to the ground. Analysts apprehend, Bangladesh may be heading towards a terrible time, when India-sponsored saboteurs may come out to blast the issue.
Moreover, Sheikh Hasina is working on yet another agreement with Delhi, a newspaper report said, covering common security issues in line with that of Nepal has in place with Delhi to subvert the domestic opposition to the Indian interest.
In line with this strategy Sheikh Hasina government is now working on different fronts to set the country's institutions and infrastructure supportive of Indian business and strategic interest in Bangladesh.
Some commentators here say, she wants to project her now as a catalyst of change, not only to reshape domestic politics destroying the opposition, but also in the regional context to prove her mettle by building a new South Asia as her father had created Bangladesh. Her visit to Stockholm may be part of such an international image building drive, as she has so many honorary doctorate degrees, which now total more than a dozen, they say.
Padma bridge in India's interest Only last week, functionaries of a civil society organisation raised question on justification of adding a railway track to the proposed Padma bridge. At a press conference in the city on the PRSP issues, they said the loan that the Government would take for the bridge inclusive of the railway track would ultimately increase the nation's per capita debt to 205 dollars from 149 dollars at present.
Some experts say a direct railway track from Jessore to Dhaka crossing the Padma bridge will give India a shortcut transport corridor for movement of goods and passengers to its northeastern region and Delhi wants so. They say India is not interested in using the existing railway on the Jamuna Bridge as it takes a long time for moving onward to Sylhet and Akhaura through Dhaka.
So the Government is hastily adding a railway track to the Padma bridge, while donor agencies like ADB and World Bank are also putting pressure, though informally, on the Government to support the Indian strategy, if it wants to get loans and also quick delivery of the loans to finish the project before next election. A rail-line on the Padma bridge was never talked about any time before.
Since it is an election pledge, Awami League is serious about its early implementation and ready to take any step in this regard.
Speaking about the security aspects of transit, experts say military installations and cantonments at different places on the highways may expose the army secrets leaving the force vulnerable to Indian watch and strategic intervention. The secret behind the BDR carnage at Peelkhana gives a stark reminder that such an incident may occur any time anywhere in this country with vulnerability of defence installations elsewhere.
Local sources at Sylhet told this scribe recently that the Government was already planning to build a new highway from Sylhet eastern bypass to the northeast through crop land to link it with Tamabil highway, about 10 km away from Bateswar, leaving behind the Jalalabad cantonment on the highway.
But the question is: who will pay the bill and why should Bangladesh Government spend taxpayers' money or take foreign loans to create the facility for movement of Indian goods and passengers through its heartland?
Cantonments, highways
Not only Jalalabad cantonment in Sylhet, but also cantonments at Jessore, Comilla, Savar and many such army and BDR installations may become vulnerable with their security at stake forcing the Government to build new highways, relocate cantonments or agree to compromise the country security.
The Government is working yet on another front. According to press reports, the government is taking steps to carry out dredging of major rivers to increase their navigability. Only last week the authorities have signed an agreement to buy three dredgers to start intensive dredging of the rivers.
The Government is claiming that the project is aimed at enhancing the depth of rivers to stop erosion of their banks as river erosion leaves thousands of people homeless. But analysts say the real focus of the project lies elsewhere.
They say as the Government has already agreed to offer Ashuganj as a port of call to the Indians as part of a transit plan to help move their goods and passengers to Agartola through Akhaura using the railway and road transport system, dredging of rivers has assumed a new significance. The government has, therefore, taken a master plan for dredging the rivers. It points to the river-bank erosion only to justify the plan, which amounts to deceiving the people.
Experts say the Government is not only strengthening the river training and dredging system, it will also use Indian expertise and equipment to keep the water routes navigable at its own cost.
No study on transit's benefit
An ADB study on the regional connectivity said all such loans and public expenditure, required to develop the infrastructures in Bangladesh, would be the Government's liability, be it World Bank or ADB loans or funds from domestic sources.
Moreover, experts say the country's soil structure is not strong enough to support any vehicle carrying a load of more than 10 tonnes and as this region has low-lying areas. Construction cost of roads and bridges is also higher here compared to the global standard and the Bangladesh Government has to bear all such expenses from its own coffer.
There has not been a single study on the benefit of transit so far by the World Bank (WB) or Asian Development Bank or any such other donor, let alone Bangladesh government, to figure out what financial benefits the country would get from allowing the transit.
India is not ready to enter into any such joint study either, and the Awami League government is only putting misleading figures without having any expert report in place. What is the cost-benefit of the transit project? What is the rate of economic returns? All these are yet to be answered at a time, when Sheikh Hasina is eager to sign the deal.
There is another concern that the fish population in major rivers may slowly disappear due to water pollution because of disposal of fuel waste from ships or such other disturbances. But unfortunately there is no such ecological study.
India's tariff barriers
Bangladesh may also be losing its market in India's northeast, experts say, at a time when Delhi is using tariff and non-tariff barriers on Bangladesh to slow down access of Bangladeshi goods to its vast western market. The northeast Indian market, mainly fed by informal trade, will slowly disappear for Bangladeshi exporters, as India will supply low-cost products with opening of the transit route from the mainland.
Since waterways are becoming the most viable transit route for supplying low-cost products, the Government is turning to dredging of the major rivers. But to keep the waterways navigable round the year, the rivers should have adequate and uninterrupted flow of water.
But India is denying such uninterrupted flow. It is not only blocking Bangladesh's due share of water from the river Tista, but also planning to build a dam now at Tipaimukh threatening insufficient flow of water in the Meghna river, which may hinder Indian cargo ships' movement to Ashuganj port and beyond to Karimganj in the Indian state of Assam.
Then how Bangladesh will maintain the major waterways is now a big question, particularly when the water level will fall and even hit the bottom of the rivers. A situation may arise in the process, when, an analyst says, Bangladesh may find it rather easier and less costly to hand over everything, from river training to dredging, to the Indians to maintain the waterways and run their ships.
It may happen that Bangladesh may come under increasing pressure to fulfill its contractual obligation, when the country would be unable with its limited resources and political support to maintain proper navigability of the waterways.
Many political observers here now tend to believe that Sheikh Hasina is wooing Delhi like a protective umbrella on her power base in Dhaka. It becomes clear when she says every time that Delhi has assured that it will do nothing that can cause embarrassment to Hasina's government here.
However, utmost caution should be maintained in steering the statecraft forward.
It has often been taken for granted that China and India will rise simultaneously and peacefully in the 21st century. But a recent flare-up challenges that view. Thirty-seven years after the two countries fought a border war and 28 years since they opened settlement negotiations, the entire frontier from Kashmir to Burma remains in question. It would be dangerous to ignore this festering sore any longer.
The dispute stretches back to the British Raj, when colonial official Sir Henry McMahon drew the boundary between India and Tibet at the Shimla Convention in 1913. China has never recognized the McMahon Line, and regards the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh as part of its Tibetan Autonomous Region.
Lately the border has been arousing more fervent passions than usual. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the state of Arunachal Pradesh earlier this month, irking Beijing and prompting New Delhi to assert "Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India." Earlier this year, Beijing attempted to block a $1.3 billion loan to India by the Asian Development Bank, part of which was meant for a watershed project in Arunachal Pradesh. The war of words is likely to escalate as the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama plans to visit Arunachal Pradesh next month. Beijing is pressuring India via diplomatic protests and a media campaign to make the Dalai Lama abandon his planned trip.
The causes for the recent deterioration in relations are complex. China perceives India as the weakest link in an evolving anti-China coalition of democratic and maritime powers (the United States, Japan, Australia and India). Viewing India as a pawn in Western designs to encircle and contain China, Chinese leaders worry about the ramifications of India's power particularly in Tibet, a concern fanned by the March 2008 uprisings there. A common theme in state media this year is the desire to capture the lost lands and crush India for daring to compete with China.
Meanwhile, Beijing's influence in Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka—all of whom have relationships with India that range from strained to downright hostile—fuels Indian anxieties. Beijing's opposition to India's membership in regional institutions like the East Asia Community and international forums like the United Nations Security Council; China's attempts to scuttle the U.S.-India nuclear deal at the Nuclear Suppliers Group; and Chinese naval forays into the Indian Ocean region all have reinforced Indian suspicions that China seeks to deny India its proper place in the international system.
As a result of these rising tensions the potential for armed skirmishes, if not conflict, on disputed borders remains high. Since 2006, Chinese strategic experts, bloggers, retired diplomats and think tanks linked to the People's Liberation Army have been discussing the possibility of a "partial border war" to "teach India a lesson." Parallels are being drawn to the pre-1962 situation, when Beijing blamed India for Tibetan uprising and New Delhi provoked China with its "Forward Policy" on the border. China has referred to India's current troop movements as a "New Forward Policy." The Indian media, always wary of China, have chimed in by sensationalizing alleged border incursions and by hyping "the China threat." India's military has bolstered its presence in areas bordering Tibet. The military forces of both sides are once again pushing into remote and previously (for the most part) unoccupied mountainous frontier regions.
Adding fuel to this fire is mounting confidence on the Chinese side that China would win any conflict and reap broader strategic rewards from doing so. PLA generals believe India's military remains inferior in combat, logistics and war-fighting capability. Should the PLA succeed in occupying Tawang, a town near the border, and giving India's military a bloody nose, the Chinese thinking goes, Indian leaders would be much more deferential in dealing with China. A short and swift victory would underscore the need for other countries in Asia, especially U.S. friends and allies, to accommodate China's growing power by aligning with, rather than against, Beijing.
Though India is no match for China in force-on-force posture, it is no pushover militarily. Unlike the PLA, which has not seen combat since the Vietnam War of 1979, India's military today is battle-hardened and experienced. If Beijing is determined to gain the lost territory in Arunachal Pradesh, India is equally determined not to see a replay of the 1962 war by losing large chunks of territory. With India embarking upon a massive military modernization plan, a punitive war may well be too costly and its outcome unpredictable.
However, all this misses the fact that China and India are both nuclear-armed nations with enormous stakes in maintaining peace. Burgeoning trade ties and collaboration on issues like climate change have shown both capitals the benefits of cooperation even as border tensions rise. For Beijing, a hardline approach to India could backfire and drive India and its other Asian neighbors into stronger opposition to China and deeper alignment with Washington and Tokyo. The pursuit of aggressive foreign adventures would destroy the benign "peaceful rise" image that China is so assiduously striving to achieve. A conflict will cost India dearly in terms of economic developmental objectives and political ambition of emerging as a great power in a multipolar Asia.
Other countries, particularly the U.S., can play a vital role in preventing escalation. Washington enjoys close ties with both China and India and could exert diplomatic pressure on both sides to reach a settlement. But ultimately this is a border dispute between two large countries, and they alone have it in their combined power to resolve their differences peacefully. It's in both their interests to do so.
Kaplan asserts, "China is in the midst of a shipbuilding and acquisition craze that will result in the People's Liberation Army Navy having more ships than the U.S. Navy sometime in the next decade." Since 1945, U.S. diplomatic and political strategies in Asia have been predicated on U.S. naval domination in the western Pacific and Indian oceans. The U.S. Navy's control of seagoing lines of commerce from the Middle East to all points in Asia has been a major component of America's alliance system in the region and its relations with potential adversaries. Kaplan's essay reminds us that over the next decade or so, the rise of China's naval power will scrap the assumptions underlying the United States' Asian diplomacy.
According to Kaplan, the collapse of the Soviet Army in the 1990s removed China's most significant land-based threat. With its territorial security established, China's leaders could afford to spend money on naval forces. This shift coincided with the massive expansion of China's international trade. Kaplan reminds us that China's energy imports from the Middle East -- which travel across the Indian Ocean, through the Strait of Malacca, and up the western Pacific -- will double over the next decade or two. China's ocean-going commerce currently receives protection from the U.S. Navy and its allies in the region. But as an arriving global power, China's leaders are not likely to tolerate this vulnerability to potential U.S. leverage. China's naval shipbuilding program indicates China's response.
According to Kaplan, by 2015 China will surpass South Korea and Japan to become the world's most prolific shipbuilder. China will achieve this position because its growing shipbuilding expertise will combine with its labor and capital cost advantages to make it the preferred shipbuilding vendor. China's cost advantages in "metal-bending" industries will compare very favorably against U.S. naval shipbuilders who are best known for gross cost overruns, long delays, and problem-ridden deliveries. U.S. military acquisition officials have hoped that U.S. technological advantages will offset an adversary's numbers. But such a focus on technology might be part of the problem, rather than the solution. Looking out over the next two decades, military shipbuilding trends do not favor the United States.
The solution is expanded diplomacy. Kaplan discusses how the United States and China will find common interests protecting shipping from piracy, terrorism, and natural disasters. In addition, China and the United States share an interest in keeping open the ocean's lines of communication -- both countries are highly dependent on trade and energy imports from the Middle East. With many common interests, China's arrival as a naval power need not result in conflict.
But will the United States be able to maintain its Asian alliance system if its naval hegemony comes under challenge? Will America's friends in Asia drift into China's orbit if the U.S. military cannot maintain its investment in naval power? This decade's land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have absorbed huge sums that might have otherwise gone into naval recapitalization. The looming fragility in America's position in the western Pacific might be the best reason for it to wind up its affairs in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The plan to de-dollarise the oil market, discussed both in public and in secret for at least two years and widely denied yesterday by the usual suspects – Saudi Arabia being, as expected, the first among them – reflects a growing resentment in the Middle East, Europe and in China at America's decades-long political as well as economic world dominance.
Nowhere has this more symbolic importance than in the Middle East, where the United Arab Emirates alone holds $900bn (£566bn) of dollar reserves and where Saudi Arabia has been quietly co-ordinating its defence, armaments and oil policies with the Russians since 2007.
This does not indicate a trade war with America – not yet – but Arab Gulf regimes have been growing increasingly restive at their economic as well as political dependence on Washington for many years. Of the $7.2 trillion in international reserves, $2.1trn is held by Arab countries – China holds about $2.3trn – and the nations interested in moving away from dollar-trading in oil are believed to hold over 80 per cent of international dollar reserves.
Saudi Arabia's denials of any such ambitions were regarded by Arab bankers as a normal part of Gulf politics. The Saudis, of course, managed to deny that Iraq had invaded Kuwait in 1990 – even when Saddam Hussein's legions stood along the Saudi frontier, until the US broadcast the news of Iraq's aggression to the world.
Saudi bankers are well aware that in nine years' time – the current timeframe for a transition away from the dollar in oil trading to Japanese and Chinese currencies, the euro, gold and a possible new Gulf currency – China will have doubled its national income to $10trn (assuming a growth rate of 7 per cent), at which point the US might hold no more than 20 per cent of the world's gross income.
Such massive financial movements, encouraged by the de-dollarisation of oil, will have enormous political effects in the Middle East, especially if economic superpower rivalry between America and China comes to dominate the Arab world. Will American economic support for Israel remain as loyal in nine years' time if China and the Arabs are setting the pace in global financial markets? Indeed – perhaps with this in mind – some Israeli financiers have been expressing interest over the past two years in non-dollar Arab bank investments. Whenever a change of this magnitude takes place over a number of years, it has to be commenced in secrecy.
Nor can it be denied that the very project to take oil trading away from the dollar market has deep political roots. The collapse of the Soviet Union has allowed the US to dominate the Middle East more than any other world region, and the Arabs – who can no longer contemplate an oil boycott of the kind they imposed on the West after the 1973 Middle East war – are still anxious to prove that they can flex their economic power to bring about change.
Saudi Arabia's pan-Arab offer to recognise Israel and its security in return for an Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab land is not – according to the Saudis themselves – indefinite. If they are ignored or rebuffed, then they can search for other allies through new financial institutions to force a new Middle East peace. China will be happy to help.
On Monday, the Independent reported that a number of countries are conspiring to dump the dollar as the primary oil trade currency, spelling disaster for the U.S. economy. But the United States wouldn't need to fear -- even if it were true.
BY DEAN BAKER
Foreign Policy - OCTOBER 7, 2009
For at least the last decade, a persistent, recurring conspiracy theory has held that major oil exporters will stop pricing oil in dollars, which will then lead to a collapse in the U.S. economy as the dollar becomes worthless. According to some accounts, Iraq's decision to price its oil in euros rather than dollars precipitated the U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and Iran's threats to move away from the dollar is the real reason the U.S. government is raising the alarm over the country's nuclear program.
The latest item in this tradition was an article by Robert Fisk, a longtime Middle East correspondent, in the London-based Independent. The article warns of a grand conspiracy between the Arab oil states, China, Japan, Russia, and France to stop pricing oil in dollars by 2018. When this happens, Fisk says, the dollar will suffer a severe blow to its international standing and the United States might struggle to pay for its oil. The article apparently caused a shudder in the currency markets yesterday, as panicked investors unloaded dollars in reaction to the terrifying prospect of this alleged international oil conspiracy.
But they really shouldn't be concerned. Fisk's theory would make a good plot for a Hollywood movie, but it doesn't make much sense as economics. It is true that oil is priced in dollars and that most oil is traded in dollars, but these facts make relatively little difference for the status of the dollar as an international currency or the economic well-being of the United States.
With the United States' ascendancy as the pre-eminent economic power after World War II, the dollar became the world's reserve currency: Most countries held dollars in reserve in the event that they suddenly needed an asset other than their own currency to pay for imports, or to support their own currency. Much international trade, including trade not involving the United States, was carried through in dollars. In addition, most internationally traded commodities became priced in dollars on exchanges. However, the dollar was never universally used to carry through trade (even trade in oil), and the pricing of commodities in dollars is primarily just a convention.
Any market -- a stock market, a wheat market, or the oil market -- requires a unit of measure. The importance of the U.S. economy made the dollar the obvious choice for most markets. But there would be no real difference if the euro, the yen, or even bushels of wheat were selected as the unit of account for the oil market. It's simply an accounting issue.
Suppose that prices in the oil market were quoted in yen or bushels of wheat. Currently, oil is priced at about $70 a barrel. A dollar today is worth about 90 yen. A bushel of wheat sells for about $3.50. If oil were priced in yen, then the current price of a barrel of oil in yen would 6,300 yen. If oil were priced in wheat, then the price of a barrel of oil would be 20 bushels. If oil were priced in either yen or wheat it would have no direct consequence for the dollar. If the dollar were still the preferred asset among oil sellers, then they would ask for the dollar equivalents of the yen or wheat price of oil. The calculation would take a billionth of a second on modern computers, and business would proceed exactly as it does today.
It does matter slightly that the trade typically takes place in dollars. This means that those wishing to buy oil must acquire dollars to buy the oil, which increases the demand for dollars in world financial markets. However, the impact of the oil trade is likely to be a very small factor affecting the value of the dollar. Even today, not all oil is sold for dollars. Oil producers are free to construct whatever terms they wish for selling their oil, and many often agree to payment in other currencies. There is absolutely nothing to prevent Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, or any other oil producer -- whether a member of OPEC or not -- from signing contracts selling their oil for whatever currency is convenient for them to acquire.
Even if all oil were sold for dollars, it would be a very small factor in the international demand for dollars, as can be seen with a bit of simple arithmetic. World oil production is a bit under 90 million barrels a day. If two-thirds of this oil is sold across national borders, then it implies a daily oil trade of 60 million barrels. If all of this oil is sold in dollars, then it means that oil consumers would have to collectively hold $4.2 billion to cover their daily oil tab.
By comparison, China alone holds more than $1 trillion in currency reserves, more than 200 times the transaction demand for oil. In other words, if China reduced its holdings of dollars by just 0.5 percent, it would have more impact on the demand for dollars than if all oil exporters suddenly stopped accepting dollars for their oil.
This raises a more serious issue affecting the demand for dollars, which is the dollar's status as an international reserve currency. Currently the dollar is by far the preferred currency, but others, notably the euro, are gaining ground. A switch away from the dollar will lower its value, but this is hardly anything to fear: In actuality, it was and is an official policy goal of both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations.
Both administrations are on record complaining about China's "manipulation" of its currency. China does this by buying up vast amounts of dollars to hold as foreign reserves, suppressing the value of the yuan against the dollar. This, in turn, makes Chinese goods cheaper in the United States and bolsters China's exports.
If China stopped buying up huge amounts of dollars, as the United States wishes, then the dollar would fall in value against the yuan, thereby making Chinese imports more expensive. The result would be that the United States would buy fewer imports from China, improving its trade balance. Not too many people would be frightened by this prospect.
To summarize, the dollars needed to finance the international oil trade are trivial compared with other sources of demand for dollars. The currency chosen for foreign reserve holdings can have an impact on demand for dollars, but this has nothing to do with the currency chosen to conduct the oil trade. If Saudi Arabia wanted to hold euros rather than dollars, it could almost instantly offload as many dollars as it desired. Plus, the White House wants the dollar to decline anyway because it would improve the United States' trade balance.
Thus, the conspiracy theory Fisk resurrected might have spooked the markets, but the reality is that there is nothing to fear. The dollar's value will likely fall over time (as it has been doing against the euro for the last nine years). But there is nothing in the cards to suggest a collapse, even if Saudi Arabia starts selling its oil for euros or yuan.
The opinions and statements made in the following article are not that of the owner of DeshCalling and all questions and inquiries should be directed to ahmadashiqulhamid@yahoo.com
DeshCalling disclaims all responsibility for the contents of the following article the facts of which are unknown to its owner. The article reached the owner by email with the following caveat –
If you are an active member/supporter/collaborator of BNP/AL/Jamaat, or any other political party of Bangladesh, then this mail is not for you. You may well delete this. This mail is for people with open and unbiased mind. And for the people who have at least a drop of love for Bangladesh stored deep inside their heart.
The attached document "Peelkhana Conspiracy" contains nearly 14,000 words. So, you should think before you decide to read or study it. It will take a lot of time. The article is a teamwork, involving about 23 persons. The team includes general people, businessmen, custom officials, members of armed forces, members of law enforcement agencies, and a few courageous investigative journalists.
This email DOES NOT request you to believe whatever appear in the attached document. You are to use your own intellect and sense of judgment to reach to a conclusion. Please believe what your conscience says, and not what we have tried to say. If accidentally your thoughts and ours favorably coincide, please do whatever your conscience dictates.
Thank You
PEELKHANA CONSPIRACY
PROLOGUE
Entire Bangladesh is convinced that “Peelkhana massacre was the outcome of a long and deep-rooted conspiracy.” But there is a mystery shrouding the background of Peelkhana carnage. Somehow or the other, people of Bangladesh do not still know the entire truth. This article endeavors to un-shroud the hidden truth. Purpose is not to vindicate anyone, the pure purpose is to erase the lies and bring the truth to the open. You are not required to believe whatever follows. It is totally up to your judgment. If you believe, you may pass it on to persons who may try to spread the message so that justice, the rarest phenomenon on planet earth, may see light in Bangladesh—today, tomorrow or year after. If you don’t believe this article, utter a curse and just put this article into trash and forget it.
SOME STIRRING THOUGHTS
· On 24th February between 10pm and 11pm Mr Ataur, the owner of a filling station at Jhikatola, gave a call to DG BDR Shakil over mobile and said, “Sir, apnakey kalkey Peelkhanay mere felbe. Apni kalker onushthaney jaben na.” The recorded conversation was spotted by RAB Headquarter and Mr Ataur was immediately taken into custody. This information was disclosed to the TFI cell members by Colonel Rezanur himself. Later Mr Ataur was released and nowhere his statement has been included in the inquiries.
· On 25th February at about 8:45 am, PM was informed by NSI that after a few minutes the Peelkhana mutiny would begin. The same information also reached CAS Moeen simultaneously. PM just digested the information and didn’t react. CAS Moeen also kept mum.
· DG BDR Shakil died at around 10:30 am and Indian channel (24 hours) first reported his death along with his wife at 11:00 am in the scrolls. NDTV showed the news in its scroll at 12pm and the death of DG and his wife was telecast at 12:15 pm in NDTV news bulletin. And the whole Bangladesh knew nothing about the death of the DG until 26th evening! Drama it was!!
· Colonel Aftab was killed on 25th night after the departure of Sahara Khatun from Peelkhana as he came out from hiding to look for his wife and daughter whom he knew to be in the officers’ mess. But they were by then taken to the quarter guard. Colonel Reza was killed after 3 am on 26th February. When held captive with other officers, he managed to keep with him the mobile of Colonel Gulzar for some time. Colonel Elahi was also killed after the departure of Sahara from Peelkhana on 25th night. He came out from his hiding inside manhole after he thought that some negotiation had been finalized. Major Mosaddek died from over-bleeding at about 5:30 pm on 25th February. His frantic calls for help were responded with hope initially, which was later proved to be bogus. A lot of other officers died much later after the meeting of the killers with PM. Still the entire nation is convinced that most officers were killed by 11 am on 25th February. This story has been carefully implanted into the nation by Lieutenant Colonel Shams, also a collaborator of the massacre.
· IG Police desperately wanted to get inside Peelkhana to rescue his daughter, and for that he requested Sahara Khatun time and again. But she refused. When IGP said that he would go alone, then Sahara was forced to enter to stage the drama of family rescue and arms surrender. She only visited the building “Otoshi”. She rescued wife of Lieutenant Colonel Quamruzzaman (another collaborator), the daughter of IGP and Mrs Akbar. She never went above 1st floor of Otoshi. Quamruzzaman, the communication officer of BDR Headquarters, survived the carnage as did all officers under him, his personal car was also not burnt! Then he staged a beautiful drama at Senakunj in front of PM, just to bluff the nation about his collaboration.
· There might be a question—why so many courageous and talented army officers inside darbar hall could not plan some counter action? There were a few Army Commando officers amongst them including the veteran Colonel Emdad, sector commander Rajshahi. Why didn’t they organize into small groups, confuse the BDR killers, snatch a few SMGs and ammunition, and try to fight back in small scale and then die? The answer is simple. They saw that immediately after the initial incident with a single BDR soldier, the DG talked to PM, CAS, DG DGFI; Colonel Gulzar talked to RAB, CGS, DMO and others. Colonel Gulzar asked CO RAB 2 Liutenant Colonel Zaman to send only FIVE soldiers! All were hopeful that some help would arrive. More so, the confident DG ordered Colonel Mujib (Dhaka sector commander), Lieutenant Colonel Enayet and other Peelkhana officers to go to their units and motivate the troops. Almost all officers inside darbar hall had long experience under the military leadership. They had tremendous faith in the leaders and the guardians of the country. They thought that definitely some help was on the way since PM and CAS had been informed and they assured of help. That is why they had full faith in the government that people so overwhelmingly elected and in the CAS who appeared to them as a tough military leader. But alas! Oh poor sons of the soil!! They could never dream that they would be betrayed so miserably by the guardian of the nation and also, more criminally, by the CAS. They could never imagine that the 2nd Palassey was about to be staged at Dhaka again. A number of wives of officers staying inside Peelkhana tried to call Begum Naznin Moeen, the wife of CAS Moeen, to seek help. Unfortunately and shamefully enough, she did not receive any call coming in from the endangered families.
· Why Gate no 5 of Peelkhana was left unguarded on 25th and 26th February? The officers of RAB 10, after arriving near Gate no 5 at 10:30am, saw the obvious choice of deploying near Gate 5 and along the low-height outer perimeter wall separating Peelkhana from the civilian area. They were certain that the area could be the most suitable stretch of place for storming into Peelkhana and also for a quick extrication. But at around 11:30am, the Additional DG of RAB Colonel Rezanur (cousin of Bahauddin Nasim) ordered RAB 10 through the CO to move away to Beribadh Area about 3km from Peelkhana. Bewildered and confused with this order, RAB 10 had to move out leaving Gate 5 and moved to Beribadh area for assuming the role of sitting pregnant ducks. That was how Colonel Rezanur, one of the elder siblings of Mir Zafor Ali khan of Palassey, ensured that BDR killers had a free run through that area after they completed their crime against humanity. It also ensured that the looted arms and ammunitions could be easily sent to the house of ward commissioner Torab Ali for onward distribution to BCL cadres. Other than RAB 10, RAB 2 and 3 were also near Peelkhana by 10:30am on 25th February.
· The bodies of Colonel Mujib and Lieutenant Colonel Enayet were found and recovered from the sewerage at 2:30pm on 25th February. The team of 14 BDR men went to the residence of PM at 3:30pm. And after discussion that lasted about 150 minutes, the PM declared general amnesty to all killers ignoring the fact that dead bodies of two officers were already found. During the entire period of discussion, PM didn’t ask a single time about the fate of other officers. Nobody also told about the fate of the officers. The PM wanted peaceful negotiation. The government concluded that it was a peaceful and politically solved mutiny. Well, that means the lives of 57 officers have no value! Their value lay only in monetary grant, state funeral and flats and cheques from banks. What a treacherous traitor! How can a PM of a nation be such a traitor!! To those intellectuals of the country and of India who think that a military action would have caused a ‘civil war’ or could have caused more lives, it can be said that a military action starting at around 11:30 am would have ended within two hours maximum. You blind intellectuals, please search the history of the entire mankind. You will find that whenever there was no “right cause” of a mutiny, it ended immediately on being intervened militarily. That is how Major General Matin, the then GOC 9 Infantry Division, quickly solved the Ansar revolt at Shafipur within 30 minutes. Did Indian government solve the Mumbai attack politically? Why not? Only civilians were kept hostage in Mumbai. If army moved in, the BDR troops, who were not well organized at 11:30, would have surrendered and some of them would have fled. Instead, the PM declared a general amnesty, knowing fully well that officers were killed, thus giving a free chit to kill and torture. PM was time and again informed that the families were being tortured. She was unmoved. CAS was informed by the national monitoring cell of the conversation between BDR troops and outsiders. The BDR troops were narrating how they were killing officers and torturing their families. CAS asked the officer at the monitoring cell “not to be emotional.” We hope Moeen’s wife and daughter are tortured to death when he is alive, just to see his emotional state.
· Mirza Azam ensured brutal murder of Colonel Gulzar, avenging the death of his criminal relative Shykh Abdur Rahman. He was frequently talking to his BDR contacts inside Peelkhana over cell phone on 25th February. He instructed the killers to gouge out the eyes of Gulzar and break his spinal cord.
· Colonel Emdad, sector commander Khulna, was alive in the toilet of darbar hall at least up to 1:30pm. He offered his zohr prayer and talked to his wife. Colonel Aftab, sector commander Rangpur, sent 3 sms to his senior colleagues (one brigadier and two colonels) at 4:30pm stating “I am alive in darbar hall, pls rescue us”. And still in the parliament the PM keeps lying that all the officers were killed by 10:30am. And still the AL and their entire team of foot-lickers swear by God that all killings ended by 11 am.
· On 25th February night about 7 to 9 white speed boats were used to let the fleeing BDR killers cross Buriganga. Haji Selim coordinated the entire effort. Local civilians were asked to move away from the scene by the associates of Haji Selim. If you kindly recall a news coverage at 1:00 am on 25th night where some local eyewitnesses were interviewed. They told that they had seen a few speed boats plying across the river, but they were forced out of the place by some political workers. Please also recall that this news was never broadcasted by any other channel, that news just vanished from the media.
· None of the officers of the of the officers of the revolting 44 Rifle Battalion was killed: Lieutenant Colonel Shams, Major Mahbub, Major Ishtiaq. All offices of officers were ransacked except 44 Rifle Battalion. At about 10:45am, a few minutes after the mutiny had begun, Shams was seen briefing a large number of BDR troops near gate no 5. A few civilians from outside crowd shouted, “Officer ra shoinik thekey alada hoye jaan.” Immediately thereafter Shams finished the briefing hurriedly and went away. As a reward for being part of the conspiracy, Shams was released to join SSF. The core of the mutineers was from 44 Rifle battalion. As such, in military terms, it was a fatal failure of Shams, CO 44 Battalion, to stop the mutiny of such a horrific magnitude. For that the CO must have been sacked immediately and taken into custody for further inquiry. Instead, he became a media hero of AL by changing his statements and fabricating the truth. Please note that when BDR killers were being interrogated at RAB headquarters, some of them confessed of the killing. But they insisted that Lieutenant Colonel Shams be asked about the planning as they didn’t know the planning in details. Army inquiry team asked statement of Lieutenant Colonel Shams and wanted to question him. But it was refused from PM office. None of the officers of the communication unit of BDR, headed under Lieutenant Colonel Quamruzzaman, was also killed!
· On 26th February morning Nanak and Mirza Azam threatened the just rescued wives/families of officers, “Do not talk to media because your husbands are still inside.” Nanak and Mirza wanted to ensure that (1) the country didn’t come to know immediately about the torture that went inside Peelkhana, and (2) no interference was there as the coordinated obliteration of evidence and dead bodies was about to end that evening . Interesting to note that a few hundred looted weapons and ammunitions, specially pistols, were handed over to BCL cadres through the team of Torab Ali.
· Entire media and the nation know that Taposh was not allowed to enter Peelkhana on 25th and 26th February by the BDR troops. This is also a blunt lie. He entered into Peelkhana a number of times on 25th Febraury. He was the person who declared DAD Touhid as the new DG of BDR, which appeared in the scrolls of TV channels. This was the signal of letting all BDR battalions across the country to know that Peelkhana operation was successful. Then onward mutiny started spreading all over the country.
· On 27th February when the second mass grave was discovered, Nanak proposed to Brigadier General Mamun Khaled to handover the mutilated and decomposed bodies to their families immediately without media coverage and a mass state funeral. An officer of engineering corps got furious and went to hit Nanak, but he was restrained by other on duty army officers. Nanak and Mamun Khaled were sitting nearby. And as the mutilated bodies of martyred officers were being removed from the mass grave, Mr Joy was handing over payment to a few foreign and a few BDR killers in Dubai.
· Some inane intellectuals of the country think that there could be civil war if army stormed into Peelkhana on 25th. They argue that army’s rescue mission into Peelkhana could trigger mutiny in all BDR units nationwide thereby starting a civil war. Respected intellectuals, do you have any idea what is a civil war? All BDR troops revolting around the country could be called a civil war? Then what could the nationwide unrest and brutal killing on 28 October 2006 be called? What do you call the nationwide killing, torture and unrest in educational institutions by BCL after January 2009? What do you think? Could the BDR attack army cantonments? Really? The total BDR troops is about 45,000, of which 10,000 were in Dhaka on 25th, leaving about 35,000 countrywide. The army has about 155,000 troops, of which about 25,000 at Dhaka and the rest 130,000 outside Dhaka. That leaves the ratio of about 1:4 between BDR and army, leaving aside the inferiority of armament of BDR compared to that of the army. Some intellectuals have opined that BDR could have started killing civilian population all around the country. People are also arguing that civilians around Peelkhana could have been killed. It appears that all intellectuals are retired army officers, knowing fully well how army operations are conducted. Dear myopic intellectuals, army knows how to operate in an area like Peelkhana and its surroundings. Fighting in Built Up Area (FIBUA) is a subject of utmost importance in military training. Never mind readers! In Bangladesh, there are more opinion givers than there are workers.
· Major General Moinul Hossain was a captain in the infantry battalion which took part in the killing of President Zia. He somehow escaped trial. On 27th February, the same Moinul Hossain assembled a group of officer and discussed the Peelkhana issue. He convinced the officers with logic that the government and CAS Moeen had failed to handle Peelkhana incident resulting to the death of so many officers and humiliation of the families. He then told them to type down their points of grievances and submit to him. Then he took those to Lieutenant General Aminul Karim and told him (General Amin) to discuss these with the CAS Moeen. Moinul Hossain also instructed the officers to give those points in an organized way during CAS address at Senakunj on 28th February. All officers shouted against traitor Moeen at Senkunj. Moeen urinated on his chair at Senakunj and was severely panicked. He had to be assisted to walk away by “Army Security Unit” officers as he fearfully left the venue. He had to change his dress to attend the namaz-e-janaza scheduled immediately after the address. Later Lieutenant General Aminul Karim was charged for instigating the officers against government and failing to exercise proper command. He was immediately sacked. Oh! What an irony of fate!! The then Brigadier General Moinul Hossain ensured that one anti-Indian Lieutenant General exited the army without any fault. And that Mr Moinul is now trying to reshape BDR with the help of India as the new DG BDR, who every other day gets innocent Bangladeshis shot down by BSF. Now our enemy will dictate how our defense against him will be reshaped and reorganized! Everything is possible in Bangladesh.
· After reversing his projected role in 1/11, the real face of RAW agent Moeen started emerging. His first step was to remove Lieutenant General Masud Uddin Chowdhury, a man known well for his courage and patriotism. Moeen’s family corruption with brothers Iftekhar U Ahmed and Belal U Ahmed became known in the entire country. In 2008, Moeen visited India for negotiation. After he was back to the country, 67 chassis of Indian ‘covered van’ trucks were brought in through Benapole by one of his brothers who is engaged in transport business. Those were brought without any tax/clearance of customs. All the chassis were seized in the border by BDR battalion as they didn’t know to whom those chassis belonged. Rest of the story was simple. The sector commander and battalion commander were about to lose their jobs and those chassis were given a free run to Dhaka. One of his brothers owns a diagnostic center at Banani, which made a monopolistic business by forcing all Libya going labors to have their medical test after 1/11. Another brother of Moeen, Iftekhar Ahmed Tipu, increased his land property at Ashulia from 20 bighas to 50+ bighas between 1/11 and November 2008. How many books CAS Moeen has written? One, two or three? A series of encyclopedia can be written about the corruption of CAS Moeen. [i]He ensured that young officers and soldiers of Bangladesh Army had worked likes bulls and dogs during the emergency period. Leave of officers were curtailed. Officers were kept detached from their families for months together. Officers were forced to execute whatever he wanted, surreptitiously hiding his evil intention. Meanwhile he, along with his accomplices both in army and outside, amassed millions both in cash and kind. And now the blame comes to the entire army, and the young, innocent and the patriotic officers of the army are being tagged as corrupted “army officers”. Nation eagerly awaits General Moeen’s open trial in future. The face of this criminal of the new millennium must surface to the nation.
· What was the drama unfolding in DGFI and RAB headquarters, TFI cell and CID? Immediately after the Peelkhana incident, young officers of RAB found out all the clues of the conspiracy linking AL leaders, including the call record of 204 minutes between Nanak and DAD towhid on 24th February. However, all such call records have been deleted by this time and as a reward of the patriotism and truthfulness of those RAB and DGFI officers, they were immediately ousted from RAB and DGFI to different corners of the country. About 100+ officers have already been prematurely ousted from Dhaka. DG DGFI Mollah Fazle Akbar, in a briefing, asked the officers of DGFI headquarters to lead the inquiry out of AL connections. A few murmurings by junior officers against such a treacherous proposal by the DG saw immediate posting out of those officers from DGFI. Now, Brigadier General Mamun Khaled of DGFI has been tasked to prepare the list of officers who voiced against CAS and the traitors so that they can be gradually sacked from the army. The list would include about 50 officers. In retaliation to the noble and sincere, though failed, attempt to force a military intervention at Peelkhana and later on for proper investigation, quite a few officers have been sacked silently. The plan is to at first put the officers in different peripheral units of the army, and then gradually sack them on different grounds, not linked to Peelkhana. DGFI teams started working in all TV channels from 2nd March, just to ensure that truth was not leaked out. Major Atik, the beloved intelligence RAB officer of Colonel Gulzar, has been tasked to establish link between Peelkhana conspiracy and JMB, BNP or any other militant organization. Colonel Gulzar liked him very much and that is why, violating all the rules, Major Atik were kept in RAB intelligence for 5 years at a stretch. What a return he is now giving to the martyred soul of Colonel Gulzar!! Major Azim, a close relative of Sheikh Helal was posted as Acting Director of RAB Intelligence. He was permanently superseded for promotion to the next rank, but this time AL will surely reward him for helping AL as a traitor to the nation. He is now working whole-hearted to wipe out all evidence against AL connection. The initial findings against AL were firmly established by Lieutenant Colonel Majid and Major Hamid. Both of them have been re-assigned and the evidence linking to AL has been sent into trash by Major Azim. Why IG Police was not selected as an active member of any inquiry team? Was it because that he would whole-heartedly try to find out the truth about the killing of his slain son-in-law and the molesters of his daughter? CID, with its professional looking yellow jackets and AC microbus, would do everything to ensure that a fair trial is not staged and AL culprits are never brought to justice.
· Nanak had to be involved as he fled to India and has the reputation of possessing the cool-blooded murderer’s instinct. He was the person involved in the burning of a BRTC bus near Sheraton hotel using gun powder for the first time in the history of Bangladesh, which killed 11 innocent people. Mirza Azam was his partner. This job was given to Jubo League by Sheikh Hasina with a view “rajpoth dhorey rakhtey hobey.” The entire confession by Sheikh Selim about the murder is now available in youtube as an audio clip (search “Sheikh Selim confesses of setting fire on bus Part 1 and 2”). One of the courteous interrogators of Sheikh Selim was Colonel Gulzar, who was trying to do justice for those 11 innocent Bangladeshis burnt alive inside the bus. Sheikh Selim and entire AL have taken revenge by sending Gulzar to a horrible death. Joy could have been a choice for future leadership of AL. But Joy, due to his immature talks and poor verbal communication skill, and also due to his long stay in US, was not the most obvious choice. Instead, Taj is the son of the widely accepted personality and the first prime minister of Bangladesh Tajuddin Ahmed, and thus rightly could be chosen to be a top AL leader. Same was the issue of Barrister Fazle Noor Taposh, son of Sheikh Moni. They would ensure that the family leadership in AL is maintained in future and the legacy of killing and arson continued. However, the criminals like Tofail, Suranjit Sen and the likes would not sit tight and vanish into oblivion.
· Please also note that the military team of inquiry, specially Brigadier General Hasan Nasir, proposed to interrogate Nanak to know his whereabouts on 25th night while Sahara was staging the drama of arms surrender inside Peelkahna. Immediately following this demand, Brigadier General Hasan Nasir was replaced by a new member of the team of inquiry[ii]. Nanak suddenly developed chest pain and was rushed to Labaid Hospital. Later, to avoid the inquiry, he was sent to Singapore on 1st of April for fake treatment. Within a few days following the visit of Indian foreign secretary on 12th April and his meetings with PM and CAS Moeen, Nanak came back from Singapore. The military inquiry was a mockery as the terms of reference did not allow an inquiry in the truest sense. Lieutenant General Jahangir Alam Chowdhury, known for his honesty and integrity, faltered and succumbed to the government pressure. He should have resigned from the presidency of the board of inquiry, which surely would bring an end to his military career. What else the general is left to achieve in his career? Could he not be courageous to prove his integrity to the nation? It is almost needless to comment on minister Ashraful Islam denouncing military inquiry report as it couldn’t find out any connection of JMB or anti-liberation force. Doesn’t it denote the government was trying to influence the inquiry boards to establish JMB and BNP-Jamaat link with the murders forcefully? Judge yourself.
· Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Mukim Sarkar (CO 25 Rifle battalion Panchagar) was with the BDR killers at Peelkhana on 25th Feb 09. The killers were addressing him as “sir”, and at the same time they called other officers “Kuttar bachcha” and killed them, bayoneted them, burnt them, gouged their eyes out, broke their backbone. Following is the extract of Mukim’s conversation on 25th February at 9:30pm with his subedar major: “Amader nirdesh holo sainikder jatey kono khoti na hoy. Jara paliye geche to geche…apnara DAD shaheb k niya valo thaken. Aar kono bahini jatey vitorey dhuktey na parey. DAD shaheb ke enader sathey kotha boltey bolben…” This is the crux of the conversation. His voice was calm and stable at 9:30pm on 25th February! Note that he said “amader nirdesh holo”, meaning Mukim was directly involved in the mutiny. Who is “amader”? What did he mean by “Aar kono bahini jatey vitorey dhuktey na parey”? The answer is left to your judgment.
· After Faruk Khan declared that some Muslim terrorists were involved, suddenly Moulana Sobhan was taken into safe custody and put in a RAB safe house. It was a plan to make a false statement by Mr Sobhan about the involvement of Islamic militants with the BDR massacre. But a daily newspaper reported immediately after his secret hiding under RAB custody that no Islamic militants were involved. The report was published with a lot of facts and figures. That report was stunningly true. This forced the AL to abandon the idea of making a false Islamic militant link to the massacre. Mr Sobhan was then allowed to leave the safe custody. After a few days he, along with his few other party members, met PM expressing their solidarity with the government.
· How can a disciplined organization like Army, BDR or Police stage a mutiny to put forward their demands? Is it a jungle they are working in? There are set procedures in all these organizations to project individual and collective grievances. That was truly done by the BDR leadership, as projected by DG Shakil during an interview in Channel I two days before his death. Realization of the demands was being delayed by the ministry of home affairs, not by BDR. Police had similar demands about their ration. That’s why, within 3 days of Peelkhana massacre, we saw in the scrolls of TV channels that government had decided to give 100% ration to police. It was a hasty and face saving move by the snail-paced ministry.
WHY PEELKHANA?
The seed of Peelkhana massacre was sown right at Roumari in April 2001, where 150 BSF personnel were killed inside Bangladesh territory. They came in to raid and capture a Bangladesh BDR camp, but the local Bangladeshi civilians informed the BDR about the intrusion. Following that, four army officers (one major and 3 captains) led the BDR troops and ran havoc on BSF. 128 bodies were handed over to BSF right there and the rest 22 bodies were handed over from Dhaka, which was telecast by ETV, covered by Shupon Roy. Sheikh Hasina, the then PM, said “sorry” to her Indian counterpart innumerable times over telephone. The then DG BDR ALM Fazlur Rahman was immediately removed from command. PM Sheikh Hasina accused that it was DG BDR who alone took the decision about Roumari and Padua cases. Actually General Fazlu took the steps keeping the Home Minister (Nasim) and PM in full picture. So the PM, Home Minister and Foreign Minister fooled the entire nation and also the Indian government by lying bluntly. This put the entire BDR, led by army officers, in a very awkward position as the command of BDR was betrayed by the government itself. Apart from Roumari, 15 BSF personnel died in Padua a few days before in the same month, which was the initiation of the total issue. Padua, an area of about 500 acres at the border in Sylhet, was used as a Muktibahini training camp where Indian Army organized training in 1971. When the Muktibahinis were called to deposit their arms at Sylhet stadium after 16th December 1971, they vacated Padua camp. Immediately thereafter, the Indian BSF took over Padua from Indian Army and continued to hold that place until recaptured by BDR in 2001. Padua was under Indian control for 30 years! Many a times BSF agreed to handover Padua in the flag meetings, but continued to hold that area illegally. Let the people of Bangladesh know that Padua was captured by BDR in 2001 and BSF of Padua Camp were disarmed, captivated and handed over to BSF authority. About 15 BSF personnel died as they opened fire and was fired back by BDR forces led by army officers. Roumari capture was planned by BSF as retaliation to Padua. Roumari was planned to be used as a bargaining chip to get back Padua. But as BSF sustained heavy casualty at Roumari and lost miserably, the government of AL came under tremendous Indian pressure. Finally, Bangladesh government handed Padua back to India in the same month (April 2001)!! The handing over ceremony was covered by ZE Mamun of the then ETV. Please note that at that time the GSO-1 of Operations of BDR was Lieutenant Colonel Rezanur (now Colonel and Additional DG of RAB). He is the cousin of Bahauddin Nasim of AL. He tried to victimize the officers who took part in Roumari operation, but was prevented from doing so by the DG. In 2009, he led the TFI interrogation and desperately tried to eliminate all external links to Peelkhana conspiracy. Interesting to note that Rezanur was posted to RAB to replace ADG Operation Colonel Gulzar. Colonel Gulzar thought to make a thorough briefing and orientation for Rezanur for a period of about a month because Gulzar was in full picture of RAB operations and crime scenario of the netire country. But unfortunately, Rezanur gave a cold shoulder to him and indirectly forced him to leave RAB immediately to join BDR. A normal orientation for Rezanur by Gulzar would not have allowed Gulzar to be in BDR uniform on 25th February. Gulzar was actually forced into the death trap by his colleague Colonel Rezanur.
Interestingly enough, whenever BDR is ambushed or attacked by BSF or Shanti Bahini in Hill Tracts in the absence of army officers, they even some time leave their weapon and run away. On the contrary, the same BDR men fight and win against BSF in every single encounter when led by army officers. To verify this phenomenon, you may inquire with the elderly mature population living in the peripheral areas of our border with India. So, it was always BSF versus army officers, never BSF versus BDR. Since BSF could not operate inside Bangladesh to avenge their continuous defeats, it was RAW[iii] which came in naturally. There are hundreds of RAW agents within our government machineries that even include a few army officers. Many of them are intellectually corrupt and as such work as unpaid agents of RAW. A good number of intellectuals, educationists and columnists are agents of RAW. Neutral and intelligent Bangladeshis can easily spot them without any hesitation.
After Sheikh Hasina assumed the leadership of AL in 1981, she attended a tea party at Bush house in London. She was introduced to the editors, journalists and directors of BBC by Serajur Rahman, a renowned journalist and columnist who also introduced Sheikh Mujib, Father of the Nation, to the world media in 1969. In Bush house that day, while giving an interview, Sheikh Hasina said that she hated politics, but she was in politics only to avenge the assassination of her father Sheikh Mujib. The interviewer immediately stopped recording the conversation and made her understand what could go wrong terribly if her statement of revenge was publicized in Bangladesh. (Daily Naya Diganta, 24 March 2009, page 6)
Now, if you connect the BSF+RAW with the mindset of Hasina, can you reach a reasonable conclusion that the aim of RAW and AL coincided somewhere?
RAW, ECONOMICS AND BDR
Many noted economists argue that India has nothing to do with the economy of Bangladesh because Indian economy is much resilient and India is heading for the place of a super power on the globe. Unfortunately, they are too myopic and insane in thinking like that. Indian economy is not as healthy as it looks outwardly. In 2008 alone, 1500 peasants committed suicide only in Chattishgarh after being unable to repay bank and lenders loan. How many similar suicides take place in Bangladesh? Bangladesh provides a market of not less than 150 million people, most of which is ready to consume low-cost low-quality products of India. India illegally pushes about 167 items into Bangladesh, a few of which are sugar, powder milk, Yaba tablet, Phensidyl and clothing items. Most of these items are, surely enough, custom-produced for Bangladesh. This is no secret. And none can deny accepting this fact. Lieutenant General Jahangir Alam Chowdhury, an ex DG BDR successfully brought down this number to 35 in connivance with the government. If you kindly recall the coverage in a national daily in March 2009, present AL government decided to urge India to stop the Phensidyl factories along the Indian border west of Bangladesh. Another such product is powder milk. Please recall the media coverage on fresh milk vendors spilling out thousands of kg of cow milk on the road as the regular big buyers were either not buying their fresh milk, or offering very low price. The media coverage was on 9th and 10th April 2009. This was because the giant milk producers were getting low-cost powder milk from India as border was open for Indian goods after AL came into power. There are thousands of other examples that may be quoted. Before 25 February 2009, one bottle of Phensidyl was being sold at Dhaka at Tk 1000/=. After 26 February the price came down to Tk 100/= and the media gives the proof of capture of thousands of Phensidyl bottles all around Bangladesh, indicating a clear run of Indian deadly goods into our land beginning early 2009. You may please note that the production cost of a bottle of Phensidyl produced for Bangladesh, inclusive fixed overheads, stands somewhere between 6 and 8.50 rupees. India also has different powerful tools to influence the economy of Bangladesh. Atta is selling at about Rs 7 in India and Tk 18 in Bangladesh, Flour at about Rs 9 in India and Tk 24-30 in Bangladesh. US ‘Red Heart Winter Wheat’ selling at USD 132 per ton in India, why not in Bangladesh? Whenever their would be and anti-Indian psyche in power in Bangladesh, she will play her evil moves with these facts and figures, artfully assisted by the Marwari investors working at Old Dhaka with billions. Soon Bangladesh will observe how her spinning mills, poultry and diary industry, re-rolling mills—all go down into trash due to Indian game assisted by Bangladeshi traitors.
RAW knows that anti-AL parties of Bangladesh, who know the deep-rooted evil intention of India, would never allow a transit of 700km for India through Bangladesh. India is not also ready to give only 40km transit to Bangladesh for Nepal and China. India hates “transit to Nepal and China” subject so much that she never allowed it to be in the agenda of any bi-lateral or SAARC meetings. The recent declaration of making Chittagong an international port is nothing but to serve the Indian interest. Who could use this port other than Bangladesh? Obviously Nepal and China could be the beneficiaries in addition to India. But for Nepal and China, use of this port without a transit through India was of no value. As such, Chittagong can serve the interest of India by becoming international. You will observe sanction of loan from ADB or other organization/country for renovation/reconstruction of Dhaka-Chittagong highway soon enough. Though this was a long awaited requirement of the nation, but the relatively unimportant roads entering into Bangladesh from the west of North Bengal (Rajshahi Division) received more importance. This was to allow, when needed, quick entry of Indian Army into Bangladesh with tanks and large artillery pieces with a quicker access to the capital. Otherwise, the first national highway that should have become multi-driveway and multi-lane was Dhaka-Chittagong highway, the lifeline of the economy. Now that India is about to fetch the benefit of “International port” from Chittagong, the road leading to the port city would also get prime attention.
The 700km transit to India through Bangladesh would bring down the cost of transporting one truck load from Kolkata to Assam/Tripura from Rs 34,000/36,000 to Rs 7,000/8,000. The time taken for transporting the goods would also reduce by 70%. And if India uses Chittagong Port to transport goods to Assam, the cost would be as low as Rs 500 per ton! But, in return, India is not ready to even discuss the issues of Nepal and China’s transit into Bangladesh, which could help Bangladesh import goods from China at much lower cost and export to China at a price lucrative for the Chinese. If India gets only the port facilities at Chittagong and not the 700km transit, it will still be highly cost-effective for her for shipment of goods to the seven sisters. Unfortunately enough, still intellectuals of Bangladesh will go to India to lick their foot and bring back laurels, and spend hours in the “talk shows” in TV explaining why we must immediately give transit to India citing examples of EU and North America (NAFTA). Is the backdrop of creating EU and the political situation in North and Central America similar to this sub-continent?
Poor Bangladesh always possesses the potentials of a reasonably large market for illegal drugs, the median age being much lower with more younger and impoverished people than most of the countries on the planet. The population of Bangladesh is more than Russia and equal to the total population combining UK, France and Italy. In a bid to earn money and to keep India free from drugs, India tries to re-route all drugs coming in from north-north-west and south of India into Bangladesh at high cost, thus acting as middleman. Drugs arriving from Golden Triangle are also routed through Tripura into Bangladesh. Joynal Hazari is one of the beneficiaries of such trades.
Other issues related to sharing of Ganges water, natural gas, joint task force, islands in the south-east etc have not been included, just not to make this article more boring. The barrage on Barak River at Tipai Mukh is also coming up as another stab into the soul of our economy, flora and fauna. Do we know that on the issue of Ganges water sharing, the first memorandum of understanding included the term of a “third country” to mediate between Bangladesh and India if the issue of water sharing could not be bilaterally solved? What about the new memorandum signed in 1996? The clause of “third country” was removed to allow India a free run. The main Indian agenda will be realized soon without the present Bangladeshi government making any effort to serve the interest of the nation. On 19th May alone, two Bangladeshis were killed near Roumari border by BSF and another two on the same day at Bholahat border. At least 15 innocent Bangladeshis have been murdered by BSF in our own land between January-June 2009. Absolutely no reaction from the government of Bangladesh! In addition, the government is actively considering taking help from India to reorganize BDR! Our enemy will help us to reorganize a force which will always guard us against the same enemy. What a farce! What a circus!! AL will also tarnish the image of the nation in dealing with the 10-truck arms haul case pressured by India. The country’s prestige will lie naked. People with some sense know very well what was the case and how should it be dealt with. But AL will never care what happens to the nation of which they claim to be the sole liberators. And through this case, the army officers who have been purposefully USED and EXPLOITED by the government from time-to-time, would project a wrong picture about the entire army. Suffice to say that India can’t fulfill her evil desires without the help of AL. That is why all her efforts would be to make AL survive in the helm of power as long as possible. And it will be possible if the army is subdued, politicized and other political parties are weakened.
Let’s come back to BDR. As long as army officers were in BDR, all evil intentions of India to cripple the economy of Bangladesh and make her an open market for dumping trash would remain at bay.
If you have any relative who served in RAB before 2009, please ask him about the source of arms that were recovered from criminals. It was India. Ask them the source of JMB explosives, detonators, gun powder, and dice for ammunition that were/are recovered or used inside Bangladesh. All undoubtedly made in India. Please rewind and watch the close-ups of TV channel coverage on explosives captured recently from suspected JMB operatives. Which country’s name was printed on the explosive packs? India. Ask them the source of heroin and marijuana seized inside Bangladesh. It is also obviously India. Ask them the source of low-quality white sugar that was pouring into Bangladesh at the rate of 35 ton a day. India. On the contrary, India is taking away fertilizer, diesel, petrol and gold—all valuable goods—from Bangladesh through smuggling. So, who is the loser? Judge yourself. India takes away “life” from us and, in return, offers us “death”. With the barbed wire fencing all along the border, it is India’s choice to decide what would go inside Bangladesh and vice versa. It is also India’s sweet will to shoot down any innocent Bangladeshi peasant or shepherd working near the border on their own land inside Bangladesh.
If you kindly recall, the father of the nation, Sheikh Mujib, never trusted the army. Perhaps he saw what Indian Army did to us in exchange of fulfilling her evil desire in 1971 under the shadow of liberating Bangladesh. We could have won a decisive victory alone, may be it would have taken us 18/27/36 months. Vietnam experience of US proved it later. Anyway, the mistrust of Sheikh Mujib created Jatiya Rakhkhi Bahini (JRB) as a parallel organization against army. The wrath of army and the nation came down on him when Sheikh Kamal picked up the wife of Major Dalim and molested her. It was the terminal event that concluded the other crimes that were destroying the country keeping Sheikh Mujib in an apparent darkness by his associates. The country also experienced the worst famine in 1974. On 15 August 1975, Mr Tofail Ahmed was in-charge of JRB. If you kindly recall, the name of Tofail came in the front page of Daily Ittefaq as one of the accused in Sheikh Mujib murder case once the case was initiated by AL government for the first time. It was because under his leadership, JRB failed to react against the mutiny and surrendered without firing a single bullet at the Second Capital (Agargaon). Tofail changed his face immediately after the killing. He was also accused of walking over the dead body of Mujib in an apparent attempt to show his loyalty to the mutineers and thereby saving his own life. However, for mysterious reasons, the name of Tofail later disappeared from the list of accused. His same face of betrayal emerged again after 1/11, when he voiced out anti-AL comments in the national media against Sheikh Hasina to save himself from Joutho Bahini. Unfortunately AL has failed to assess this traitor, and has taken him back in the election 2008.
If army officers could be thrown out of BDR and BCS officers could be taken in, then BDR could become another Rakhkhi Bahini for AL. Please recall the cabinet meeting on 25th February 2009. It was discussed that 27th BCS and another Special BCS would be taken into BDR. Can you guess who made the proposal? None but Mr Tofail Ahmed! Would you please believe that a list of about 200-300 BCS cadres was prepared for induction into BDR as Special BCS? One day God will definitely let this truth see light. We have to wait and see how BDR is reorganized in the long run by AL. However, so far, under the pressure of army officers, AL is yet to work out inclusion of BCS officers in reshaped BDR.
It must be mentioned that AL eyed BDR for conversion into Rakhkhi Bahini quite a few years ago. A lot of BDR troops are dismissed from service every year for corruption. Only real culprits and offenders are sent home, because the trial in BDR is not political. Unlike the armymen, BDR troops have the right to appeal in civil court. As in Bangladesh, whether the dismissed BDR troops would get back their job depends on the political government in power. Out of such about 1100 appeals during the BNP regime between 1991 and 95, less than 25 sacked BDR troops got back their jobs. Conversely, between 1996 and 2001, AL reinstated about 2000+ sacked BDR troops. To whom these criminals would remain indebted for the rest of their lives? Definitely AL. So, it was not surprising that the disciples of those reinstated troops shouted “Joy Bangla” on 25th February at Peelkhana. But, if asked now, none of the officers who were forced to take the decision of reinstating the sacked BDR troops in the face of AL pressure would admit their part in giving back job to the sacked criminals of BDR.
BDR troops were being deprived too much of illegal money since 2002 as talented army officers started to join BDR. Newly promoted colonels, considered to be the most promising future leaders of the army, started to join BDR on their promotion. Colonels Reza, Gulzar, Imam, Emdad, Nakib, Aftab were such promising talented officers known in the entire army. Following this trend, the earning from share of smuggling in BDR came down sharply. The ADs and DADs of BDR, who rise from the ranks of sepoy, were the worst sufferers. It was easy for them to make the young BDR troops compare the past with the present and future. The past was full of money, the present offered very little illegal money, and the future was bleak if army officers continued to lead them. They desperately needed a change. A change that could take out army officers from BDR. An obvious choice was BCS officers to replace the armymen. BCS officers are not psycho-physically and emotionally trained to lead a para-military organization like BDR. It would also be difficult for them to lead BDR during border skirmishes where physical fitness and knowledge on military tactics and weapon handling are vital. Recall the experience during Ershad regime when he tried to train newly recruited ASPs for 1 year in Bangladesh Military Academy. The aim was to build a strong police force. But even the police officers could not sustain the psycho-physical hardship of BMA due to age and other factors and the idea had to be abandoned under tremendous uproar. The ADs, DADs and the AL thought that if the BCS officers were taken from AL cadres, then it could be an orgy of cross-border corruption and illegal money, as a bonus to the re-creation of Rakhkhi Bahini.
ALL AIMS CONVERGED INTO PEELKHANA
All the aims of RAW, AL, corrupt BDR troops and anti-army psyche converged wonderfully to a single aim—destroy BDR and army. It was a complex strategy to cause Bangladesh to “collapse within”. Unthinkable corruption by Tareq Zia and his associates, including his black money investment of thousands of crore taka in Malaysia and elsewhere, added additional advantage to usher in the collapse. Followings were to ensure it:
Creation of 1/11. It would cause destruction of the capitalism that was about to usher in rapid industrialization[iv] in Bangladesh. In addition, uprooting the small entrepreneurs from the roadsides and villages would cause alienation of the army from the general people who otherwise adore and love Bangladesh Army. Who all were the owners of small tea-stalls and vendor shops along the road sides in entire Bangladesh? They were the poor people who were left unattended by the government to survive at their own. The poor people occupied small pieces of khas land to erect little shops investing from as low as a few thousand takas to 50000 or above. They were the self-employed people, a vital economic force at the grass root level. Why on earth it was a major part of the agenda of the caretaker government to destroy these harmless entrepreneurs? They were keeping many “have nots” employed and contributed to the national GDP. Their destruction was to create poverty and crime. Still, the foolhardy caretaker government concentrated in their destruction instead of focusing on some other issues, like collection of revenue that was overdue from the large entrepreneurs amounting thousands of crore taka. Making black money white could also ensure normalization of the dark market and could make a new beginning. But 1/11 was aimed to ensure “collapse within”.
Destruction of BDR and its reconstruction suiting to the need of BSF.
Destruction of the army, breaking the backbone of morale of the army officers.
Peelkhana came as the obvious choice after 1/11. General Moeen U Ahmed[v], surely a RAW agent[vi], forced the emergency following the decision taken during Manikganj Conspiracy in early January. AL and BNP were in quagmire as their naked faces were being publicized to the entire world. Fortunately for them, US withdrew her back-up on Indian plea, as part of the total plan, and asked Moeen to reverse his effort. Moeen had only one choice: bring AL to power or face a disgraceful exit and trial for corruption. It was then that the Peelkhana was chosen for revenge by RAW. If you kindly recall, Jahangir Kabir Nanak fled to India and remained there until it was safe to come back in late 2008. He was the contact of AL with RAW for the entire planning. That is why he came to the forefront of negotiation on 25th February despite having no relation with BDR, army or Home Ministry. After all, who knew better than him about the entire plan? And who else in the AL was closer to DAD Towhid? The campaign for Peelkhana massacre began in November 2008 at the hands of Mr Sajeeb Wajed Joy, the schizophrenic son of PM. His article with co-author Carl Siovacco in US accused Bangladesh army and other military and para-military organizations of recruiting thousands of Muslim fundamentalist terrorists. For this type of comment in India prior to an election, the party would have lost peoples’ mandate. Indians would not have tolerated such an anti-nation lie told by the son of the party leader. But for Bangladesh it is always different. It should be, because a single political party considers itself to be the sole proprietor of Liberation War 1971. Joy reiterated that these organizations needed to be revamped in order to rescue the nation. The campaign gained momentum after AL was elected. A group of intellectuals started criticizing army in the TV channels. The discussion against army was at the peak at the Parliament on 24th February. The campaign was given a new color by the para-military organizations and media as suddenly JMB operatives were being captured countrywide in February. The voice of Joy was echoed by the commerce minister Lieutenant Colonel Faruk Khan immediately after the Peelkhana episode was over. The whole country knows about the pregnancy incident of Mukta, the kept of Faruk Khan. Now he is the custodian of investigations! He murdered about 15 innocent civilians in the mid 70s in Rangpur. His wife was teased in a cinema hall. Later he came back with a few soldiers and sprayed bullet on the cinema hall, killing innocent people. Later Sheikh Mujib, the father of the nation, had to go to Rangpur to diffuse the situation.
Unfortunate for Bangladesh, almost nobody knows that 6 young army officers (one major, 3 captains and 2 lieutenants) were martyred fighting against Shanti Bahini in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). Do the intellectuals of Bangladesh know how did they die and what are the dates of their death? Do they know 7 JCOs were also martyred? Do they know 312 soldiers gave their lives in CHT? Does the nation know anything about their heroic sacrifice for the nation? Does any university student know how their brothers were dying in the treacherous hills trying to save a beautiful piece of land called CHT? Was their ever a lead news in all the national dailies about the martyred officers, JCOs or soldiers? Does the nation know that one Bir Uttam (posthumous), 16 Bir Bikrams, 69 Bir Protiks and 85 CAS Commendations were awarded to the courageous officers and soldiers of Bangladesh Army for outstanding achievements in CHT? Does the nation ever try to remember the martyrs of CHT on their death anniversaries? Does the nation know that more than one-third of the 1600km road in CHT has been constructed by Bangladesh Army? Do you know each battalion deployed for UN mission earns more than USD 2 million for the government itself, excluding what is earned by the individuals as pay and allowances? All answers are negative. But why? Why the nation doesn’t know all these real-life stories? Why the politicians also don’t know these? Because, it is the political parties who keep the army alienated from the people of Bangladesh. The politicians are afraid that the existing love of the general people for the army would multiply if the people know that army doesn’t only provide them VGF service, disaster relief and rehabilitation, emergency water supply, traffic service at Dhaka and so on and so forth, the army people are also sacrificing their lives both in CHT and in UN missions. That could make a deadly combination of the people and the army. Together they could any time eliminate all betrayer politicians from our soil and give birth to a safer and more prosperous nation.
What do you call this ignorance of facts about supreme sacrifices? If patriotism is the precondition to become a political leader, wouldn’t you call this ignorance a crime against the nation?
By the way, dear readers, do you know who were harboring and nourishing and still harboring the insurgents in CHT? India. Just along the reverse U border on the tip of Khagrachari, there are 23 Shanti Bahini training camps, leaving aside the rest of the border of CHT. Kindly note that the worst failure of RAW in its entire history of Bangladesh chapter was its inability to annex CHT with Tripura. If somehow India could let the Shanti Bahini win autonomy from us, then it would be a piece of cake to gradually capture CHT. You don’t need to capture a piece of land physically if you have free access to all the resources and economy of that area.
And India would never dare to militarily capture and hold Bangladesh under her control. It is not because we are militarily superior for our alliance with China. It is because if India makes Bangladesh her part, she has to feed 160 million ill-fed mouths and take care of the large percentage of unemployment. Instead, India can capture the economy of Bangladesh by installing government of her liking (like Sikkim) and fetching more benefit than if Bangladesh were part of India physically. A street vendor would understand this. But if you ask the Indian-foot-licking people of Bangladesh, they would raise their eyebrows in astonishment and say, “For God’s sake, how on earth people are insane enough to say something so obnoxious against mother India?” Ungrateful intellectuals indeed!! Just wait and see. India’s effort worth billions of rupees for more than two decades in CHT seemingly went futile due to interest of AL. However, the peace accord was just the end of Part 1, just a travesty. Bangladesh is yet so see what is India and RAW. Surely enough, within a decade or two, Bangladesh will witness with horror the resurrection of Shanti Bahini with a new get up and with greater prowess. Nevertheless, if AL stays in power for long, India may not outwardly revamp Shanti Bahini, instead will adopt indirect approach to suck everything out of Bangladesh. We have not forgotten what Indian Army took away after our liberation. They didn’t even spare the regulators of ceiling fans from cantonment barracks to be looted, and also took away shit-pot (bodna) from barrack toilets!!
Anyway, having understood the interest of the stakeholders of Peelkhana massacre, let us now see how the carnage was artfully planned.
THE PLAN
You might know that the BDR Week 2009 was postponed initially. Then it was decided that it would take place under the new DG BDR. Brigadier General Moinul Hossain was informed of his coming assignment as DG BDR. He was then in the National Defense College. Later, the BDR Week was given a go from Home Ministry for reasons unknown, but known now.
The plan was aimed at achieving the following short-term objectives, the long-terms yet to be unearthed:
To make BDR politicized and ineffective in the borders and at the same time making it a parallel force against the army. Thereby:
i) Reinstate the illegal Indian cross-border trade worth approximately USD 6 billion a year, with the surety of yearly expansion. That includes arms, drugs, weapons, explosives and low-quality goods that are custom-made for the poor, innocent and simple Bangladeshis. ii) Keep a constant psychological rivalry between army and BDR and let a particular political party fish in the murky water. iii) To take a two-way revenge for 15th August 1975 assassination and Roumari-Podua deaths of BSF. (May call it Alindia Conspiracy! Alindia=AL + India) iv) To ensure India’s avenge of her primary failure to annex CHT with Tripura through Shanti Bahini’s attempt of winning autonomy. (The grudge is against Bangladesh Army.) v) To teach Bangladesh Army a frightening lesson for its actions during and after 1/11. vi) To destroy the morale and faith in command of the junior officers of Bangladesh Army by simply not allowing any military action on 25th February.
The plan had 2 parts. Let’s name them Plan A and Plan B.
Plan A. This was an overt plan. It was decided that there would be a hostage situation in BDR Darbar Hall on 25th February. The angry BDR troops would make all officers attending the darbar hostage and put forward their demand of ration, pay, UN mission etc, a total of 22 points. PM would then send CAS, Sahara and Nanak to negotiate. The demands of BDR would be met, making all negotiators heroes. It was quite obvious that DG BDR himself knew part of this plan. He had no choice but to accept the risk. Otherwise he had to face trial for his wife’s failed attempt to leave the country with Tk 6 Crore (or more) in late 2008. The wife of General Moeen rescued her and Major Mahbub (later Mahbub left the job and went to UK). There was an obvious share of CAS Moeen in that money. The tricky part of the plan, not known to DG BDR, was that he and DDG may be shot in the legs if the points were not met immediately. Plan A was known to CAS, new DG DGFI Mollah Fazle Akbar, DG NSI Monir, army CGS Sina, Lieutenant Colonels Quamruzzaman (communication in-charge BDR), Shams CO 44 Rifles, Mukim, Salam (Paramilitary wing DGFI). Plan A was a decoy. This plan was also known to most BDR troops stationed at Peelkhana. They were ready to force the hostage situation, demand withdrawal of army officers from BDR and realization of other 21 demands. Their false grievances against army officers were framed on a piece of paper that was to be faxed on 25th February to CAS Moeen’s secretariat, DG DGFI office and PM office and other important offices and media by Lieutenant Colonel Mukim.
What is the proof that DG BDR knew something was coming? The leaflet[vii] of BDR reached the hands of Commanding Officer RSU (Rifles Security Unit) Lieutenant Colonel Enshad Ibn Amin (martyred) on 21st February morning. He immediately rushed to DG BDR Shakil with a copy of the leaflet. General Shakil told him to make a counter leaflet and circulate immediately. On 23rd February, it was found out that three sub-machine guns were missing from the armory (kote) at Peelkhana. Following that discovery, officers were put on duty in the armory. And still the PM visited Peelkhana on 24th February!!! You know SSF ensures that the firing pins of all weapons on duty are removed when PM visits a military or para-military outfit. Even officers posted as guard commanders for PM are not allowed to have a weapon that can be fired. Only PGR and SSF officers carry usable weapons with ammunition. If this is the level of security for a PM visit, how come the PM visited Peelkhana on 24th February, where 3 machine guns were already reported missing? Officers are never given duty in the armory unless the situation is grave. Knowing what was about to unfold, the PM cancelled her planned dinner on 26th night at Peelkhana.
Plan B. This was an exclusive covert plan of the big evil brains and the masterminds. It was the pure and raw RAW. About 15 foreign gunmen were hired. They entered Bangladesh not on 11 January as reported in some dailies, but after 19 February 2009. A few of them entered through the Benapole border on 21st February when it was open for 5 hours for people of both sides willing to exchange greetings. They carried 16000 sweets to Dhaka out of the 1 lac sweets offered by the West Bengal government on the occasion of Ekushey February. The plan was deadly but simple. The gunmen would get their BDR uniform tailored by a civilian tailor (the tailor shop and person were traced by RAB during the initial investigation). As the BDR troops would execute Plan A, these hired killers would suddenly move in and kill about half of the red-tapers (Colonel and above). Then they would force other mutineers (Plan A party) to join them in the killing spree. They were to use a Bedford truck and enter through Gate 4. Another pick up was used to take in the arms and ammunition they were to use. These arms and ammunition were purchased by Haji Selim in mid February. This was spotted by a Prothom Alo journalist, who in turn went to NSI and informed that something was cooking up against Peelkhana involving BDR and politicians. But NSI warned him not to talk to anyone else. NSI itself also kept mum from the open forum. Frequent meetings took place involving BDR and Mirza Azam, Haji Selim, Nanak, Taposh and Mohiuddin Khan Alamgir. Torab Ali acted as a link between the BDR troops and Taposh, Nanak, Mirza Azam and Sohel Taj. The initiation of involvement of Taposh was during his election campaign. About 5000 BDR voters are registered under Dhaka-12 constituency of Taposh. BDR troops contacted Taposh via Torab Ali, AL president of Ward-48 under Dhaka-12. They assured Taposh that “Boat” would win at Dhaka-12 and all BDR voters would vote for him. At that point, 5000 votes meant a hell of a number. In return, BDR wanted their demands to be met. Taposh agreed and while the planning for the Peelkhana was being finalized, Taposh agreed that somehow he would assist BDR so that they were safely through with the mutiny and their demands realized. In the election, however, Taposh won by a big margin (126,780 to 69,494); which he could otherwise have won without BDR support. But his aim was not only to win the election, he had different motive as a member of the Sheikh family, which you can guess logically. The last meeting before the massacre was held at the place of Torab Ali in the evening on 24th February. Final oath of about 24 BDR key killers was taken at the Dhanmondi residence of Fazle Noor Taposh on the same day at night. Torab Ali and his son leather liton acted as the administrative support and safe house for the planners. There was a little problem with leather liton as he was apprehended by RAB on 10 January 2009 on a lot of criminal charges. Fortunately Taposh and other AL leaders could ensure his safe release by the end of January 2009. Sohel Taj was given the responsibility to ensure safe return of the killers to Middle-east, London and USA. It was decided that BG flight 049 would be used, if require it will be delayed to ensure safe exit of the foreign killers. A series of meetings were held at the residences of Taposh, Nanak and Mirza Azam with the key group of BDR killers lead by the DADs. One of such meetings was held at the Banani residence of Sheikh Selim on 13th February. Sohel Taj, also a resident of Banani, joined the meeting. After finalizing some issues and his duties overseas, Sohel Taj reportedly left for USA on 18th February. But we are confirm that Taj didn’t go to USA, rather he first visited India. As known by the entire nation, Taj was in USA during 25th-26th February. This is a blunt lie and bluff. He was at Dhaka at that time. On 28th February he was flown to Sylhet by an Army Aviation Helicopter in the evening and the same night he left for abroad by plane from Osmani Airport. Make a guess who was one of the pilots of that helicopter… It was Lieutenant Colonel Shahid, the unfortunate pilot who later died in the chopper crash with Major General Rafiqul Islam, GOC 55 Infantry Division. Do you accept the death of Lieutenant Colonel Shahid as a coincidence? It’s up to you. The final meeting of the hired killers was held at hotel Bab-Al-Shams in Dubai sometime on or near 19th of February. The meeting was attended by a Russian don Lazar Shybazan and a host of other Indians. The main focus of the meeting was to finalize the action and payment plan for Peelkhana massacre. Another meeting of the financiers was held at International Club (IC), Gulshan at Dhaka in early January, where the younger brother of Sohel Taaj attended. Plan B was known to the PM, Sheikh Selim (who was not available in his house on 25th and 26th February), Nanak, Taposh, Sohel Taj, Mirza Azam, Haji Selim, Abdul jalil, Mohiuddin Khan Alamgir and a few others. Mohiuddin Khan Alamgir, Jahangir Kabir Nanak and Mirza Azam were in favor of total annihilation of officers at Peelkhana. As they approached PM, she initially was hesitant about the mass killing. However, PM herself gave the final nod for eliminating DG, his wife and Colonel Mujib before one week of the deadly mutiny (this piece of information was extracted by the young officers of RAB at TFI cell on the night of 12th April during interrogation of key BDR killers). However, CAS was told not to be emotional if DG and his wife were shot dead accidentally. His silence denoted his acceptance and approval. It was a good option for CAS because it would eliminate his partners of crime in the failed attempt to smuggle out Tk 6 crore (or much more). Nobody could then link CAS Moeen and his wife to that attempt. Plan B was also known to the key BDR personnel including DAD towhid, DAD jalil, DAD habib. Reportedly RAW pumped in about Rs 60 crore for the entire operation. It was Nanak’s responsibility to ensure the complete annihilation of army officers inside Peelkhana and it was the responsibility of Taposh, the local MP, to ensure the escape of BDR killers through Hazaribagh and Jhigatola area. Nanak was also responsible, along with local MP Taposh, to ensure safe exit of the hired killers by ambulance on 25th night, and the escape of the entire Peelkhana killers by 26th February. That is he instructed through miking that all residents of that area to keep out of 3km radius of Peelkhana. The ambulances to be used for the extrication of the hired killers were from Red Crescent hospital, led by an AL sympathizer, and from the clinic of the personal physician of the PM. On their way to the airport, the killers would be shifted to microbus (the number plates are with RAB. Probably fake plates were used). Hindu BDR men were carefully chosen and given duty in a way so that they could take part in burning the bodies of the officers to eliminate evidence (Monoranjan was such a BDR man). Success of Plan B totally depended on the ability of the government in preventing army to go in for a military solution and obliterating maximum evidence of murder from Peelkhana. That is why Nanak was given the responsibility to assume command inside Peelkhana. He is the person who ensured that the Darbar Hall was cleaned by BDR sweepers and maximum bodies were buried into mass graves during the darkened night of 25th and 26th February. All these he ensured by deliberately switching off the power line inside Peelkhana. Logically it seems that there was a contingency to meet any army action inside Peelkhana. CAS would be immediately sacked and all BDR sectors would be asked to kill the army officers. Then government would declare a vague ‘civil war’ situation and Indian Army would get in by air. To generate sympathy of world media in favor of the mutiny, Joy told world media on 26th February (Al Jazeera) that BDR mutiny was due to the corruption of army officers. Traitor son of a traitor mother indeed!!
To keep the BDR troops in good humor and in full faith about Tk 15-17 crore was distributed in Peelkhana between early and late February. Tk 4 lac was fixed per officer’s head and the total money was redistributed. The killer group of BDR, who were fixed before, had a much larger payment. The killers who joined later enthusiastically didn’t receive any additional payment during or after the massacre. The distribution of money for Plan A participants was mainly through the connections of Fazle Noor Taposh, and the payment for the DADs and the main killer group was handled by Nanak. Payment for the hired killers was arranged by Sohel Taj and Joy, some advance made in Hotel Bab-Al-Shams in Dubai earlier.
Contingencies. You know that always there has to be a contingency to every plan. It means what to do when a plan goes wrong, which normally does. So, what was the contingency for Peelkhana massacre plan? Here we consider only two of the contingencies:
If the Nation Knows about AL Involvement in Peelkhana Massacre, what to do?
A totalitarian effort involving newly-posted foot-licking officers of RAB, DGFI and Police would be used to create a fake link with JMB, Jamaat and BNP or any mafia group to the massacre. In addition to that, astonishing it may seem, appointment of Sahara Khatun was an artful deception by AL to meet this unforeseen situation. But why? A part of the buildup was under her inexperienced eyes. When BDR troops were contacting Nanak, Taposh, Taj and Mirza Azam with their demands and when they were getting their leaflets approved from them, the PM was approached and she instructed her partymen to send the BDR troops to discuss the issue with their Home Minister Sahara Khatun. As they approached Sahara Khatun with their points, she gave them a hearing and said that the points would be seen later. Unfortunately for Sahara, her culprit brother got entangled in the issue and allowed secret meetings of BDR and the AL leaders in his Hotel Imperial. The trap was complete. If ever the nation comes to know about the link of AL with the killers, Sahara would be linked to that and removed from her ministry, and actual Home Minister would replace her. So, in effect, Sahara Khatun is a decoy of AL. What if Nanak and others are also indicted in the Peelkhana massacre by the media and peoples’ opinion of Bangladesh (since investigations will surely spare them)? That was planned to be tackled by the art of gambit in chess. Sending Nanak to Singapore for a fake chest-pain treatment on 1st April from Labaid hospital was just the beginning of many gambits that the nation would witness.
What if the army retaliates on 25th and storms into Peelkhana to rescue their comrades and families? What answer AL would give to India for spending so much Indian money and brain of RAW for planning the massacre?
If army retaliated against 25th February massacre, Indian army, with the help of Indian air force was to get inside Bangladesh as an assisting force to the SOS call of PM (this was declared at a press conference by Indian foreign minister). This, together with the mutiny in all BDR units, would destabilize the entire country. This situation had been destined to be termed as “civil war” by the government, seeking foreign assistance. Indian Air Force was ready at Jorat Air Base in Assam with heavy lift and medium lift aircraft and 30,000 troops (statement of Indian newspapers known to all). More so, if at all army stormed in violating the government’s illegal order of not to do so, CAS Moeen would be sacked immediately along with other generals and officers involved in the supposed military intervention. Following that CAS Moeen would be put before trial for violating the PM’s order and also for the crimes he committed during the national emergency. This wonderful contingency silenced criminal CAS Moeen from even thinking about a military intervention to solve the mutiny issue swiftly. Moreover, in the event of a military intervention, BDR killers would be killed and captured. Then the government would have invested another Tk 5 Crore into the pockets of a few “yellow journalists” and propagate the message to the nation that the intervention was done without the PM’s consent and that some “innocent” BDRs were killed for their “right cause”...just what AL did after Padua and Roumari. The rest of the contingency plan could not be unearthed as yet. We have to wait and see what AL offers to the nation as the contingencies, if at all required.
Plan A and Plan B combined made the entire plan of Peelkhana massacre. This plan, executed with ruthless and cruel betrayal, became the worst possible single-event carnage of military officers in the entire history of mankind. Bangladesh may not hold any world record for outstanding achievements, but surely she will painfully shoulder this agony—the agony of a fratricide synonymous to social cannibalism.
EPILOGUE
Peelkhana massacre is not the end in itself. There are far-reaching plans and objectives, the beginning of which was on 25th February. However, that part has been kept out of the purview of this article.
No link with Nanak, Mirza Azam, Taposh, Sohel Taj, Haji Selim, Mohiudding Khan Alamgir and Abdul Jalil has been found in the inquiries so far and CID inquiry would produce the same. They will remain out of justice despite being the masterminds and traitors to the nation. All evidences against them have been destroyed. That is one of the many reasons for delaying submission day of investigation reports. The aim was simple: destroy actual evidence and create new evidence; block evidences from military investigation. After all, creating new evidence would take more time than the time required to destroy actual evidence, isn’t it? Only AL activist linked to Peelkhana would be the ward commissioner Torab Ali, who will be jailed for a few years for being part of the conspiracy. He may also be eliminated to conceal all AL connection with Peelkhana for good. But truth can never be destroyed. Truth shall prevail.
A few BDR killers will be hanged, but most of the killers will be jailed. This will be done deliberately as the impotent Kahhar Akhand has been brought back from LPR and given the job, despite of the fact that he contested in the last election for the post of an MP!! 24 types of crimes were committed in Peelkhana. No witness will bear the humiliation at the court for proving one kind of crime.
If situation worsens beyond the control of AL, the collaborators would slip into India. The aim will be to save Sheikh Hasina and Awami League, not the nation or the face of justice. Else, a few of AL lawmakers would be removed from their minister-ship on charges of failing to handle the mutiny correctly. Surely, one such scapegoat for AL will be Sahara Khatun.
It is most likely that AL, in collaboration with RAW, will stage bomb attacks or similar anarchies all over the country, panicking the general mass about JMB and creating hatred against Islam in the country. This will also be a diversion for taking peoples’ minds away from Peelkhana trial. AL surely has chalked out other plans of diversion in coordination with RAW. The nation will be fooled again.
The present AL government is outrageously overconfident in dealing with the nation. It is already clear how AL is bringing down the price of rice by accelerated import from India and at the same time putting our poor farmers into financial peril by not taking care of the buying price of the Boro production. AL is also desperate enough to bring in India if threatened by internal situation. Pronob of India already said, “India will not tolerate any attempt to touch the hair of Sheikh Hasina.” So, it is no more India, it is India+AL against Bangladesh. Indian foreign secretary came discreetly to Bangladesh on 12th April, which was kept secret from the press initially. But the smart press people broke in. The secretary met PM, Foreign Minister, Home Minister, CAS Moeen and others. The purpose was simple: coordinate the future plan and discuss the latest instructions of RAW. And still the intellectuals of Bangladesh will praise AL government and lick the foot of their Indian parents. AL is about to reward the garments workers by providing them rice on OMS. This is in gratitude of the help they provided to AL during the pre-1/11 period by carrying out destruction and creating unrest at Dhaka.
It is nothing new for AL. Awami League was the introducer of “burning people alive” in Bangladesh. A bus full of passengers was set afire near Syedabad in 1995-96. Before that incident, such crimes were found in Assam, but never in Bangladesh. Sheikh Hasina is the leader of AL, the party who sent abroad Century Manik to avoid trial after he came into the media limelight. If you kindly recall, Manik openly celebrated his 100th rape of Jahangirnagar University girls by cutting cake in a party with his accomplices. Rape is not uncommon in society, but it is regarded as a crime even under warring conditions. We would request the entire learned community of Bangladesh to find out one example from the history of mankind where “100 girls of a university are raped by a single political activist over a long period of time, and he celebrated it openly with his accomplices like a birthday. Later, as a reward for creating such a history, that rapist is sent abroad by the head of the government of that country.” We have something more to add about the killing psyche of AL. Dr Afsarul Amin, a minister of present AL government, and his accomplice Dr Bakhtiar, were responsible for the killing of the daughters of the Principal of Chittagong Medical College in late 1970s. They were the President and GS of student body of CMCH. They tried to kill the Principal as he was the only bar for their completion of MBBS. But unfortunately, when they tried to shoot the Principal in his residence, the daughters of the Principal were killed. Afsarul Amin and Bakhtiar were sentenced to death and the sentence was upheld by Supreme Court. However, later President Abdus Sattar granted them President’s mercy in the early 1980s. That convicted killer Mr Afsarul Amin is now a minister of Bangladesh! Dr Bakhtiar was working in the Middle East in the administration of a hospital, lately he joined in a memorial hospital in Chittagong. As such, it is not surprising that AL will kill and rape the nation a
nd sell the wrecked country to India in a way that would not be felt by the innocent mass of Bangladesh, who will feel contented with rice at Tk 16 per kg.
What about BNP and Jamaat and other parties? Don’t worry! BNP took the level and magnitude of financial corruption to a new incomprehensible height in Bangladesh led by Tareq Zia and his associates. BNP sucks out money and ensures murder of the nation by politicization of government machineries; and AL kills people and ensures molestation of the nation by politicization of the entire government and non-government machineries. Most of the politicians of the country are self-seeking animals; they give a damn to what happens to the nation and the people who elect them. No party is patriotic in Bangladesh. Only the degree of betrayal with the nation varies from party to party. More so, the nation will not be surprised if BNP and AL strike a compromise keeping Peelkhana issue in one side and the other issues against BNP and its allies, including the house at Moinul road, on the other. God only knows when Bangladesh would have a truly patriotic political party, where the percentage of betrayal would be almost zero. We are, some time, forced to think that AL and BNP have an underhand liaison to destroy the entire nation and make their fortune.
Please note that AL will want another internal clash in the army that would separate the officers and troops. India, along with US, would eagerly await an opportunity to enter militarily into Bangladesh for a brief period in the guise of Multi-national Force. Surely enough, bewildered Bangladeshis will observe with horror the emergence of AL as another Rajakar force in that situation.
And finally, CAS Moeen might be rewarded with the ambassadorship to USA or UN. If so, he will become the most corrupted Bangladeshi culprit-cum-criminal ever to represent our beloved land on foreign soil.
So, justice remains at the discretion of the people of Bangladesh, and of course, the ultimate justice is surely with the Omnipotent Creator. Shall we never be lucky enough to see justice on our piece of beautiful land?
What we shall do? How long we shall have to keep saying, “Bangladeshey jonmoi amar ajonmo paap!”?
Thank you very much for your time.
Research Team. 1st June 2009.
Is there any courageous patriotic media-person who could translate this article into Bangla and publish it in any newspaper with a disclaimer saying, “The opinions and information expressed in this article are not of the editor or any other correspondent of this paper”…
[i] As the GOC 24 Infantry Division, Moeen managed 75% of the expenditure of his daughter’s marriage from army fund! Each brigade and unit was tasked to provide goats, cows, chicken, rice, and decoration from private funds. East Bengal Regimental Centre was tasked to organize the marriage ceremony. And this man gives speeches about anti-corruption and dishonesty! [ii] Lately DGFI has circulated anonymous letter to many army officers defaming Brigadier General Nasir. Probably he will be ruthlessly sorted out by the present government. [iii] Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) is the prime Indian intelligence agency working abroad. Other agencies operating inside Bangladesh are Intelligence Bureau (IB, which trains and harbors terrorists), Special Security Bureau (SSB, which operates on behalf of RAW), Special Frontier Force (SFF, which carries out special subversive missions) etc. One of the meeting places for RAW operatives in Bangladesh is the Indian Cultural Centre at Mohammadpur, Dhaka. [iv] Creation of 1/11 was a RAW job in connivance with USA and Israel. It needs broad elaboration, which we hope to circulate later. However, the truly learned persons know for sure that 1/11 was indeed an Indo-US-Jew creation. [v] General Moeen, in collaboration with Major General ATM Amin ex DG DGFI, orchestrated an election in 2008 to bring AL in power. Ballot boxes filled in with pre-sealed AL ballots were handed over by DGFI in some crucial seats of the country. That’s why ATM Amin was pardoned from the inquiry against him as he had 2 Sub-machine Guns in his jeep when he attended the BDR Parade reviewed by PM. The nation also knows about the pre-casting of 30% votes in collaboration with the polling officers in many centers all over the country. [vi] You need not to “swear in” to become a RAW agent. By actions you would be unknowingly working for RAW. That’s the beauty of RAW strategy. [vii] First published in Amader Shomoy, a daily financed and partly sponsored by DGFI.
On the eighth anniversary of 9/11, it's time to finally confront al Qaeda's scary move toward modernization -- and the charismatic sheikh who is leading the way.
BY JARRET BRACHMAN |
SEPTEMBER 10, 2009
Eight years after the September 11 attacks -- years that have seen many precious lives lost and an overwhelming expenditure of effort and money -- the battle against al Qaeda still continues, and it is still not clear whether America is winning or not. As I give talks on this topic to everyone from undergraduate students to counterterrorism practitioners to community groups, I am invariably asked whether there is a winner in the war on terrorism. Questioners are almost always dissatisfied with my answer: "It depends."
But this is the only answer I can give, because the terms of the question are out of date. If you're asking whether the United States has defeated al Qaeda, you also have to ask: Which al Qaeda are we talking about? The senior leaders operating somewhere in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan? The al Qaeda franchises around the world, most notably in Iraq, Algeria, and Yemen? Or the global ideological following, sparked by al Qaeda, calling itself al Qaeda, but not technically affiliated with al Qaeda? If you ask about winning, you have to also ask whether winning means killing the organization or just handicapping it. Does it refer to destroying al Qaeda's military capabilities, or to mitigating al Qaeda's ability to win hearts and minds around the world?
As these questions suggest, over the last eight years al Qaeda has undergone a metamorphosis. It has transformed from a global terrorist group into a global terrorist movement, one with its own founding fathers, well-codified doctrine, substantial and accessible corpus of literature, and deep bench of young, bright, and ambitious commanders. Attacks still matter to them, but in an era of increased counterterrorism pressure, al Qaeda is beginning to realize that it is a lot more effective at being a movement, an ideology, even a worldview. It is starting to see that terrorism is only one of many tools in its arsenal and that changing minds matters more than changing policies.
In other words, the al Qaeda that we are fighting in 2009 is not the same al Qaeda that we went to war with in 2001. Unfortunately, however, our own mindset has remained mostly unchanged.
Much of al Qaeda's evolution over the last eight years is embodied in one man, Sheikh Abu Yahya al-Libi, director of al Qaeda's jurisprudence committee and a likely successor to Osama bin Laden. Young, media-savvy, ideologically extreme, and masterful at justifying savage acts of terrorism with esoteric religious arguments, Abu Yahya offers the global al Qaeda movement everything that its old guard cannot.
Details about Abu Yahya's life are sparse, but a basic timeline can be pieced together from al Qaeda's published interviews with him as well as the published insights offered by his current and former colleagues. Growing up in Libya, Abu Yahya (whose real name is Muhammad Hasan Qaid but who is also known as Yunus al-Sahrawi) was a bright and affable young man. For at least a period of time, he attended SebhaUniversity in Libya, majoring in chemistry. At some point during the late 1980s or in 1990, Abu Yahya left his home country and traveled to Afghanistan, where he settled in Logar province. During that time, he joined the nascent Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG),a faction of Libyans who had fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan and were hellbent on violently overthrowing Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi. Abu Yahya'solder brother was a senior LIFG leader.
Abu Yahya must have shown promise because, around March 1992, LIFG's leadership dispatched him to Mauritania, where he was instructed to pursue advanced religious studies under some of the country's most prominent clerics. After several years of intensive religious study, Abu Yahya returned to Afghanistan, likely around mid-1996, where he saw combat near the eastern city of Jalalabad and became a well-known religious voice within the LIFG organization. At some point between 2001 and 2002, he took up a position in Karachi, Pakistan, as a webmaster for the Taliban's Al-Imarah al-Islamiyah Web site, a job that offered him important insights into the power of new media for reaching out to young people.
He was arrested by Pakistani intelligence on May 28, 2002, and was eventually transferred to Bagram prison in Afghanistan, where he passed time by intimately studying his American captors as they aimlessly surfed the Internet or complained to him about their dysfunctional childhoods. In a June 2006 interview with al Qaeda's media outlet, As-Sahab, he said that he found American soldiers to be "cowardly," "lost and alienated," and a "mix of doctrinal, behavioral, moral, and ideological deviation." He also used the time to learn the security protocols of the prison.
On July 10, 2005, Abu Yahya and three of his fellow detainees stuffed their beds with sheets and changed out of their bright orange prison outfits into less conspicuous blue prison garb that they had hidden in their cells. The group picked the lock of their cell door and then escaped, at one point walking through the Bagram base posing as U.S. soldiers carrying furniture. Shimmying under the perimeter's concertina-wire barrier, they then journeyed for days through the Afghan countryside until finally making contact with the Taliban.
Almost immediately, Abu Yahya hit the media circuit, using his dramatic escape as a means to gain fame and infamy. His releases have included countless feature-length videos, multiple extended monographs, numerous articles, and even a published photo shoot. In many ways, al Qaeda "rolled out" Abu Yahya as a marketing firm might do a new product. And he has been welcomed with open arms by the global terrorist movement.
Whether he's shown traipsing through valleys, target shooting with his buddies, reciting poetry on a mountaintop, or breaking bread with his students, Abu Yahya seems to have made al Qaeda "cool" for a younger generation. His formal religious training has allowed him to credibly and aggressively defend al Qaeda's attacks and assail his enemies in a way that bin Laden and his deputy, the former medical doctor Ayman al-Zawahiri, don't always have the theological background to do.
There is no doubt that when bin Laden and Zawahiri die or are captured, al Qaeda's global movement will look to Abu Yahya to seize the reins. He has become the obvious heir apparent. But with Abu Yahya at its helm, al Qaeda is certain to become a far more frightening enemy.
Al Qaeda's primarily Egyptian senior leadership founded and built the group on principles of elitism and secrecy. The leaders saw themselves as the vanguard, the tip of Islam's last and only spear. Their doctrine was restrictive and exclusionary. Their bureaucratic structure was stifling and micromanaging. They saw themselves as terrorists' terrorists, and acted the part.
A lifelong student with an easy smile and a gift for gab, Abu Yahya sees the world quite differently. For him, al Qaeda's fight is not just about unseating Arab governments or pushing U.S. troops out of the Middle East. In this paradigm, al Qaeda is first and foremost an intellectual and religio-ideological insurgency -- not just a terrorist group. Its goal is to capture the imagination of Muslims worldwide. Abu Yahya is not just trying to make Muslims love al Qaeda (like bin Laden tries to do) or make the "Zionist Crusaders" fear al Qaeda (like Zawahiri does). Abu Yahya's goal is nothing short of remaking Islam from the inside out, and he does so in a candid, compelling, and inherently populist fashion. In other words, what we know about how al Qaeda does business is about to completely change.
Despite the qualitatively different threat that Abu Yahya poses, however, he remains a virtual unknown outside a small circle of counterterrorism professionals in the United States. Of those who do know him, most view him as just another target. Abu Yahya's obscurity to senior policymakers -- and the similar obscurity of al Qaeda's other young guns who are modeling themselves after Abu Yahya -- is more than an oversight. It reflects a continued and pervasive ignorance across the U.S. government about the kind of war in which the United States is engaged. This is a fight in which ideas have become the new center of gravity.
If America is serious about defeating al Qaeda, U.S. government agencies will need to expand and prioritize the translation and study of strategic and ideological communiqués, which often hold the most insightful nuggets about al Qaeda's strengths and vulnerabilities. Government agencies have not been pushed to think "great thoughts," in large part because they lack the staffs and the budgets, and due to the operational necessities of their missions. This is precisely why the Barack Obama administration would be well-advised to invest serious time and money into expanding current efforts. We must combat Abu Yahya's al Qaeda today before it takes us by surprise tomorrow.
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